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CONTENTS

PAGE

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

- Strategy Proposed in Book 'Euroshima' Analyzed, Criticized
(Jean Faverge; STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE, Nov 79)..... 1

NORWAY

- Norway's Defense Policy Worries Finns, Swedes
(Ole Kromann; INFORMATION, 10 Oct 79)..... 7
- Columnist Questions Norway's New Defense Orientation
(Ole Kromann; INFORMATION, 8 Oct 79)..... 11

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- EC Official's Visit to Finland Signals Increase in Nordic
Contacts
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 23 Nov 79)..... 14
- Finland's USSR Ties Affect Sweden's Security
(HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 15 Nov 79)..... 15

BELGIUM

- PCS Discusses Status of Brussels Within Federation
(Jacques van Hoorebeke; LE SOIR, 6 Nov 79)..... 20
- Martens Government Receives Vote of Confidence
(LE SOIR, 27 Oct 79)..... 23

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Egmont Committee Opposes State Reform (LE SOIR, 11/12 Nov 79).....	27
Egmont Committee Deems Federal State Necessary (LE SOIR, 27 Oct 79).....	28
CVP Launches Attack on Flemish Socialism (LE SOIR, 7/8 Oct 79).....	29
Amada-TPO Changes Name to PTB (LE SOIR, 27 Oct 79).....	31
Claes, de Wasseige Discuss Government Energy Policy (Willy Claes Interview; LE SOIR, 27 Oct 79).....	32
Strikes in Limbourg Mines Continue (Serge de Waersegger; LE SOIR, 14/15 Oct 79).....	40

CANADA

PQ Deputies, Officials React to By-election Defeats (LA PRESSE, 16 Nov 79).....	43
Deputies Blame Labor Leaders, by Lysiane Gagnon Militants Blame Party Leaders	
PQ Labor Union Policy Criticized (Marcel Adam; LA PRESSE, 16 Nov 79).....	48
PQ White Paper on Referendum Analyzed (Various sources, various dates).....	51
White Paper Seen Flawed by Overoptimism, by Michel Roy Terms Considered Dangerously Vague, by Lise Bissonnette Possible Federalist Positions on Referendum, by Marcel Pepin	

DENMARK

Conservative Congress Buoyed After Election Gains (Hans J. Poulsen; BERLINGSKE AFTEN, 9 Nov 79).....	58
---	----

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Center-Democrats Weigh Election Losses at Congress (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 11 Nov 79).....	61
Center-Democrats Reelect Party Chairman at Congress (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 12 Nov 79).....	63
Center-Democrats Elect New Deputy Chairman (INFORMATION, 17 Nov 79).....	66
Jørgensen Loses to Nielsen in SDP Deputy Chairman Vote (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 25 Nov 79).....	67
Defense Minister Issues Proposals To Cut Forces in Eighties Plan (Mogens Auning; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 24 Nov 79).....	69
Briefs Purged CP-Leader's New Organization	71

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Strauss Discusses Domestic, Foreign Affairs Issues in Address (Wolfgang Tersteegen; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 26 Nov 79).....	72
CSU-General Secretary Pledges Campaign Cooperation With CDU (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 14 Nov 79).....	75
Saarland FDP Backs Coalition With CDU Preparatory to April Vote (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 3 Dec 79).....	77
Schmidt Discusses Energy Policy With Labor, Business Chiefs (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 14 Nov 79).....	79
Maoists Running Self-Sufficient Model Farm in the North (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 3 Dec 79).....	82
Bundesbank Expresses Concern on Reserve Role of Mark (DIE SPIEGEL, 26 Nov 79).....	84
Briefs No Party Politics for Environmentalists More Vietnam Refugee Aid	86 86

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

FINLAND

Parliament Approves Nuclear Pact With Australia (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 17 Oct 79).....	87
Aircraft Industry Seeks Soviet Joint Projects To Survive (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 18 Oct 79).....	90
Soviet Nordic Trade Official Discusses Joint Projects (Matti Pensala; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 16 Oct 79).....	93
Briefs More Meat to USSR	96

FRANCE

Seguy Stresses CGT's Common Points With Communist Party (Georges Seguy; L'HUMANITE, 23 Oct 79).....	97
Health of Prime Minister Barre Cause for Concern (Michele Cotta; LE POINT, 22 Oct 79).....	103
Army Creates Rapid-Strike Foreign Intervention Forces (Jacques Isnard; LE MONDE, 9 Nov 79).....	105

PORTUGAL

Commentary Scores Eanes for Receiving PLO's Arafat (Peixe Dias; A TARDE, 3 Nov 79).....	108
--	-----

SWEDEN

Social Democrats Reconsidering Party Leadership After Elections (Axel Waldemarson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 2 Nov 79).....	110
Social Democrats Seeking New Strategies, Themes for 1980's (Editorial; DAGENS NYHETER, 7 Nov 79).....	114
Government Leaders Preparing New Moves To Strengthen Economy (Lars Ramklint, Bjorn Anders Olson; DAGENS NYHETER, 13 Nov 79).....	117

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Falldin Seeking To Hold Line on Taxes, Spending (Kas Eneberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 11 Nov 79).....	121
Soder To Resign Peace Research Institute Board Chairmanship (DAGENS NYHETER, 22 Nov 79).....	124
Navy Chief Says Budget Undermining Defense Capability (DAGENS NYHETER, 1 Nov 79).....	126
Volvo Contracts To Improve Bus Transit System in Lahore (DAGENS NYHETER, 27 Nov 79).....	127

SWITZERLAND

Socialists Consider Successor to Donze (Francoise Buffat; JOURNAL DE GENEVE, 13 Nov 79)....	129
--	-----

TURKEY

Army Keeps Steel Plant Running (THE HINDU, 26 Nov 79).....	132
---	-----

STRATEGY PROPOSED IN BOOK 'EUROSHIMA' ANALYZED, CRITICIZED

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Nov 79 pp 40-42

[Article by Jean Faverge: "Euroshima or the Great Strategic Shudder"]

[Text] In his book "Strategie France-Europe"---with a preface by General Andre Laurier, commandant of the Ecole Superieure de Guerre [War College]--Lieutenant Colonel Guy Doly described himself as one of the protagonists of the "new wave of French military thought for the 1980's." In this ostensibly theoretical treatise, Doly applied himself to demonstrating that the concept of national defense was inadequate in the present international environment with its mounting threats and technological advances in weaponry. He argued that the French nation's vulnerability was such that the time had come "for definitive strategic choices." What choices? In Doly's opinion, it is high time to resume the campaign for adoption of a total strategy whose nuclear, conventional, and psychological components would exceed the capabilities of a medium-sized power like France, insofar as those components can be determined at a time when the USSR and its alliens "have thrown off the mask of detente." Hence the remedy would be "security based on the European union, a new world power."

This profession of faith in an Atlantic Europe integrated at all levels, with a single statement and an elected president, a single budget, etc., necessarily had to lead to vilification of the principal of national independence and to casting opposition forces into the darkness of administrative and political interdiction, particularly all communist parties in Western countries and also other forces termed subversive. And because, in Guy Doly's view, any credible dimension of deterrence can only be European, France will definitely have to agree to the necessary surrender of some of its national sovereignty.

This is obviously no new proposition. It has been advanced since the days of the defunct EDC [European Defense Community]: Europe will be built by the sword or perish by the sword, including the most pressing and threatening sword of subversion already being brandished at our gates.

The complement to this proposition is the more recent book authored jointly by Guy Doly, Rene Cagnat, and Pascal Fontaine, a book with the metaphorical title of "Euroshima." Even though it adds no really new argument to the aforementioned "Strategic France-Europe," it is a more voluminous and more venturesome book: doesn't it envisage a military alliance between the European union, under the aegis of the United States, and China to crush the Soviet Union? Moreover, the title's significant parallel to everything the martyred city of Hiroshima conjures up in people's minds is enough to produce a great shudder. Especially in those persons who, in the name of national defense, independence, French security, and peace--ideas called inoperative, ineffective, and obsolete--continue to reject the major collective European, nuclear, conventional, ideological, and psychological battle.

The fact that everything is in danger of collapsing makes establishment of a European defense organization all the more urgent. With SALT II, the USSR is about to surpass the United States in strategic nuclear forces. And the prospect of SALT III is liable to transform the "grey area" of the European theater into a stake and hostage of the two superpowers. The rapid destabilization of the Third World continues unabated. The United States is at ebb tide while the Soviet Union is at high tide. The dilemma is distressing for Europe which could not survive the threats hanging over it, threats resulting not from the economic slump, unemployment, and unequal distribution of wealth but from the identified, designated, perceived, and deeply felt strategic enemy, namely the Soviet enemy and the totalitarian enemy.

The fact that some French military and political figures are insisting so strongly on formation of a European defense establishment would be somewhat surprising if we were to overlook a series of factors directly related to the short-term and medium-term target dates in the timetable of decisions to be made by the principal countries of the Atlantic coalition.

Foremost of all there is the U.S. Senate debate on ratification of the SALT II agreement, including the convulsions and vagaries of American domestic and foreign policy. The presidential campaign has practically started. The Congress will approve constant increases in the federal defense budget so as to tie Jimmy Carter's hands or those of his possible successor. Lastly, to complete the picture, there are the Pentagon's proposals for deployment of medium-range strategic nuclear forces (Perishing 2 missiles) in Europe.

First in order of priority is the next meeting of the Atlantic Council, in December 1979, which is expected to approve a large-scale modernization program covering all levels of the Alliance for the next 10 years. Within this same NATO context, the FRG's review of defense problems detailed in a white paper released in early September referred to "the major strategic turning point."

In France, the work of a committee of experts on the status of the strategic nuclear forces over the next 30 years and the parliamentary debate on ratification of the modified 1979-1982 military programming law fit into a similar pattern.

The agitation, speculations, calculations, geopolitical statements, and ulterior motives of all kinds of pressure groups thus have ample basic material with which to express themselves on a very broad scale from Washington to Paris via Bonn, Brussels, and Strasbourg, the epicenters of intensive public debate on strategic and military issues.

To tell the truth, the value of a book like "Euroshima" stems not so much from its actual content as from the fact that it fills a big gap and reveals --in timely fashion and with much ingenuity--what really lies behind these American and Atlantic decision-making target dates.

During the election campaign for the European Parliament, our advocates of supranationality and military integration carefully regulated the temptation to speak in federalist terms. They were forced to hold their tongue and ignore defense issues which are, in principle, outside the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Assembly.

But inasmuch as the profile of the new West European power has been drawn in high places and the big shift toward Atlantic integration is well underway, why go to all the trouble of trying to marshal support within the elected majority of the Strasbourg Assembly whose European views are quite dissimilar and contradictory except on one point, namely opposition to the French spirit of independence that must be destroyed without further delay by definitive and complete reintegration into NATO?

In trying to justify their great haste in campaigning for the integrated defense of Atlantic Europe, the authors of "Euroshima" argue with a great deal of candor: "It will be noted, under these conditions, how really crucial the present and medium-term periods are: Europe will have the most reasons to unite in order to fight, defend itself, and win when it becomes most threatened by total war. That time will come in the 1980's.

But catastrophism, alarmism, and great haste are not a sound basis even for dressing up a book like "Euroshima."

In "Euroshima," Guy Doly has recopied almost in full a chapter from his pseudotreatise on total and offensive strategy, a chapter on what he had called "the rules of strategy in the late 20th century." There is, therefore, nothing original in Doly's contribution to "Euroshima." It is a re-hash of his "Strategic France-Europe." It was probably meant to pad the new book which appeared likely to limit itself inadequately to the supranational views more sharply advanced by its three authors. In addition to the already well-known Guy Doly, one of the two other authors, Captain Rene Cagnat, describes himself as a specialist in Soviet affairs. He forgot to tell his

readers that he is also on the staff of the General National Defense Secretariat, an agency directly responsible to Prime Minister Raymond Barre. As for Pascal Fontaine, a specialist in problems related to expanding the EEC to include Mediterranean countries, he served for 4 years as assistant to Jean Monnet, "the father of Europe."

The important point about this conjunction of their combined fields of expertise in a hastily-written book designed to impress the general public is neither the official status of the authors--two military officers on active duty and one civilian highly involved in European options--nor their freedom of expression that cannot be questioned. To the extent that it transcends the national framework which they peremptorily consider obsolete, their argument fits into, precedes, and accompanies the general pattern of statements which have abundantly fueled the controversies that raged during September and October. As everyone knows, these controversies were prompted by proposals made by General Buiss and Alexandre Sanguinetti in their NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR articles--20 August and 10 September--in which they argued that French-German nuclear cooperation was necessary sooner or later, provided the FRG withdrew from NATO. Henry Kissinger came to the rescue with his statements on the reduced credibility of American nuclear deterrence in Europe, statements that dominated the October Brussels conference on NATO's next 30 years, a conference sponsored by Georgetown University and the Atlantic Institute. Oddly enough, "Military Balance 1978-1979," the annual assessment of the global military balance published on 5 September by the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London, had already been largely exploited in "Euroshima" long before its publication.

These disturbing coincidences are clearly indicative of a truly progressive escalation of psychological intoxication.

We must, therefore, frankly examine the real ratio of forces situation: Is there or is there not general strategic parity between the USSR and the USA? Must this question be considered on the basis of one single kind of weaponry, namely the operational European theater nuclear forces, i.e. the Soviet SS-20 missiles and the American Pershing 2 missiles? Are the distortions and imbalances a source of total war in Europe and solely in Europe? Has "World War III" already begun? Do the observed or assumed already completed technical and strategic upheavals necessitate thorough revisions of NATO military doctrines, of the orientation of French defense policy, East-West relations, and the international outlook centered on detente and its military extensions? Is world peace threatened to such a point that it is now most urgently necessary to establish the French-German nuclear partnership, to strengthen the military blocs to an unprecedented extent, to revive an unbridled arms race, to abandon all current or coming negotiations on disarmament, reduction of forces and military capabilities in Central Europe, and on European security among the 35 signatories of the Helsinki Agreement who are scheduled to meet again in 1980 in Madrid in an effort to reach new agreements?

All these questions require appropriate and serious scientific study far removed from the childish and deceptive influence of the fears about the year 2000, the proclaimed fateful date of a historical turning point, the destined end of human civilization, if not of the entire human race. These cyclic fears have appeared every 1,000 years since the Middle Ages and are part of a backward mythology in which deep-seated and primitive pessimism combines with stupid nonsense and the absence of any rational perspective.

In France, we are literally submerged by a massive stupefying and frustrating output of political fiction in which all spiritual and moral values are caught in the toils of a proliferation of threats whose inevitable outcome would be a European-scale and then global-scale nuclear holocaust.

"Euroshima's" basic premises do not differ much from these extreme scenarios that need to be subjected to critical discussion and thorough analysis. We shall mention but a few of these premises: The USSR and its allies could prepare a surprise attack in Europe within 48 hours; the SALT negotiations are a dangerous illusion; the American nuclear umbrella is full of holes; the validity of the French nuclear deterrent is questionable; and a new strategic phase has begun throughout the world, transforming Western Europe "into a small solitary and threatened island" (p 155).

Is there some justification for all these premises? Are they consistent with the facts and with the evolving international situation? Or aren't they put forth merely to find a pretext for a new European Defense Community? In the view of some (the authors of "Euroshima"), the European nuclear force would be composed of the French and British components and operate within the reinforced NATO framework. According to others (Buis and Sanguinetti), that force would be based on the Bonn-Paris nuclear partnership, but practically with the liquidation of NATO. In either case, all EEC countries would contribute to the force's common budget.

Such then is the grand design for the end of this century. "Euroshima's" authors couple this design with "the European ideology" which is the common source of a continent badly in need of an identity, an ideology which should be strengthened, and also with a pluralistic strategy of offensive action, with common action in foreign and domestic policy, and with voluntarism without which there would be constant fear of lapses and defections.

Nor should anyone think for one moment that under these conditions "the united Europe" would be exposed to all the winds of history. The cement which would give it substance would become diluted in the face of "the right to the democratic alternative after free and secret elections" (p 152).

And as "the European ideology" is hostile to all political and totalitarian systems, "the united Europe" invented by our three authors would hold in itself the seeds of its own dissociation. As a matter of fact, if perchance a European country were to have the sudden idea of choosing its own political system, one that could immediately be denounced as "totalitarian,"

the "iron law" would become operative, without further consideration, against the right of choice: that country would be excluded from the Community, without omitting quarantine and even war. Is our interpretation unreasonable? Does it distort the thinking of our authors by taking it out of context? Our reader can judge for themselves by carefully considering the following excerpt from pages 153-154 of "Euroshima": "The ultimate response, intervention, initially economic and perhaps eventually military, would mean that Europe had forged a bond between its members, a bond strong enough to have them view the prospect of recession by one of its parts as a threat to the security and smooth operation of the whole. The partners of the country in question would probably be compelled to find justification for their attitude by invoking the theory of 'shared sovereignty.' According to this theory, the interdependence and common interests of the Community's member countries are too numerous and too important for the secession of one of the partners not to be considered a hostile act. Attacked at its very foundation, the Community would defend itself. It would also intervene to lend assistance to those elements in the secessionist country who had remained true to democratic principles but had been unable to hold out against the subversion and factious activities of those who had seized power and received substantial support from a power not belonging to the Community."

We shall summarize the principal goals of this new structure whose construction will require so much boldness and imagination.

In its total and offensive strategy, the militarily "united Europe" will not rule out preventive war against the predesignated enemy: "On the strategic level there is only one way to win a war, the same way tomorrow as yesterday. It is by carrying the battle onto the enemy's soil as quickly as possible" (p 66).

In "defending its interests," this Europe will not rule out armed intervention in Third World countries. It will not rule out punitive war against any European country that chooses a political system other than the system of the other Community members. In a nutshell: war on all fronts to meet all the threats that have to be avoided.

A simpleton has now become the strategist and military thinker as we view the geopolitical horizon of the 21st century. His motivations boil down to something in which the values advanced under the misleading term "defense of the West" are not necessarily the values that are basic and specific to France, to its history, to the history of its armed forces and its people, to the desire for freedom and security which gives its vocation an original character. And if one has to be totally submissive to eventually give atomic weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany, a country that declares it does not want such weapons on any terms, then we can rightfully ask ourselves: where now are the "totalitarians"?

NORWAY'S DEFENSE POLICY WORRIES FINNS, SWEDES

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10 Oct 79 p 2

[Commentary by Ole Kromann, special correspondent of INFORMATION]

[Text] Finland is committed to preventing its territory from being used for attacks on the Soviet Union, but cannot do anything about the new rockets.

Oslo, 8 Oct--Leading Finnish politicians and officials are following the development of Norwegian defense policy with growing uneasiness and worry, and are afraid that Norwegian base policy may be gradually undermined.

The Norwegian paper AFTENPOSTEN's special correspondent Morten Fyhn came to that sensational conclusion after conversations he had with leading Finnish personalities in the wake of Prime Minister Odvar Nordli's official visit to Finland late in September.

That conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the statements made during Odvar Nordli's visit in Helsinki, from which it appeared that "for the time being there are no problems in the field of security policy that are of such nature that they can be regarded as a strain on relations between the two countries."

Here it is reported that the Finns are keeping informed of NATO's plans to station new and modern atomic weapons in Western Europe with increasing uneasiness about possible consequences for their own situation.

It is emphasized, to be sure, that the Finns are counting on Norway's not doing anything that can be interpreted as a change in the base policy and atomic policy. It is especially the plans to place heavy military in Norway in advance for the use of allied forces in a crisis or war situation that have evoked Finnish concern.

Soviet Doubts

It is feared that the Soviet Union "can find grounds for raising serious doubt as to whether the principles of Norwegian base policy are as firm today as in the past." The Finns know from experience that if the Russians think that stability in Scandinavia is about to be shaken, that may have

consequences for Finland's own relations with the Soviet Union, according to reports.

It is the Finns' view that Norway today, perhaps more than ever, holds the key to continued stability in Scandinavia. There is no attempt to conceal the fact that this question is being discussed with Sweden, which takes the same view of Norway's situation.

In his conversations the AFTENPOSTEN correspondent got the impression that the Finns think there is increasing danger that Norway will be drawn into NATO collaboration in a way that may be in conflict with the interests of the Scandinavian countries.

They think that Norway is beginning to adhere to the "hard line" in NATO with regard to the attitude toward the military threat from the Soviet Union, while the Finns do not believe there is cause for that fear. It is regarded as an expression of Norway's new line that for the first time Norway is taking an active part in discussions of NATO's placing new atomic weapons in central Europe.

Finland is afraid that this line will increase armaments and worsen Finland's security.

Rockets Worry Finland

It is the new rockets that have become a problem for Finland. In the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and aid with the Soviet Union, Finland is obligated to prevent Finnish territory from being used for attacks on the Soviet Union.

But Finland's armed forces cannot do anything about the new rockets, which can fly over Finland at an altitude of 100 to 200 meters on the way to targets in the Soviet Union. The Finns calculate that such rockets may take something like 20 minutes to cross central Finland.

The AFTENPOSTEN article does not mention any Finnish politician by name, but the correspondent "found clear indications that Finland will now place definite limits on its disarmament policy with a view to adapting to this new development."

In an earlier article AFTENPOSTEN printed a statement by Mauno Koivisto, Finnish prime minister:

"It should be that in Scandinavia nobody does anything that may create problems for others. In Finland we always have the other Scandinavian countries' interests in mind."

Koivisto says that the international situation has deteriorated and that this also has effects in Scandinavia. The prime minister has the feeling today that relations between Norway and Finland are better against the background of earlier problems, but he emphasizes that "the contact with Sweden is much better still."

Koivisto says that Finland has good relations with the Soviet Union today, and that the arms race is a burden to the Soviet Union, which for that reason is interested in détente. On the other hand, the Finnish prime minister has found less interest in détente in the Western World than formerly. (AFTENPOSTEN, 2 October.)

Compelled To Arm

The prime minister says that there are forces in the Western World that will force the Soviet Union to arm, so that the country must use a large part of the reserves left after maintaining the standard of living. "That seems a dangerous line of thought," he says.

Several indications can be found that the Swedes also share the Finnish concern about new tones in Norwegian defense policy.

The two experts at the Swedish Defense Research Institute (FOA), Gunnar Jervas, lecturer, and Ove Kallin, military aviator, recently wrote in the journal of the foreign policy institute, INTERNATIONELLE STUDIER, that in a crisis situation Sweden might stand out as an ideal springboard for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In Sweden there are 45 airports with permanent landing strips over 17,700 meters long, scattered all over the country.

In a statement to SYDSVENSKA DAGBLADET, 30 August 1979, Ove Kallin said that it must be made clear to both sides that if one tries, it will find support for the other. Then the attacker will lose the advantage he is looking for.

Both the Finns and the Swedes are watching for signs that NATO wants to step up its presence in Norwegian waters. Lt Gen Kjell Bjørge-Hansen, commander in chief for southern Norway, told AFTENPOSTEN, 28 September, that the supreme command of the Norwegian armed forces has been eager for the American "Strike Fleet Atlantic" to stay in northern waters as much as possible.

Air Combat Exercise on Election Day

It was this same Lt Gen Kjell Bjørge-Hansen that was responsible for a sharply criticized air combat exercise over Norwegian polling places from north to south on the very day of the parliamentary election in September 1977.

Parts of the Norwegian air force, as is well known, are under NATO command even in peacetime, and the commander in chief of the air forces of the northern command, with headquarters in Oslo, is always an American officer.

The lieutenant general would like to have an American aircraft carrier make frequent voyages in Norwegian waters, if it is not possible to station one there permanently.

Incidentally, in his opinion it is not necessary to involve American or Norwegian politicians if the Atlantic command SACLANT should desire to send vessels into Norwegian waters, as long as the limits are observed that the Norwegian political authorities have set for maneuvers in the direction of the Soviet area. In voyages in international waters the navy does not need to heed Norwegian decisions, says the commander in chief for southern Norway, who, however, is an air officer.

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CSO: 3106

COLUMNIST QUESTIONS NORWAY'S NEW DEFENSE ORIENTATION

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 8 Oct 79 p 2

[Commentary by Ole Kromann]

[Text] Oslo, October--For the first time in NATO history, Norway and Denmark, together with others of the smaller member countries, will take part in the formulation of the alliance's atomic weapons program. Even though Norwegian and Danish atomic weapons policy and base policy forbid stationing atomic weapons [on their territory] in peacetime, NATO wants the two countries to be present to take the moral and economic responsibility for new mobile medium-range atomic rockets as a response to the Soviet SS-20 rockets.

Not since the raging debate nearly 20 years ago about atomic weapons bases have Norway and Denmark been faced with such an important decision, but it is characteristic that the debate today is almost totally without popular participation. The decision is to be reached not later than the meeting of the NATO council of ministers at Brussels in December.

With few exceptions the Norwegian mass media have refrained from informing the public about the problem, and there have been only slight efforts to get a debate going among military experts and informed politicians. In the coming week Foreign Minister Knut Frydenland will report to the Storting for the first time on the government's position in regard to the new NATO atomic weapon program.

Representatives of the Norwegian ministry of defense and supreme command of the armed forces have participated for a long time in the work on NATO's program of modernization of atomic weapons, and in reality the government has agreed to the mobile tactical atomic rockets which, in the critics' opinion, will increase the danger of local atomic warfare.

There may be a question of introducing nearly 600 of these atomic rockets into Europe at a total price of about 25 billion kroner. Advocates of these new type atomic weapons say that they are necessary as a response to the Soviet Union's deployment of the mobile and therefore less vulnerable SS-20 medium-range atomic rocket since 1977.

Nils Morten Udgaard, military editor and former Moscow correspondent of Norway's biggest paper, the conservative AFTENPOSTEN, insists that NATO must undertake this arming with tactical atomic weapons because the alliance is not on a par with the Warsaw Pact in this field, and that the French and British atomic weapons are "somewhat unmodern." (AFTENPOSTEN, 15 September and 20 September.)

In an answer on 25 September under the headline "No to NATO's Atomic Rockets," Rolf Thue, information chief for the Civil Defense Directorate, writes that he is not in agreement with that view:

"NATO has about 7,000 tactical atomic warheads of varying explosive force. They can be delivered with about 3,620 delivery vehicles of various kinds. To these may be added the French atomic weapons. This means that NATO today has at least 3,900 delivery vehicles that have adequate range to attack the Soviet Union with atomic warheads. There are warheads with up to a million tons' explosive effect; i.e., 70 to 80 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb. And that is not so bad, if you are enthusiastic about possibilities of attacking the Soviet Union," says Rolf Thue.

In Rolf Thue's opinion neither the Soviet Union nor NATO has plans to attack, but even if he believed that the Soviet Union would attack, it would not be necessary for NATO to procure new medium-range rockets, if one were sure that the United States would be willing to use its strategic atomic weapons in case of a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

For about 20 years hundreds of Soviet atomic rockets have been aimed at Western Europe without increasing the risk of "Finlandization" as the advocates of the new atomic weapons claim, Rolf Thue writes. The Soviet SS-20 rockets will not change that.

The new weapons will be stationed chiefly in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Although Norway and Denmark have said "no" to atomic weapons on the whole in peacetime, it is obvious that the two countries are now exposed to a political pressure to give at least moral support to the new atomic weapons program. Especially since Norway and Denmark's rejection of the neutron bomb, the proponents say that the Scandinavian NATO countries must support the common cause not only morally but also economically. Norway and Denmark must thus go along, through the NATO infrastructure program, with paying their part toward the new tactical atomic weapons system.

The state budgets contain no item designated "atomic weapons" to allot funds for "construction and installation" in connection with the atomic weapons system.

The serious thing about the present phase, until the decision is reached at Brussels in December, is that the United States is obviously placing less weight on arms control and increasing the military response, and that Norway especially has been chosen to play a leading part in this.

This is apparent especially from the chief objective of one of the biggest military exercises in NATO's 30-year history, "Ocean Safari," which was completed on 5 October and in which 17,000 men, 70 naval vessels, and 200 planes were engaged in coming to the aid of Norway--not in a war situation, but in a crisis situation.

Friday ended a big "convoy strike" along the coast of northern Norway with the participation of seven NATO countries: Norway, the United States, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Portugal.

At the same time, on a small scale, the exercise showed the Norwegian airports' capability for receiving American planes in an international crisis situation. Sixty of the 200 planes, principally American Phantom fighters, with over 300 men were stationed in Norway, and they will stay in the country for some time after the end of the exercise.

There are plans for Norway to receive a few hundred of the total of 500 American planes that in a crisis situation will be transferred to Western Europe. Most of these planes are designed for transporting atomic weapons.

Norway is not only to become NATO's bristling little hedgehog; preparations are in full swing to make it an aircraft carrier for the U.S. Air Force.

8815

CSO: 3106

EC OFFICIAL'S VISIT TO FINLAND SIGNALS INCREASE IN NORDIC CONTACTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Nov 79 p 13

[Text] The EC plans to strengthen its relations with the Nordic countries which stand outside the EC cooperation. This will take place at the same time as the association with the South European countries is increased-- first, with the membership of Greece as of 1981 and, later on, with the expected entry of Spain and Portugal as well.

For this reason, a member of the EC Commission will, next month, be visiting Finland for the first time. It will be Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp who, from 4 to 6 December, will be carrying on negotiations with the Finnish government. In addition to the prime minister and the foreign minister, the Finnish trade minister will be participating in the meetings with Wilhelm Haferkamp. Earlier in the year, EC Commissar Etienne Davignon paid a visit to Sweden, and the Nordic countries already have agreements with the EC in a number of areas. During his visit to Finland, Wilhelm Haferkamp will, moreover, be discussing the cooperation in the rest of the EFTA countries. Prior to his visit to Finland, Wilhelm Haferkamp will, on behalf of the EC Commission, go to Moscow for negotiations with the economic association of the East European countries, COMECON.

7262
CSO: 3106

FINLAND'S USSR TIES AFFECT SWEDEN'S SECURITY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 15 Nov 79 p 7

[Text] "Perhaps a 'big-brother mentality' inherited down through the centuries puts obstacles in the way of a more general Swedish recognition of the advantages that the reorientation of Finnish foreign policy after World War II has for Sweden, too. Instead, Swedish opinion and the Swedish mass media have all too often taken a one-sided view of the complications that were seen as characterizing Finland's behavior toward her great-power neighbor on the east."

This polite criticism of certain phenomena of Swedish foreign policy debate was offered by Katarina Brodin, Ph.D., when she gave her entrance address at the 183rd festival of the Royal Academy of Military Science 12 November.

Katarina Brodin, born in Finland, is the first woman to gain admission to the Swedish military science academy. Johan Tunberger writes in SVENSKA DAGBLADET, "I dare assert that she got in exclusively on grounds of merit. Probably she would have been a member several years earlier if she had not been a woman."

"Finland and Stability in the North" was the title of the address. Katarina Brodin reminded her hearers that it is now 40 years since the slogan "Finland's cause is ours" was coined in connection with the Winter War.

Lagercrantz's Slogan

She attributed the authorship of the slogan to the two Swedish writers Karl Gustaf Hildebrand and Olof Lagercrantz. On the instructions of the Finland Committee, after the outbreak of war they composed an appeal in which they Finland's defensive fighting was a thing that could not be viewed with indifference, since it was also Sweden's cause that the people of Finland were defending.

"The problems which in 1940 in Sweden occasioned domestic political tension and sometimes harsh attacks in the press against the government are partially recurring today," Katarina Brodin stated.

The Finnish reorientation after the war and the good neighbor relation to the east, which to both Paasikivi and Kekkonen have been a guiding principle of Finnish foreign policy, have freed the Swedish neutrality policy from the latent complications which the close Scandinavian cooperation during the latter half of the 1930's implied.

But later, too, the Swedes have emphasized that Finland's status as a free nation and as a member of the Scandinavian circle is a first-rank Swedish interest, that Finland's status as a free nation and a member of the Scandinavian circle must not be weakened.

Note Crisis

"This relationship is one of those things that are so obvious and fundamental that they are seldom spoken of in official declarations," said Katarina Brodin. "An exception is the government declaration issued on 14 March 1962, some months after Finland's so-called 'note crisis.'

"In a retrospective view, Undén, the then foreign minister, stated that in connection with the note crisis the Swedes had had an occasion to emphasize Sweden's 'legitimate interest' in the course of Finno-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union had also recognized that interest by, for example, specially informing Sweden of the proposals to Finland."

Anxiety in Scandinavia

The anxiety that the Soviet note evoked in Scandinavia was due, according to Undén, to apprehensions that Moscow would set the conditions itself for the Finnish neutrality policy under discussion. It did not happen that way. The Swedes had also been unable to believe, Undén said, that "Moscow would be unaware of the importance to stability in Scandinavia of preserving Finland's status in foreign policy and defense policy."

"Today the statement is relatively far back in time, but it should not have less validity than then on that account," said Brodin. It should be noted, however, that since the note crisis in 1961 Finno-Soviet relations have developed along quiet, undisturbed lines."

Hard To Sell in the West

"A cornerstone of the Finnish foreign policy doctrine has long been the concept that the Russian interest in Finland is dictated in all essentials by military strategic considerations and by concern about the security of the Russian state. By comparison, ideological considerations have played a minor rôle for the Soviet Union. This conviction has been hard to sell in many quarters in the west.

Finnish foreign policy as it was shaped under Paasikivi and Kekkonen consistently sought to get rid of all expressions of cheap heroism and crusading. As early as the fall of 1940 Paasikivi noted in a telegram from his post in Moscow that the Finnish people should be able to get along

without "beating too much on the big drum," which he thought was dangerous from the foreign policy standpoint. A new Runeberg, Paasikivi added, could bide his time!

Pragmatic Line

Essentially the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line is a pragmatic, unsentimental line based on the realities, such as historical experience and Finland's exposed geographical position.

This also means that the feeling for Finland among a number of Swedes that--in Krister Wahlbäck's words--is supported by "a Greater Sweden line of feeling that runs from the hills of Lützen, the heath of Narva, and Ensign Stål down to this century's War of Liberation and Winter War," lost one of its chief bastions in the postwar period.

The pictures that today's reality offers are different from yesterday's. They are at the same time both more many-sided and less emotionally satisfying than those which for many sustained the feeling for Finland in 1939. Herein lies both a complication and a challenge, said Brodin.

Kekkonen and Scandinavia

"In his Vasa speech 2 years ago Kekkonen emphasized that all through the years he has regarded it as necessary for the Finns to show an active interest in conditions in Scandinavia. Everything should therefore be done to prevent the occurrence of serious and complex conflicts in northern Europe."

An open conflict would open a chasm between the Scandinavian countries. But even at lower levels of conflict difficulties could arise. Increased tension in Scandinavia, according to Kekkonen, could thus "destroy much of what Finland has achieved since World War II."

Atom-Free Zone

The initiatives that have been taken by the Finns--first of all the proposal to set up an atom-free zone in Scandinavia--first presented in 1963--but also the idea in 1965 of an arrangement intended to secure peace at the Norwegian-Finnish boundary in the north--should be viewed in that perspective.

The Finnish proposals may be said to constitute a part of a policy aimed at creating a tenable basis for Finnish security policy even in a future war situation and as far as possible keeping the Scandinavian area outside of international fields of tension.

The objections that these proposals have encountered, especially in Denmark and Norway, go back in practice to differences in views of the way in which the common aim of all the Scandinavian countries--namely, maintenance of peace and security in Scandinavia--can best be achieved.

At the same time, of course, the oppositions reflect the differences in judgments and perspectives that follow from and to a large extent are also dictated by the Scandinavian countries' choices of rôles in security policy.

New Challenges

President Kekkonen's speech at the Foreign Policy Institute in Stockholm on 8 May 1978 can, if one wishes, be regarded as an indication of a Finnish anxiety about the future, conditioned among other things by the prospects that the development of weapons technology and the continuing arms build-up can conceivably face Scandinavia with.

It is important to all the Scandinavian countries for Finno-Soviet relations to be allowed to continue to develop without disturbances. The Finns have accordingly emphasized the importance of the other Scandinavian countries' not taking any measures that may have a negative effect on stability in our part of the world.

Maintain Tranquillity

The Swedish neutrality policy supported by strong armed forces, like the special forms of Denmark's and Norway's NATO membership--i.e., the restrictions contained in the so-called base policy and nuclear weapons policy--have been mentioned in this connection as especially important from the Finnish standpoint.

To this may be added that it is not only in the Finnish interest but also in the common Scandinavian interest to prevent a development that might lead to increased tension and more direct great-power confrontations in our vicinity. Maintaining tranquillity in the Scandinavian area has in fact been said to be a principal mission of Swedish foreign policy. The strength and the missions of the Swedish armed forces are to be evaluated in that light.

"Official Statements"

A noticeable weakening of the strength of the Swedish armed forces in comparison to the world around us might have a destabilizing effect and perhaps even in peacetime lead to measures on the part of the great powers that could render more difficult the effort to stand watch over the status quo in Scandinavia.

Katarina Brodin pointed out that in debates on Swedish defense it has been mentioned that the reasoning is hypothetical and is based on no evidence other than official statements from the Scandinavian countries.

"In refutation it can be said that this evidence is not the worst. We for our part hardly have reason to doubt the seriousness of official statements that are made in our Scandinavian neighbor countries."

Sweden's Responsibility

"Foreign opinions of the credibility of the Swedish policy of neutrality and of the strength of the Swedish armed forces are--regardless of whether we ourselves accept the realism of them or not--an undeniable part of political reality.

"In a time of increased armaments around us and of rapid, complex changes in the field of weapons technology, it stands out as especially important for these opinions not to change in a direction that is disadvantageous to us. This is not an insignificant part of Sweden's responsibility for peace and stability in northern Europe. It is also a perspective in which the old slogan 'Finland's cause is ours' can be justified anew," Dr Brodin said.

8815

CSO: 3109

PCS DISCUSSES STATUS OF BRUSSELS WITHIN FEDERATION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 6 Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Jacques van Hoorebeke: "Thys Says: Without Regionalization, Brussels Will React as French-Speaking Entity"]

[Text] The idea of Mr Francois Martou, president of the Christian Worker Movement of Brussels, to turn the Brussels region toward Wallonia, in case of a two-part federalism, seems to be making headway. Before him, Mr Jean-Louis Thys (PSC [Christian Social Party], Christian Democratic Group), the deputy mayor of Jette, had expressed some ideas which ran along the same lines on the occasion of an interview published in LA CITE. We asked him to spell out his options on this matter in some more detail. Like Mr Martou, he first of all stressed the fact that this is an alternate proposal in case the Flemish majority should reject the concept of "Brussels, a region all by itself."

Mr Thys above all came out against recent proposals from Mr Tindemans who wants to conclude an agreement behind the backs of the people of Brussels, addressing himself only to the Walloons. "In so doing," he told us, is Mr Tindemans time to create, in the center of the country, a situation similar to the one we have been having for several months in Fourons? Because, in the final analysis, the charter for Fourons is typical in this regard; it was negotiated by the two major communities without considering the opinion of the principal parties involved, the people of Fourons themselves who, for the most part, always wanted to remain in the Province of Liege."

Brussels Sensitivity

For the deputy mayor of Jette, things are developing rapidly in Brussels. "When specific and pacifying solutions were proposed for the country's central region in recent years," he told us, "they were approved and defended by a very broad majority of the Burssese. That was true of the Egmont pact and also the Martens-VDB [Flemish Democratic League] agreement."

"Another characteristic fact," he continued, "is this: If the Flemish side hints that the agreements will not be complied with, then the Brussels will automatically react as if they were part of a French-speaking entity. Whereas Brussels may be understanding and peaceful when reasonable solutions are proposed, it may react with exacerbation when it feels that a maneuver is being mounted against it. This is particularly what Brussels resents as it realizes the Mr Tindemans, CVP [Social Christian Party] chairman, seeks to diminish the authority which the Brussels executive branch should have. If these arrangements are to be challenged tomorrow for any reason whatever, one should permit all of us to do the same thing. We Brussels should be able to make our own choice."

To impose his will, Mr Leo Tindemans is calling upon the democratic majority he has in Flanders. Why does he not also admit right now that one million Brussels can decide their own fate? And by virtue of what principles does he refuse to take their sensitivity into account?

Community of Destiny

"And if the Flemish should reject the Martens-VDB agreement, would you then be in favor of a merger of the Brussels region with Wallonia?"

"Yes, up to a certain point. I am particularly in favor of a merger of the community and regional executive branches. This however must not prevent the Brussels region from being able to retain the broadest autonomy for itself. And claiming, as does Mr Francois Martou, that Brussels is a Walloon city is in my opinion a futuristic, exaggerated, and unrealistic view. Although it is true that the vast majority of the Brussels belong to a French-culture community, it is no less true that they present a specific nature of their own in their community of destiny."

On the Dutch-speaking side, the approach is different: The Flemish of Brussels are Flemish before they are Brussels. Right or wrong, they have been pushing mostly for a merger of regional and community authorities. That has the effect that they finally wind up in the minority in their own Flemish community as compared to the people of Antwerp, Ghent, and Ostende.

A State Governed by Flanders

"Are negotiations contain the representatives of the two communities difficult on the community level?"

"As mayor of a community of more than 40,000 people (Jette), with 25 percent Flemish, I believe that coexistence, within the specific nature of each of the communities, is possible and is even viscerally desired. There is undeniably a desire to respect the other fellow. By way of a solution, it has been proposed to guarantee a minimum of 20 percent of the budget for issues concerning the Flemish community, according to the opinion of

the 'Sociaal kulturele raad' [Social-Cultural Council]. This budget would be managed by a Dutch-speaking municipal magistrate and it is of course understood that the reciprocal arrangement would be applied in the six communities for facilities in favor of the French-speaking citizens. Unfortunately we find that some people of the Flemish side increasingly tend to make the future regions of Brussels a target for all the barbs and criticisms which in the past were aimed at the central government."

Now, these criticisms are essentially criticisms due to a central government that today is dominated by the Flemish Community. Mr Tindemans in fact proposed to have the Brussels region pay for the hegemony of his own community within the central government. If the Flemish community tomorrow were to reject once again the agreements that were concluded, it is clear that the Brussels community would deliberately turn toward its own community with its French-speaking destiny. In that case, it is also clear that the Brusselese would no longer have any interest in having their city play the role of capital. They would then resolutely set themselves up not as a Walloon city but side by side with the other Walloon cities, as a big French-speaking city, having its own regional council and its own executive branch. If the politicians in the northern part of the country do not understand that, then there could be a big, bad smashup, Mr Thys concluded.

5058

CSO: 3100

MARTENS GOVERNMENT RECEIVES VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 27 Oct 79 p 2

[Article by J.v.S., P.B.: "Confidence Vote Wanted by Mr Wilfried Martens Comes Off Quietly in Senate"]

[Text] As expected, the cabinet of Mr Martens won the vote of confidence in the Senate which, without reservation, was supported by all majority delegations. According to the opinion of all observers, the atmosphere generally remained much calmer than in the Chamber. However, on more than one occasion, certain provocations by "Volksunie" caused some very strong reactions. Thus, a senator from the Walloon Rally refused to go to the rostrum after the spokesman of the Flemish Federalists Party. The French-speaking socialists were called "neofascists" and even left the semicircle as a sign of protest. But passions had subsided by the time the prime minister made his response and everybody listened to his remarks in an atmosphere of serenity regained.

As in the Chamber, the debate devoted by the senators to the examination of the administration statement issued last week by Mr Wilfried Martens revolved around two main points. On the one hand, the community matter and, more specifically, the importance of government reform and the situation in the communities along the language frontier; on the other hand, measures of a social and budget nature with the accent essentially on social security reform.

On the community matter, the offensive was conducted almost exclusively by Flemish elected representatives. Mr Michel Capoen (VU [People's Union], Ypres) thus talked about the "terror" which, according to him, the French-speaking group create at Comines.

Mr Ferdinand De Bondt (Independent, St Nicholas-Wass), in connection with Comines, began to deplore the fact that the first implementation of the language laws to the benefit of the Flemish produced opposition from the

French-speaking people. Concerning the institutional reform, the former secretary of state came out with all of the bad things he had been thinking about the second phase. The final reform entails the risk of being outdated or becoming irrelevant so that parliament would in effect be renouncing its role as a constituent body.

Mr Germain De Rouck (VU, Audenarde) came out against the fact that the measures taken by the administration to save jobs essentially benefit the big economic units, that is to say, Wallonia, rather than the small and medium enterprises, meaning of course Flanders.

We might also look at the remarks made by Mr Albert Daulne (PS [Socialist Party], Eupen). The only German-speaking senator expressed regret that the bills pertaining to the government reform do not at any time mention the German-speaking community.

Provocations From Volksunie

For Mr Wim Jorissen (VU, Malines), the French-speaking people are much less worried about their real autonomy than they are about "profiting from a phony consumer-oriented federalism," while the system of community and regional allocations enables one of these two peoples to live beyond their means and at the expense of the other people. The speaker then with passion defended the "constitutional right" of the Flemish group to demonstrate when they desire to do so in Fourons. The session then became rather lively when the Volksunie spokesman thundering from high on the rostrum to make himself heard among the general brouhaha, charged the socialist representatives and the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] with "complicity with the neo-Rexists of Action Fouronnaise," after demanding the recall of the mayor of Fourons and the assistant district commissioner of Tongres. In an effort to protest against the suggestions coming from Mr Jorissen, the next speaker, Mr Yves de Wassege (RW [Walloon Rally], Namur), refused to take the floor.

There was also an incident on the side of the French-speaking socialists who, as a sign of protest against the charges from the representatives of Volksunie, left the amphitheater.

Social Security and the Middle Class

Several speakers brought up social security reform, generally without much enthusiasm, such as Mrs Irene Petry (PS, Liege) and Mrs Lucienne Herman-Michielsen (PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress], Gand). In the opinion of Mr Pierre Mainil (PSC [Social Christian Party], Soignies), the administration is not sufficiently attentive to the specific problems of the independents.

Mr Albert Delperee (FDF, Brussels), former secretary general of the social welfare department, came out with some watered-down proposals against the administration's proposals in the matter of social security. The revenues

anticipated are good but insufficient, both in terms of restoring public finances in general and the situation of the social sector, in particular. According to the speaker, the government nevertheless has taken an important step on the right track. Thus, the effort undertaken should be developed in depth in 1980.

Mr Roland Gillet (FDF, Brussels) complained about the negligence manifested by the administration toward the middle class. Besides, he was afraid that putting the unemployed to work on public works projects would in the end only lead to an increase in social expenditures taken care of by the state. He finally emphasized the importance of the role which the small and medium enterprises can play in economic revival.

We might also look at the remarks made by Mr Michel Toussaint (PRL [Party of Liberty and Reform], Namur) who deplored the fact that the majority systematically refuses to respond to the suggestions from the opposition. On the other hand, in the opinion of the former minister, the government agencies continue to intervene in the wrong way and that does not create any greater effectiveness in the fight against the effects of the crisis. Mr Toussaint then denounced the contradictions between the majority parties before concluding with a quotation from Talleyrand: "A ministry that has to be propped up is a ministry that will fall."

Other Issues Lumped Together

Other remarks were then heard in a group.

For Mrs Mathieu-Mohin (FDF), the refusal to establish a Flemish school at Comines was presently legal. But the administration followed the line of argument advocated by Mr Verroken and Tindemans and decided to amend the decree, reducing the distance to the nearest Flemish school from 4 km to 2 km. If this is what is supposed to happen at Comines, then it would be good for the rule also to be applied to all of the communities along the language border.

Mr Vandeput (PSC) worried about the "dramatic" consequences of the regionalization of the Community Fund which the Brussels communities are putting together and expressed a desire for the creation of general infrastructure plans for the big metropolitan areas.

Mr Jean Humblet (RW, Nivelles) once again brought up the case of Comines, declaring that "the entire population of the town refuses to adjust to the language legislation which is at its expense." Like Mrs Mathieu-Mohin, he reiterated that, if one touches the linguistic system in that locality, one must also revise the system in the other communities, such as Espierres, Helchin, Neuve-Eglise, Werwicq, and Rekkem.

In a very lengthy response which, essentially, summarized the broad outlines of the presentation he had made to the Chamber on Tuesday, the prime minister tried to respond to all of the speakers who made statements during the debate.

On the language issue, Mr Martens recalled the legal motivations behind the administration's decision concerning the opening of a Flemish school at Comines. He then disassociated himself from a viewpoint advocated by the FDF according to which the rule should also be applied in the other communities along the language border and particularly along the outskirts of Brussels.

On the institutional issue, Mr Martens reiterated that the second phase of the government reform would not be sacrificed since the administration has made it a point to honor "correctly, loyally, and completely" to implement the government accord without infringing upon the prerogatives of parliament which will have the last word. It is parliament, he added, which will be called upon to study the institutional proposals and to find out whether they are in conformity with the spirit of the country's constitution. The prime minister also said that there will be a move in the direction toward transferring powers toward the regions and communities, something which is exactly in line with what all of the federalists are demanding.

On the economic and financial level, the prime minister confirmed his earlier proposals, noting in passing that the fiscal measures envisaged are moderate and that there are even tax reductions through indexing of scales for certain categories. He mentioned the negotiation of new agreements with the oil companies and the conversations conducted with Saudi Arabia and Algeria. Concerning energy, he noted that a major debate will take place in parliament before next spring.

In conclusion, Mr Martens mentioned the situation in Foudrons which he termed "tight and dangerous." He then expressed the administration's desire resolutely to tackle all problems which exist today: "We want to continue to work," he said in his peroration, "and this is why we appeal to the majority." (Very lengthy applause from all majority benches).

The confidence motion was then put to a vote and was passed by 106 in favor and 30 against from the opposition plus six abstentions (one by Mr De Bondt, Flemish independent, and five by pairing). The session was adjourned after 2030.

5058

CSO: 3100

EGMONT COMMITTEE OPPOSES STATE REFORM

Brussels LE SOIR in French 11/12 Nov 79 p 2

[Text] The "Egmont Committee--which consists of the Flemish pressure groups that conducted a violent campaign against the community agreements concluded under the preceding administration--is not laying down its arms. Its chairman, Mr Clem De Ridder (Davidsjonds), announced that demonstrations would be organized if the debate in the senate on the second phase of the government reform should take "a bad turn." As a matter of fact, for the "anti-Egmont" people, the bills submitted by the administration are no more acceptable than those that were submitted earlier.

"A totally inapplicable bill," "a monument to ambiguity"--such are the terms used by Mr De Ridder and his friends in rejecting government proposals on the community issue. They are thus mainly zeroing in on the system of allocations, the provisions pertaining to Brussels, the mechanisms for settling conflicts, and the possibly irreversible character of the transition phase.

Under these conditions, the committee feels, the statements made by Mr Martens to the senate committee on institutional reforms are only intended to lay down a "smokescreen" in order to make the opposition believe that the irreversible is only provisional.

The proposals for an immediate constitutional amendment would finalize the ultimate reform of Belgium on the basis of three regions with equal rights. In this way, the Flemish are urged to drop one of their fundamental demands, that is to say, absolute parity in the exercise of power in Brussels.

The "anti-Egmont" people are also coming out against the continuation of the system of allocations, the insufficiency of guarantees given to the Flemish of Brussels, and the possibility for the Walloons and the Brussel-ese to interfere in the internal affairs of the Flemish community.

Moreover, Mr De Ridder and Mr Daels and associates feel that the authority of the regions is too vast as regards Brussels and too small for Flanders and Wallonia. And it is regrettable that education and health were not placed among personalizable issues.

Finally, it was decided that a "Flemish fighting day" would be held on 15 December at the Royal Club in Brussels.

EGMONT COMMITTEE DEEMS FEDERAL STATE NECESSARY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 27 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] In a communique, the "Egmontkomite" "issued an appeal to all Flemish and Walloon members of parliament on the occasion of the start of discussions on the bills pertaining to government reform."

The committee "feels that the Belgian state has no chance of surviving, on the eve of the celebration of its 150th anniversary, except if it becomes a federal state with two nations: the Flemish people and the Walloon people."

This state must "rest on simple foundations: Autonomy for the two peoples, integrity of their territory, complete parity in the joint capital, Brussels, separate financial responsibility for the two parties of the state."

The communique adds that "Belgium's survival depends to a great extent on the speed with which the French-speaking members of parliament realize that this is the only chance the country has."

"And we clearly assert that we do not want Belgium to come to an end; but we are not ready to maintain it at any price. Government reform need not necessarily be undertaken all at once but partial reforms, in conflict with this one and only possible and final solution, must be rejected. The second phase proposed, in its current form, is irreconcilable with a definitive and sound reform."

The committee announced that "it will keep the Flemish people involved on the development of debates in the senate committee and that it has taken steps toward the actions necessary to that end."

This is obviously a communique that is in line with a certain Flemish action at this moment.

5058

CSO: 3100

CVP LAUNCHES ATTACK ON FLEMISH SOCIALISM

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7/8 Oct 79 p 2

/Text/ After Andre Cools' PS /Socialist Party/ and Antoinette Spaak's FDF /Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers/, it is now the turn of Karel Van Miert's BSP /Belgian Socialist Party/ to be the target of ZEG, the bi-monthly published by the CVP /Social Christian Party/. The Social Christian editorial writer questions the new BSP leadership's determination to inaugurate an "open socialism" cleared of its "outmoded image as a workingmen's, anticlerical party."

"Tolerance is becoming a magic word," ZEG goes on, "but that slogan masks a vast vacuum with regard to program, because in fact that tolerance leaves a bitter aftertaste."

The newspaper blames Chairman Van Miert for opposing the appointment of a Social Christian to National Education and for fighting the construction of a Catholic hospital in Dilbeek. Therefore: "The BSP has learned nothing as far as pluralism is concerned: it's old wine in new bottles."

The CVP editorial then strives to demonstrate that socialists are proving intolerant in economic matters: Willy Claes may widely proclaim the part played by marketing and business, but in practice the issues are only IBRAMCO /expansion unknown/ and structural reforms."

Finally ZEG questions the "new Flemish nature" of the BSP, contending the Flemish socialists have not sincerely renounced the Egmont agreement. ZEG blames the Flemish socialist members of the ministerial cabinets for submitting to their PS "godfathers." Lastly, it condemns MORGEN for having shown a certain scepticism regarding research done by KUL /Louvain Catholic University/ economists. Such attitudes, ZEG maintains, may be explained by the BSP's fear of finding itself alone and facing the powerful CVP in an autonomous Flanders.

The Social-Christian editorial writer notes that: "The brand new BSP image is no more than an appearance in many respects, since besides its big moralizing statements (on Eurosystem and Zaire) every day in the MORGEN, it has been conducting a campaign of belittlement made up of personal insinuations, mainly against the CVP and its representatives. Any information concerning our party

is steeped in an atmosphere of underhanded insinuations which are in sharp contrast with the BSP chairman's magnanimous style."

Thus, ZEG concludes with the following statement: "The BSP's tolerance is nonexistent and open socialism is nothing but a campaign trick we shall not fall for. The masks are falling away."

11936

CSO: 3100

AMADA-TPO CHANGES NAME TO PTB

Brussels LE SOIR in French 27 Oct 79 p 2

[Text] "Amada-TPO" becomes the "Labor Party of Belgium." This change in name goes hand in hand with amendments in the party charter and program which were discussed for a year on all levels of the party and which were finally approved on Friday at the end of a 6-day congress.

"Amada-TPO" ("All Power to the Workers") came out about 10 years ago among student circles who were trying to get closer to the workers. This movement also had the support of members of the Communist Party who joined it down through the years.

The PTB [Belgian Labor Party] claims to be an open party, accessible to all revolutionaries. It intends to develop democracy in its own ranks systematically.

The PTB also wants to provide much greater support for actions organized by the population itself.

The party's action revolves around two essential points: "Expropriation of monopoly capital and dismantling of the repressive bureaucratic apparatus."

This party does not have the intention to become a pro-Chinese party: "The Chinese," it says, "would undoubtedly be the first to reject such a concept." The PTB is of the opinion that each country must develop Marxism-Leninism in its own way. The PTB pictures itself as the defender of all of the democratic rights of the people, of national independence, of independence from the two major blocs, and world peace.

5058

CSO: 3100

CLAES, DE WASSEIGE DISCUSS GOVERNMENT ENERGY POLICY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 27 Oct 79 p 5

[Interview by Frank de Bondt and Pierre Lefevre with Willy Claes, vice prime minister and minister of economic affairs, and Yves de Wasseige, senator: "Face to Face, in LE SOIR, as a Prelude to the Parliamentary Debate on Energy--Claes: 'A realistic energy policy...'; de Wasseige: '...that favors mainly Flanders'"]

[Text] In about 10 days, on 7 or 8 November, the famous parliamentary debate on Belgian energy policy is finally going to begin in Chamber committee. This debate has been waited for and promised for several years.

As a preview, we have brought together for a debate two of the personalities who are doubtlessly going to distinguish themselves the most in this very important discussion. On the one hand, of course, is Willy Claes, vice prime minister and minister of economic affairs. As such, he is the author of the "white paper" sent to Parliament. He is also responsible for our energy policy.

Opposite him, Yves de Wasseige, Rassemblement Wallon [Walloon Rally] senator, former chief of staff of the ministry of economic affairs and former official in the Atomic Energy Commission--in other words, one of the opposition representatives best-informed on the subject.

The duel was courteous, but the approaches were nonetheless different, sometimes contradictory. The minister argues for realism based on a certain optimism about economic growth in the coming years. His interlocutor proves more pessimistic and thus defends a more voluntaristic policy: it is time, he says, to change bearing. The one considers that the nuclear-electric power programs started should be continued. The other fears that the existing overcapacities will be extended further still.

The minister declares that he is Belgian first of all, and is concerned for the interests of the country, without regional distinction. De Wasseige, on the other hand, reproaches him for placing his policy at the service of Flanders. In brief, it is the first time that the two men, who are adversaries

in Parliament, have agreed to cross swords directly and to go farther. This means we get a fine battle of ideas in which each argument is also informative.

[LE SOIR] Estimation of energy needs on the 1990 horizon varies from 58 million to 64 million tons of oil equivalent, on the basis of the hypotheses considered by the "white paper" on energy policy. These figures are considered too high by other experts.

[Claes] All the studies done on this subject throughout the world agree: energy demand is going to continue to grow. We have therefore adopted a bracket corresponding to an annual consumption growth rate ranging from 2.5 to 3 percent. Those who defend the lower hypothesis demonstrate pessimism as regards economic growth. I believe we should be far more optimistic and that economic evolution will prove us right.

[de Wasseige] That amounts to believing that nothing has changed, that we can continue, as in the past, to base our growth on cheap and abundant energy. Staying with this view of matters will inevitably lead us into impasses and incoherent situations. The cost of such a policy will be higher and higher, and the impact on the balance of payments is going to be such that we will have to renounce this type of growth. What is more, I do not believe that tomorrow's growth will be based on heavy industry and large-scale consumption --that is, on iron and steel, petrochemicals, automobiles, highways.

In my opinion, one cannot follow these two policies at the same time: investing so as to have more energy all the time, and promoting an alternative industrial policy. If we commit ourselves to energy growth and invest in nuclear power, in the Zeebrugge methane terminal, in coal mining, we will no longer have the financial and human means for doing something else. On the contrary, one must start from the idea that something has changed irreversibly.

No Return to the Candle

[Claes] It is obvious that something fundamental has changed. I do not exclude the possibility of running into impasses around 1985-1990. But I do not see where the incoherences are. There are certain realities. We are talking about our needs for 1985 and we are in 1980. Let us not forget that the EEC itself foresees an energy-consumption growth rate of 3 percent.

Having said this, I do not rule out the necessity of introducing some voluntaristic elements into energy policy. Industry accounts for 34 percent in our energy balance-sheet, and it is true that iron and steel and petrochemicals have a large part of this. But who can say that 5 years from now we will be in a position to effect a fundamental transfer of activity from these sectors to high-technology sectors? As for myself, I have my doubts.

The household sector and the tertiary sector represent 27 percent of our energy consumption: are we ready to apply the brakes heavily in these areas too? Is Belgium prepared to renounce the consumer society? I have my doubts. Of

course, there are tendencies to encourage in favor of change, but I do not believe that results can be achieved between now and 1985.

[de Wasseige] I am afraid that for the sake of "insurance," we will take an energy-growth approach that in the end will prevent us from investing elsewhere. Our energy consumption has not increased since 1973, and our industrial production, like our export capacity, have remained stationary. I add that energy consumption in industry has even declined during this period.

What I want to say is that one should not expect an increase in consumption in the "heavy" industrial sectors. Moreover, these big-consumption industries are going to be the most active in the area of energy-saving. They will be spurred on more and more to do heat recovery.

Since we are faced with the necessity of economizing on energy, let us take advantage of this situation to develop a different growth and employment policy. If we stay with our previous outlooks, the rationalization investments are going to be made to the detriment of employment. On the other hand, if we opt resolutely for energy savings, we can develop new job-creating activities: double-glazing, urban heating, mini-power plants, etc.

[Claes] I repeat that in the short term, we have to remain realistic, while at the same time, of course, having a voluntaristic attitude in the sense that you indicate. But neither do I believe that the predominance of expensive and scarce energy means that we have to go back to the candle! Having said this, I hope we will manage to regain a Gross National Product growth rate of 3.5 percent. In this case, an energy-consumption increase of 0.8 percent per point of GNP growth would give a rate of increase of energy needs of 2.8 percent. The bracket adopted in the "white paper" therefore seems correct to me.

[de Wasseige] That is the position of the energy producers. But I am afraid that if we hesitate between an energy policy based on a hoped-for economic evolution and an economic policy dictated by energy-saving, the disadvantages of both approaches will pile up on us. Myself, I opt for a strategy of transformation: since it is definitively over with, let's try something else. It is a matter of changing our investments and our production apparatus so that they can do as much, if not more, with less energy. Furthermore, I believe that our industrial world can effect this changeover. Didn't it manage to go from coal to oil in 10 years, painlessly?

[Claes] Don't forget that we have 300,000 unemployed. Therefore we need a strong economic upswing, especially in the sectors that we already have available. This does not mean that I am not urging a highly developed energy-saving policy, mainly for moral and humanitarian reasons. We must encourage certain transfers in order to limit the share of oil in the energy balance-sheet: thus, the cement plants can very well change over to coal, and the electric power plants too. Results can be achieved very quickly, but one must not dream, because industry cannot afford to invest in energy only.

A 30-Percent Overcapacity

[LE SOIR] Now let us see whether we are equipped to respond to the evolution of energy needs. It is said, for example, that Belgium has production overcapacities in the area of nuclear-fueled electric power.

[de Wasseige] Our overcapacity in electric power plants comes to about 30 percent of installed power, and this is at the time of year when consumption is highest. Of course, a reserve is always necessary if a breakdown should occur in a production unit. But such a reserve is very expensive, and it runs the risk of becoming 40 percent or even 45 percent around 1983-1984, when the entire nuclear program will have been completed. Investment in the energy sector is going too fast, whereas, as Mr Claes has just said, capital is needed for doing other things.

[Claes] Your 30-percent overcapacity does not take account of the obligatory shutdowns. It is true that in its latest 10-year plan, the "Electricity Production-Transport Committee" has predicted too high a rate of demand growth. But we have gone backward, which was not difficult since the nuclear program is already suffering a considerable lag. This being the case, our reserves are lower than those of The Netherlands or the FRG. And I would also like to recall a basic principle: it is theoretically necessary for every electricity customer to be able to run all his appliances at the same time! In any case, an economic upswing would quickly absorb our reserves.

[de Wasseige] I note that in 1976, the electrical engineers based their program on an electricity consumption growth rate of 6.1 percent. Then they reached a rate of 5.4 percent, and finally arrived at a rate below 5 percent! Certain studies even speak of 3 percent. But the investments have been planned on the basis of a rate of 5.4 percent to 6 percent.

[LE SOIR] Does this mean that we could do without the upcoming nuclear power plants of Doel and Tihange?

[de Wasseige] With a truly voluntaristic energy-saving policy, yes.

[Claes] There is a flaw in your reasoning here. It is true that the electrical engineers have had to revise their targets downward, but this does not mean that electricity will keep the place it holds today in the energy balance-sheet. It is called on to play an increasingly important role. I am convinced that our reserves will not be too high in 1983 and that it will consequently be necessary to build Doel IV and Tihange III, construction of which is behind schedule, for that matter.

I Feel Belgian First of All

[LE SOIR] Should a regional dimension be considered in energy policy?

[de Wasseige] I note in any case that this policy serves to develop industrial poles in Flanders and not in Wallonia. Creating a methane tanker ter-

minal at Zeebrugge also means developing a complete refrigeration industry and a complete port industrial zone in that region. The same goes for the Campine coal mines, which are being given 10 billion in subsidies per year, and around which it is desired to create a 600-megawatt electric power plant, as well as a new cokery. This is to the detriment of the Walloon and Brussels cokeries. As for nuclear power, we are told that the fuel-cycle loop must be completed. In concrete terms, this means that the industrial pole of Mol-Dessel is going to be developed. Inversely, there is nothing at all on the Walloon side, except for loss of jobs in the cokeries.

[Claes] It is always somewhat painful for me to discuss matters from this point of view. I feel Belgian first of all, and Flemish secondarily. At bottom, I prefer that natural-gas freezing plants be used somewhere in Belgium rather than in France. Furthermore, Walloon industry is going to have at least a 50-percent participation in the construction of Zeebrugge. Moreover, quite a few billions have also had to be put into the Walloon coal mines. As for the cokeries, there were some Walloon industrialists defending the idea of building one at Zeebrugge. As for myself, I say that cokeries have to be provided both near the sources of supply and near the iron-and-steel centers. Part of the program is thus going to be carried out in Wallonia.

[de Wasseige] The "white paper" does not say this.

[Claes] But it is stated in my iron-and-steel plan. One has to take all the documents into account. I am also committed to increasing the budgetary effort if I am told tomorrow that the subterranean gasification work has to be accelerated. In the same way, I have done what I was asked to do for the Radioelements Institute of Fleurus, despite quite a bit of opposition in Flanders. Thus I ask that the subject of energy not be put into a context of community considerations and opposition.

[de Wasseige] If it is true that the question of supply goes beyond the regional framework, there is no reason, when a program is being worked out, not to take into account its fallout in the different regions. You could have balanced this fallout. Most of the oil refineries are already located at Anvers and at Gand. The methane terminal is inevitably on the coast. On the other hand, nothing on the technical or economic level prevented you from installing in Wallonia the cokery and the new power plant that you want to create in Campine. As for myself, I say that these choices are deliberately regional.

Regional Consultation to No Purpose

[LE SOIR] To finish with the regional questions, Mr de Wasseige has reproached the minister for not taking into account the opinions expressed by the Walloon institutions in this regard. Some brief remarks on this matter....

[de Wasseige] The Walloon Regional Economic Council had stressed particularly the necessity of a better energy-use policy. But I find no concrete measures

in this direction in Mr Claes's proposals. The same Council had stressed the lags of which Wallonia was the victim in the energy investments planned by the minister as well as in the research budgets. There was no modification in this regard in the final version of the "white paper."

[Claes] I repeat that it is not possible to develop an energy policy in function of community and regional postulates. The Belgian dimension is itself a handicap, and it is not possible to dissipate any farther. Furthermore, I can send the balloon up again. The Flemish executive too has quite a few criticisms of my plan.

[de Wasseige] Not many.

[Claes] Yes, yes, yes...

[de Wasseige] Oh, no!

[Claes] We have discussed different opinions very seriously. The original proposals have been adapted on several points after consultation with the regions. And in the last analysis, it is Parliament who will have the last word.

As regards research in particular, I also believe it has been oriented far too much toward the nuclear in the preceding years. A fundamental reemphasis toward rationalization methods and alternative resources is urgently required. A certain balancing from the regional point of view should also be achieved. This is the reason why I continue to defend the conversion of Mol into a multi-purpose center, as well as the development of a research and prototypes center in Wallonia.

[de Wasseige] This second center does not appear in your latest energy plan.

[Claes] One must refer to the note on industrial policy approved by the Parliament during the session before this.

[de Wasseige] I regret that you did not consider it useful to cite it in your energy proposals.

[Claes] I am entirely prepared to do so if Parliament thinks my document lacks clarity in this regard.

Like Alchemists

[LE SOIR] Mr Minister, you are letting Parliament choose the way to complete the loop of the nuclear fuel cycle. What is your personal position in this regard?

[Claes] In effect, it is a question of choosing between simple packaging of radioactive wastes or reprocessing of them, with recovery of what is still

useful. I leave the question open because a good many problems remain in this regard. But personally, I would choose reprocessing. It seems to me economically more valid and more advantageous on the level of safety and ecology. I also think that reprocessing is scientifically and technically more advanced than packaging.

[de Wasseige] I have the feeling that in the matter of nuclear power, and especially in the area of reprocessing and the breeder reactor, we are behaving exactly like the alchemists of the Middle Ages and like the powers of the time who hoped to find in them a source of inexhaustible revenue. As was done for the first nuclear power plants, it is being declared today, with regard to the breeder reactor, that by drawing 50 to 60 times more energy from uranium, we are going to find total independence. This, in my view, is the biggest scientific and technical bluff of all time. Furthermore, there is a self-intoxication by the scientists in this regard: they no longer dare to do anything but repeat what their leaders say, and that goes for the French Atomic Energy Commission and the German researchers.

The danger to which a plutonium industry leads is not being acknowledged. First of all, it is not certain that it will be economically acceptable, not to say profitable. Moreover, we are not at all sure that we can do reprocessing. Some tests have been done, with enormous difficulties and many failures. We are even practically up against the technical impossibility of doing it. Right now, there is no plant in the world reprocessing spent fuels from PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] power plants, which ours are. This does not prevent the scientific world from continuing to believe in this reprocessing.

As for vitrification of the wastes resulting from reprocessing, it is declared that it is all ready to go. This is not the case. Furthermore, only the French now have, for the last few months, a pilot plant for it, but one does not know everything that is happening in it.

Finally, as regards the safety aspect, reprocessing is being done without the three protection barriers that one finds in the power plants. And this is in addition to the far higher radioactivity dangers that plutonium presents. They make use of it almost impossible.

Diversifying Research

[Claes] I want to reaffirm a fundamental principle in this regard: we cannot take an energy option that risks putting a permanent mortgage on the life of future generations. What is more, it cannot be said that the government is proposing to Parliament that it take an option on the breeder reactor.

[de Wasseige] This is partly the case since, even though you are declaring, in effect, that use of the breeder reactor is not advisable at this time, you are not making a break from the European research on it.

[Claes] All the same, one is not going to call fundamental or applied research to a halt. A commitment to a research project does not at all imply

a choice as to the industrial applications. Furthermore, it may be that science has provided a solution to the problems posed between now and the year 2070. As for myself, I do not know. The scientific world is contradictory on this subject. I say simply that with the data presently available, it is not possible to opt for the breeder reactor. The fact remains that we are obliged, even if temporarily, to accept certain forms of nuclear energy, and that we are not escaping the question of the packaging of wastes. This is what the Parliament has to pronounce on.

[de Wasseige] I too am of the opinion that research should be as broad as possible; but this precisely is not the case. In the federal budget, roughly 5 billion per year is being spent on nuclear as against only 400 million for the other forms of energy. This disproportion actually leaves no choice for the future. It is leading straight to the breeder reactor, and all the more certainly in that more than 2 billion of the 5 billion for nuclear research is directly related to it.

[Claes] We are agreed about the necessity for a fundamental reemphasis in the matter of scientific research on energy. This will be the problem of the 10-year plan on scientific research.

11267
CSO: 3100

STRIKES IN LIMBOURG MINES CONTINUE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 14/15 Oct 79 p 2

/Article by Serge de Waersegger/

/Text/ Tension persists in the mines of Limbourg. Although on Thursday there was a general return to work after the recent strikes and incidents, a new trend appeared on Friday morning among some categories of personnel in Waterschei and Winterslag.

The "Zwartberg-Limbourg" miners' fraternal organization, which acts as a pressure group in that region, spelled out and explained five new demands during a news conference, also on Friday.

Also, members of the "Commission Nationale Mixte des Mines" /Joint National Mining Commission/, who are researching a new collective agreement plan, disbanded Friday around 0600 hours after night-long discussions, and will resume their work on Monday.

In this mining problem, everything revolves around the new collective agreement, which is being negotiated while, in the back of many miners' minds, looms the fear that some new drilling sites may be closed.

Those fears stem from this fact: a report from the Office of Industrial Promotion (OPI) once mentioned a reorganization that would entail eliminating 8,000 jobs. Any possibility that these OPI hypotheses might materialize has been denied in these very pages by the management of the Kempen coal mines (KS). On the contrary, the management stated, since 1975 the government has asserted that no mine would be closed and even that production would go on until it reached the level of 7 million tons per year.

Our readers will recall that in 1966 the Limbourg coal basin provided employment for some 30,000 workers. After the Zwartberg shutdowns, their number was 28,000 and the current figure is about 18,000 persons.

The miners' watchfulness is kept alive by a pressure group peculiar to that area, the Zwartberg-Limbourg miners' fraternal organization.

That organization claims to be apolitical and nonunion, although one of its leaders is Gerard Slegers, former Volksunie /Party/ senator, who was also a leading figure in the serious wildcat strikes of the winter of 1970. As it did then and in 1974, that organization played an active role in the current strike movement in Limbourg, intending to act as a sort of keeper of the conscience for the unions, for the KS management and for the government.

At the bottom of the current confused situation is a proposed collective agreement drafted by the unions, management and government during the summer recess. This quite bulky text was adopted on the national level before its distribution to local union delegates. We are told that they have not yet actually had sufficient time to absorb that weighty document. The result was that a few oversimplifications spread among the workers, particularly the notion of a 3.02 percent increase. Such a raise had indeed been planned, but overall, for the entire mining industry. Thus, when the workers received the sheet indicating the repercussions of the forthcoming agreement as it concerned them (some 150 different trades are involved in the mines, each with its own particular criteria), a deep disappointment resulted, triggering the work stoppages. While some work classifications were enjoying substantial increases, others were stagnating or even regressing. That regression, however, did not affect the future holders of those positions. In addition, certain underground miners found themselves less well paid than those working on the surface (Editor's note: "underground" /workers/ are always in a privileged position as compared to "surface" workers).

Referendum and New Strike

The labor unions caught up with the trend that had started without them and organized a referendum on the question: "Do you want the wage scale provided for in the agreement, or 3.02 percent raise immediately (and for everyone)?" A majority of the votes were in favor of the second proposition. The Zwartberg fraternal organization, however, challenges that referendum, whose results apparently surprised the unions. Many referendum ballots arrived the day after the election, and more than a thousand were erroneously addressed. Lastly, voting was done without adequate information on the consequences of the votes to be expressed...all that, according to the organization, caused the strike action, which was effective last Friday.

Indeed, responsibility for the strikes rests with the workers who, according to the first agreement plan, were the recipients of a raise higher than 3.02 percent...

Besides," the organization adds, "since the vote took place, the miners believe that the 3.02 raise is a sealed and delivered acquisitions, while in fact it is only a basis for new negotiations."

Thus on Friday, during a news conference, the organization was prompted to suggest, as a base for negotiations, a 10 percent raise which it feels corresponds to the cost of living increase. In addition, it is demanding that

comparative studies be published showing the relationship of mining salaries with those of surrounding industries, since it was established in 1946 that miners should be paid 25 percent more than /workers/ in other industries. The organization wants surface workers' pensions to be effective at the age of 55.

As far as the unions are concerned, they have called on the mediation board of the Joint National Mining Commission on the basis of the recent referendum. That board interrupted its work at 0600 hours Friday and will resume it on Monday. According to the unions, the new collective agreement being studied is said to include the creation of a new classification effective next 1 December, with guarantee of a 3 percent salary increase for those deriving a lesser benefit from that classification. It would also include the creation of a 13th month starting this year, and bringing the young people's salaries in line with the 21 year olds'.

It appears, however, that an atmosphere of suspicion still pervades the mining area, which means that any announcement of clearly defined steps is welcome news.

11936

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PQ DEPUTIES, OFFICIALS REACT TO BY-ELECTION DEFEATS

Deputies Blame Labor Leaders

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 16 Nov 79 p A 2

[Article by Lysiane Gagnon, of the Quebec office]

[Text] "If the system of negotiations in the public sector does not change, no government will be able to last more than 4 years. Each time it's the 'western' that begins over again, and that is called 'for a few more dollars...' The labor unions lack maturity, and sooner or later they will pay for that in the eyes of the public...But I sometimes have the impression that they do not care at all, not even about the rampant anti-trade unionism that is increasing everywhere in Quebec."

This bitter charge, but said in the calm tone of one who has reflected for quite some time on such matters, comes from the pequiste [Quebec] deputy of Mercier, Gerald Godin. In saying this, he mirrors fairly well the opinion of a good part of the pequiste parliamentary wing on the morrow when all are still experiencing the shock of a defeat that is all the more bitter since it had been hoped that it would be possible to keep, even if only barely, the county of Maisonneuve.

Among the 10 pequiste parliamentarians who were invited to comment on the results of the partial elections, only Minister Claude Morin refused to give his opinion for publication. The others, about 10 of them, who were contacted by LA PRESSE, do not all have the same opinion regarding the role of trade unions, but unanimously state that the electoral result has nothing--or little--to do with the constitutional option of the PQ.

"Nothing indicates that it is necessary to change our orientation regarding the referendum," said Jean-Francois Bertrand (Vanier), while Guy Chevette pointed out that in any case the pequiste candidates did not campaign on that theme. "There was no debate on the national question"...

Several others, like Minister Pierre Marois, on the contrary thought that the matter of constitutional opinion had made some headway, if one judged by the results in Beauce-Sud, in spite of the resolutely "anti-separatist" campaign of the liberals.

The wind of conservatism that blows over America (Guay), absence of national union (Guy Bisaillon), lack of human warmth on the part of the PQ ("Were we too technocratic?" asked Pierre Marois; and Chevrete indicated that everything occurred as if the people had completely forgotten all the social measures that were adopted by the government), the economic decline of the Maisonneuve metropolis, according to the liberal candidate [a woman] in Prevost, etc., etc., Various reasons were advanced by this or that person. But it is significant that no one spontaneously thought of referring to the type of campaign conducted by the liberals, nor to the fact that the PLQ obviously has been revitalized, with the deputies having shown a trend toward analyzing the deficiencies of their own party and toward self-criticism.

For Jean-Francois Bertrand, the people felt that reforms had come about too quickly. For Guy Bisaillon, on the contrary, the PQ was a disappointment in that it tried too hard to please enterprise. Richard Guay felt that the citizens have had enough of social upheavals. Pierre Marois felt that the danger now would be to believe that one must "moderate the change." Whether the government is too much to the right, too much to the left—on that obviously there was no agreement... also no one predicted deep disturbances within the party. At most, said Bisaillon, some readjustments" between the party and the government; and, predicted Godin, "some settling of accounts, but nothing comparable to what occurred after the defeat of the 1973 election."

The PQ and the Trade Union Leaders

All, however, agreed on one point: the "social climate" has very seriously harmed the PQ.

Several, but especially Guy Chevrete and Gerald Godin, would like the trade unions in turn to reflect. "It distresses me," said Chevrete, to see certain presidents of trade unions more preoccupied with "making a success of their strike" than to negotiate an agreement. If some of the trade union centrals had accepted the one-week moratorium proposed by the prime minister, they would have had more credibility with the people—and also with their members." It frightens me to see the extreme rightist movement wave over Quebec...and also within the centrals."

The same account from Gerald Godin: "One had accepted the challenge to make the trade unions (of the public sector) our partners...But that was

of no use. Permanent lifetime employment security, mobility only up to 50 kilometers, and a limitless appetite for money: nothing would be left for social programs, nothing for day nurseries, or practical home services, the handicapped, or for improvement of existing services.

"Everywhere in Quebec," he said, "one hears it said that 'the trade unions are the ones that lead the way.' I have the impression that the public found the right to strike in public and para-public sectors unpalatable. It's not a question of dismissing this, either; the trade unions should ask themselves questions. Otherwise, the governments all will fall, one after the other, and for the same reason. The strikes in the hospitals were one of the chief causes of the Bourassa defeat. I know this, all the more so since I was the one who defeated his county...and in the door-to-door campaigning in this essentially worker county the question that constantly came up was: 'What are you going to do to prevent strikes in hospitals?'"

Militants Blame Party Leaders

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 16 Nov 79 p A 2

[Text] The result of Wednesday's partial elections in Prevost, Beauce-sud, and Maisonneuve deeply shook the Quebec Party and risks aggravating the unrest that exists between the high-ranking leadership of the party and the rank and file militants.

This is what emerges from about 20 telephone interviews conducted yesterday by LA PRESSE with Quebec Party presidents of counties or regions.

Fifteen of them, in fact, emphasized in their remarks that it is urgent for the PQ to "return to the rank and file," and for the Levesque government to think over its relations with the party that brought it to power. For one, Marcel Tremblay, of Baie-Comeau, president of the Cote-Nord, even thought that Rene Levesque's leadership should be called in question. He emphasized that this is a question of his own personal opinion and doubted that this judgment is shared by most party members. "But to whom else can one attribute the dissatisfaction that was manifested in Maisonneuve?"

Without going that far, the president of Chicoutimi county, Maurice Lalancette, imputed Wednesday's disaster to the present difficult social context in Quebec, but also "to the maneuvering that took place at the national level with regard to the choice of candidates"...For Jean-Pierre Duval, of Argenteuil county, the main explanation resided in "the lack of contact between the national executive and the rank and file. Since 1976 one has felt that confidence has been lacking...) one easily understands that the militants are less enthusiastic in the presence of the

disinterestedness of the leaders with respect to them."

Luc Tremblay, regional president of Montreal-Sud, thought that these results are going "to compel self-criticism within the party;" while, according to Roger Marchand, president of Montreal-Sainte-Marie, one must admit that "at the base we have done our work and I hope that the message will reach the top."

The latter, referring to the waves of public unrest among the pequiste candidates as a result of the nominations in Prevost and Maisonneuve, added: "All of that put end to end is symptomatic of a strategy, of a leadership from the top, one that is prejudicial to the party. It will be necessary to return to the rank and file, to consult with the people more often, and to ask for their advice. We hope that the defeat will change many things."

Without going into greater detail in this regard, Louise-Andree Poitras, president of Vanier county, merely said that "when the PQ is successful, it always is the result of the work of the rank and file." She did not specify where the blame for the failures lies...

Regarding the impact of Wednesday's results on the referendum, almost all of the persons questioned said that they are in full agreement with the leaders of the party, who said they did not see any indication one way or the other.

Stimulate Enthusiasm

For Michel Varin, president of Joliette county, Wednesday's triple failure will at least result in stimulating the enthusiasm of the militants with regard to the referendum fight. According to Marcelle Grenon, president of Abitibi-Ouest, the Quebec citizens will be able, if one explains matters to them, to make a distinction between a judgment to be made concerning a government at election time and the choice to make for the constitutional future of Quebec.

Generally speaking, all of the persons questioned manifested profound disappointment at the triple defeat without, however, manifesting discouragement. No one indicated that the militants of his county would probably react with pessimism, whereas the majority instead expressed the opinion that "this slap in the face to the PQ," to quote Yves Petit, president of Saint-Jacques, would instead probably stimulate the enthusiasm of the troops.

About half of the pequiste staff members who were consulted yesterday, however, said they were surprised by the extensiveness of the defeat, but all had expected that the PQ would encounter serious difficulties in the partial elections.

For Marc Lavallee, president of Montreal-Centre, one of the reasons for this upset is the result of an error in judgment of the "bunker," or the cabinet of Prime Minister Levesque. "Above all, one chose a poor time for the elections--all the more so since the activities schedule of the Joint Trade Union Front had been known for a long time. These elections should have been held in September. It was catastrophic "timing" and someone made a serious mistake."

In spite of this serious error in timing, Rita Bouffard, president of Shefford county, thought and hoped that the pequiste militants "will react in a positive manner and that the temporary demobilization that always follows a defeat" will permit one to question himself on the real reasons for the difficulties that were encountered.

This doubtless is the kind of exercise that the members of the National Council of the Party, who will meet at the beginning of December, will want to undertake. And according to an interviewee who refused to be identified: "This time the debate will not take place behind closed doors and I know several persons who will profit by this to open up in the presence of journalists."

Remarks collected by: Andre Chenier, Francois Forest, Martha Gagnon, Michel Hotte, Denis Masse.

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CSO: 3100

PQ LABOR UNION POLICY CRITICIZED

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 16 Nov 79 p A 4

[Article by Marcel Adam: "One Does Not Weaken Parliament With Impunity]

[Text] The adoption of a special law will have succeeded in delaying by only one week the chaos that the government wanted to prevent, if hospital and school employees follow the recommendation of the Common Front to defy the law and to go on strike next Monday.

At the writing of these lines, the results of the votes in many trade unions in the social affairs sector responded affirmatively to this call, but some hesitation was manifested in the education sector.

Even if the request from the coordinators of the Common Front should not succeed in causing all of the targeted trade unions to defy the law, the strike that is to begin next Monday will nevertheless be of great enough magnitude to reduce social services to an absolute minimum and will considerably disturb the educational sector.

That is, obviously, if in the meantime an agreement is not reached by the parties that are feverishly negotiating in all of the panels. However, in spite of all the appreciable progress that has been observed among various categories of workers, the most optimistic doubt that everything can be settled soon enough to stop the machinery.

It is doubtless because a major confrontation seemed inevitable that last night the dispatches announced the urgent meeting of a special caucus of the Quebec Party in order in particular to study the situation and to consider the measures to be taken if the trade unions implement their threat of civil disobedience.

In addition to the social crisis with which it is faced, because of this special law the Levesque government risks a serious crisis within even

its own party. First, because of its social-democratic philosophy which causes it to perceive such legislation as unnatural. Next, because this party at all levels, including its deputation, is composed of a big proportion of worker trade unionists and of career trade unionists who abominate this kind of intervention.

The fact that a deputy thought it his duty to vote against this law, that a second chose to abstain from voting, and that a third said on the air that he would revise his position if the government decided by other repressive measures to prevent the trade unions from going on strike, gives an indication of the unrest that exists within the governmental party and of the trouble in which it will find itself in coping with the crisis that is looming up.

Wednesday Robert Gaulin, president of the CEQ, said that: "Law 62 is not worthy of respect and it must not be respected." For his part, Paul Vezina, president of the corporation of lawyers attached to the Quebec court, established a precedent by publicly intervening in favor of respect for this special law, emphasizing that when a law is democratically adopted it must be respected, since parliament is supreme and legal supremacy is a basic principle in our society.

The two major trade union crises that the Bourassa government confronted in the public sector considerably contributed to undermine the prestige and to tarnish the image of its leadership. Because the latter was not able to prevent these labor crises, nor to put an end to the civil disobedience that occurred, the people became convinced that its leadership was the main cause.

When the Quebec Party took office with a predisposition that favored the workers, it created the illusion, both within the trade unions and among the people generally that finally the government and its employees could talk with each other and come to terms. And in order to give proof of its good intentions and to build up similar ones within the trade unions, in order to improve the social climate, it voluntarily pardoned the infractions committed by the trade unions and their members with respect to the special laws passed by the Bourassa government, under the pretext that their sanctions were exaggerated and inapplicable.

After the PQ had weakened parliament and called in question its legitimacy by encouraging civil disobedience under the Bourassa regime, it weakened it more, once it came to power, by short-circuiting the effects of the special laws that it had imprudently opposed in 1976—not realizing that by acting thus, it indicated that there are laws that do not have to be respected and that therefore they must be treated as such.

Thus it is that this governmental party, that in the beginning enjoyed a considerable amount of prestige because of the hope that it could better than any other re-establish agreement and gradually restore respect for the state and legislators, now finds itself confronted with a crisis that is due in part to the lack of prestige that it has largely helped to inflict on parliament and the law.

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PQ WHITE PAPER ON REFERENDUM ANALYZED

White Paper Seen Flawed by Overoptimism

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 2 Nov 79 p 4

[Article by Michel Roy: "The White Paper on the Future of Canada"]

[Text] The white paper on sovereignty-association will move the referendum debate along in Quebec. Not because the document contains novel elements; few are to be found in these 120 pages. But rather because it testifies to a real effort to offer the citizens, in clear and accessible language, a synthesis of the grand political design which the governmental party is proposing to Quebec, as well as a summary of the approach it believes it can take to achieve it. One sees better now the goal that it wants to reach: one has a better grasp of the question which the government could and should pose. The nature of this entire undertaking comes out more clearly: in brief, the voters will be asked to pass a mandate that provides both for Quebec's accession to political sovereignty and for the establishment of an economic association, the latter having to be defined and negotiated before independence is proclaimed and the treaty creating the Community is signed.

But the white paper also brings out the scope and complexity of the challenge that is recommended, the delicate, fastidious and, in certain cases, unrealistic character of the necessarily long negotiations that would be entered into by Quebec and an interlocutor as unique as it is multiple.

The authors of the document profess an optimism which borders on angelism. Thus, they have certitude that the rest of Canada will willingly consent to negotiating the setting-up of a Community of sovereign states even before Quebec has proclaimed its sovereignty, and solely on the faith of a referendum that would give the government of the province a mandate to negotiate. On the other hand, they seem convinced that the principle of legal equality between the peoples will be sufficient to guarantee both parity and proper functioning in the joint institutions. They even refrain from any reference to the simple possibility of a setback in the course of negotiation, even though this was foreseen in the manifesto of the PQ [Quebec Party] National Congress of February 1979. They envision between Quebec, on the one hand, and the

federal government and the provinces on the other hand, a futuristic scenario which the social and political realities of this country oblige one to doubt.

The white paper opens to the citizens a prospect both exalting and reassuring: the conquest of sovereignty enabling Quebec finally to establish its priorities, to make its choices freely, to collect all taxes, to exercise its powers without competition or surveillance; but also the creation of a community based on a close association by means of which the advantages of the federal system are maintained. And this kingdom will be built by means of fruitful and peaceful discussion, without clashes, without disturbances, as in a fairy tale, because, it is said, the rest of Canada will also see it as being in its interest. From optimism we pass to euphoria.

Let us acknowledge that it is not up to the partisans of sovereignty-association to bring up all the objections that its proposal can raise. They have at least admitted that the road would be a long one. Along the way, the government will have to face the objections and try to refute them with the same vigor that it has put into its document to put the federal system in the dock. The fact is that in the government's view, it has been proven beyond all doubt that federalism has impeded the burgeoning of Quebec society for 112 years in a number of sectors--one has to agree about that--and that its renewal, even renewal in depth, is impossible if one tries to meet the needs both of Quebec and of Canada at the same time.

The chapter devoted to the impasse of federalism draws attention because it highlights an examination of the unfinished thesis which Andre Laurendeau had presented in one of the first volumes of the report of the inquiry into bilingualism and biculturalism--that of political equality between the country's two great cultural societies. Unfortunately, nothing came of this idea, Mr Laurendeau dying before completing his work and Mr Trudeau having made a different concept of the country prevail as of 1968. The white paper justifies the former prime minister, for whom "special status" was not and is not always an equitable solution. It notes also that "the biggest effort at constitutional revision in Canada's history" failed in Victoria in 1971 after 3 years of hope. If this was truly the biggest effort at revision, one cannot maintain that Quebec has exhausted all its recourse: there still remain many others before it is concluded that renewal is impossible.

In the coming days, we shall go on to other aspects of the white paper, which, it should be repeated, will help to make the debate progress, because it presents a more coherent whole than all the other documents that the PQ has published in the last 3 years.

But apart from the content of the various options under consideration in this debate, the authors of the text are with the majority of the Quebecois when they state that a NO vote in next Spring's referendum runs the risk of being interpreted by the federal government and the rest of Canada as Quebec's adherence to the present system--a risk all the more to be feared if the enemies of sovereignty-association show publicly their differences regarding the renewal desired.

If the NO vote carries the day, a decline could be feared for Quebec. It is the responsibility of the Quebecois federalists engaged in the battle to show how and under what conditions this trap can be avoided.

Terms Considered Dangerously Vague

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 5 Nov 79 p 4

[Article by Lise Bissonnette: "Indefinable Equality"]

[Text] The very title of the Quebec government's white paper on sovereignty-association--"La Nouvelle Entente Quebec-Canada" [The New Quebec-Canada Entente]--promised enlightenment at least more complete, if not definitive, on the "associationist" aspect of the PQ [Quebec Party] proposal. But no part of the government's proposal is less clear, once one has closed the book. The association prospect--the very one that will be so vital to the "yes" camp for convincing the Quebecois of the possibility of acceding to sovereignty painlessly--is deliberately fuzzy: the institutions cannot be defined "once and for all," the "legal" equality so ardently desired between the two future sovereign states appears very limited if not aleatory, and the establishment and the very functioning of the "treaty of association" are barely outlined.

One thing or the other: either "association" is an accessory proposal, or it is at the heart of what the Quebecois are being asked to approve, with sovereignty. And the white paper declares solemnly, as Mr Levesque has always said, that "sovereignty is not on without association: they are indissociable." If so, then one has difficulty understanding why the governmental proposal, 3 years after the PQ came to power and 11 years after the founding of the party, does not manage to truly explain to the Quebecois what their real weight in the association would be, and exactly how their sovereignty would be "limited." Today as yesterday, the PQ proposals brush these questions aside as "details." This silence probably indicates more simply a quandary.

For in order to be able to go looking now for an "association" which Quebec could obtain more naturally if it were already sovereign, the PQ has to water down its position a lot even before it gets to the negotiating table. This means, in fact, renouncing any illusory "parity" in the conduct of the Quebec-Canada institutions, and the document is full of strategic silences that keep the door open for this retreat. At the same time, the "between equals" rhetoric having done its job, last June's PQ congress let it be known clearly that renunciation of "parity" was to be exceptional only. Under these conditions, nothing can really be made specific anymore.

This quandary is never clearer than in the prudently brief and carefully worded text touching on the community institutions, those which should govern the "treaty of association" between a sovereign Quebec and Canada.

The government, it is said, "would view favorably" the creation of four joint organisms: a community council, a commission of experts, a court of justice,

a monetary authority. Since the commission of experts is only a sort of technical working group, it is the other three institutions, with their powers of decision, that are of real interest. But Quebec-Canada equality is not fully required for any of them.

The white paper acknowledges this explicitly as regards the monetary authority, on which the number of seats would be "proportional to the relative size of the two economies, and on which, therefore, Canada would have a majority of the votes, enabling it to control monetary policy. This is not merely a fine nuance where sovereignty is concerned. At the very time when a monetary decision is in the process of annulling the effects of one of the new conservative governments most important fiscal measures--tax deductions for land-owners--one sees its effects on the fiscal policy of a sovereign Quebec. One also understands better why Quebec's minister of finance, Mr Parizeau, has been opposed to monetary union for so long. Now, to cap it off, it has to accept an unequal union.

The "community council" is the central organism, the one that will have to administer the treaty of association. But nothing in the text says whether the Quebec "ministers" who would be delegated to it would be equal in number to their Canadian counterparts. At most, an alternating chairmanship, which could be no more than a symbolic honor, is referred to. Only "fundamental" decisions will require the formal agreement of both countries--hence there is a double veto. How will the other decisions be taken? Mum's the word! However, the treaty of association would have an effect on the life of a sovereign Quebec. It will be concerned with the circulation of goods, persons and capital; it will decide tariff policy; it will give directives to the monetary authority; it will administer a series of agreements in areas as vital as transport and the rules governing the labor market.

As for the court of justice, it would effectively be composed of an equal number of judges from the two countries, but will probably be doomed to impasse even before beginning its proceedings, since the presiding judge would be chosen jointly. Unless English Canada changes spontaneously into an accommodating lamb (which half of the white paper likes nonetheless to portray to us as a dominating lion), one scarcely sees how the two countries would fail to fight tooth and nail to obtain, through the presidency, control of the supreme tribunal that is exclusively responsible for interpreting the treaty of association.

All these questions are not mere details. One can, of course, agree with the government that the nature and number of the joint organisms may vary. But the principles that prevail in their formation are fundamental; and parity, whatever the appearances and style of the document give one to understand, is no longer a fundamental demand in it. In other words, even though Quebec's accession to sovereignty would guarantee it legal equality with Canada (and with the U.S., France, etc), the association proposal that it is felt necessary to formulate at this point in time pushes us back into inequality, with regard to some fundamental economic questions.

An initial negotiating position normally demands a maximum. One may ask what reductions and what limits on its sovereignty Quebec should still consent to during the "several years" that its talks with Canada would last, following an eventual "yes" on the referendum.

Why this near-timidty, these silences, this caution? Probably because, contrary to what the hot air of the white paper gives one to understand, the PQ government evaluates better than does the party the limits of what it can expect from English Canada. The document scoffs at the Canadian "regionalisms" and prefers to continue to present to the Quebecois an "Anglophone society" that is fundamentally "one," and that is supposed to have a "favorable prejudice" toward federal centralization, as well as a primordial attachment to Ottawa as the principal "instrument of its progress." This is an anachronistic view of matters, of what is happening both in Newfoundland and in Alberta. The political and economic growth of the provinces is an irreversible phenomenon which the Laurendeau-Dunton commission, cited by the white paper, could neither foresee nor measure 12 years ago. This does not invalidate its diagnosis of the crisis of relations between the "two majorities," but it might have modified its proposals--incomplete ones--on the modes of egalitarian political association between the two groups.

The white paper does not succeed any more than did the Laurendeau-Dunton commission in truly defining this political association "between equals," which vanishes as soon as one touches it. And despite its gilt-edging, it finds itself posing, in spite of itself, the only question for next Spring--yes or no to sovereignty only.

Possible Federalist Positions on Referendum

Quebec LE SOLEIL in French 3 Nov 79 p A 6

[Article by Marcel Pepin: "The Challenge to the Federalists"]

[Text] The white paper on sovereignty-association specifies the three major arguments that the government will use to persuade the Quebecois to vote "yes" on the referendum. In the first place, it evokes the inevitable diminution of the French-speakers, whose political clout decreases as the number of English-speakers in the country increases.

Secondly, it demonstrates that the strengthening of the federal power is ineluctable, since the other partners in the Confederation tend to favor the federal power rather than provincial power, which, in its view, clashes with the profound desires of the Quebecois.

Thirdly and lastly, it emphatically declares the Quebecois people's capacity to manage themselves to their advantage, by assuming absolute mastery of the territory of Quebec.

The sum of these arguments leads the PQ government to recommend the transformation of the federal system into a freely negotiated community of two sovereign states. The better to convince the voters, the traditional federalist vocabulary has been brought back. There is hardly any talk of the sovereignty proposal, but rather of the new Quebec-Canada entente. The concept of equality is exploited--the warhorse of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and before him of Daniel Johnson. The intuitions of Andre Laurendeau, who in 1967 urged a real association of two equal peoples, but within Canada, are used for support.

And in particular, the collective danger that threatens the Quebecois if the "no" vote should win is brought out. The prime minister himself points out that the rest of the country would conclude from this that the Quebecois do not have the will necessary for achieving the reforms that they demand verbally.

How can the federalists counter these arguments and convince the voters in their turn that a rejection of the PQ option nevertheless constitutes an endorsement of a reform proposal--less bold, perhaps, but just as necessary and equally advantageous, and in particular, achievable?

The challenge is all the less easy in that the vocabulary used by the two camps is by and large the same, and because the two groups appeal to the same popular desire to support reform proposals that go in the direction of strengthening the Quebecois identity. Do the federalists have to start denying the existence of the French-speaking nation of Quebec, as Pierre Trudeau successfully did in 1968? Are the Quebecois ready to revive this bizarre scenario?

Is there, despite the cold language of the figures, a response to the danger of diminution, which is already quite clear when one measures the position occupied by the French-speakers in the various federal organisms, on the one hand, and on the other, in the different provincial bodies?

The only more solid ground on which the federalists can comfortably do battle is precisely in analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the federal system for Quebec. The government juggles this balance-sheet cheerfully, the better to serve its own cause. But it is far from indisputable that it must necessarily remain negative or even that it has always been so.

In order to succeed in diverting attention from the arguments based mainly on pride and the normal desire to manage one's own affairs, the federalists must proceed without delay with several revisions of their traditional attitude.

Instead of confining themselves to the arguments called economic, in which the Quebecois are urged to make their pride follow their pocketbook, it would be in the interest of the federalists to teach the Quebecois about Canada again, to place more emphasis on a liking for Canada and less on the fear of Quebec, to speak less of the "federal bond" and more of Canadian duality.

To succeed, this campaign must be a positive one. So far, the federalists, conditioned by a distasteful defensive tradition, have taken refuge either in legal arguments or in evocation of whimsical calamities. This bodes ill.

After all, Canada is not an abstraction. It exists. It should not be so difficult to correct the overlappings of jurisdiction and the inequality of individuals that are still impeding its growth, without the necessity of demeaning the pride of the Quebecois in the process. Fortunately, Claude Ryan is using more suitable language on these questions than are Marc Lalonde and his friends.

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CONSERVATIVE CONGRESS BUOYED AFTER ELECTION GAINS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 9 Nov 79 p 4

[Article by Hans J. Poulsen]

[Text] At the congress of the Conservative People's Party, a highly popular 200-year-old Frederiksborg citizen these very weeks, had to oblige by way of oratory excesses in a situation where the party was precluded from knowing exactly where to step in with concrete political directions. They were in a vacuum between a government formation and a speech from the Throne still not presented.

The Conservative People's Party was successful in the general election on 23 October. More than 130,000 regained votes and an increase in its Folketing group by seven seats. This was felt at the national congress of the party at Frederiksberg last weekend.

In view of the general political situation--not knowing the government's move so far, which came 1 hour after the conclusion of the congress--they were unable to discuss the details of the politics of the day. The more reason the delegates found to emphasize the position of the Conservative People's Party in areas such as the defense system, the educational system, the monopoly of the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, the possibilities of expansion for the trades and industries, owner-occupied housing, etc.

But they also dealt in great detail with an elderly gentleman from Frederiksberg, the poet Adam Oehlenschläger, whose 200-year birthday is being celebrated in different ways these very weeks.

The more or less well-chosen quotations from the works of the old poet of the golden age fell at such short intervals that one had to ask oneself if it was a literary cabaret one attended with the chairman Hanne Budtz, attorney, as the expert master of ceremonies. For, as Poul Schlüter remarked in his concluding speech: "It was a good weekend for the Conservative People's Party and a great weekend for Adam Oehlenschläger."

At the opening of the meeting, in his speech of welcome, the mayor of Frederiksberg, John H. Winther, felt it his duty to point out the said poet's close association with Frederiksberg. And the many speakers were not slow to pick up the lyrical thread, led by the EC parliamentarian Poul Møller, who characterized Poul Schlüter as "the cheerful son of nature." A sober-minded member of the newly elected Folketing group, however, found it appropriate to point out that it was at Frederiksberg Castle of all places that Frederik VI in 1813 announced the national bankruptcy!

But, otherwise, the local color was kept alive by the speakers calling the attention of the congress to the researches into the old books in "the Gold Horns," the peepshow in "A Midsummer Eve Play" and the occurrences in "Axel and Valborg," frequently quoted in puns to evoke topical political associations. Perhaps more accurately by the chairman of the meeting herself than by anybody else. She quoted from "Axel and Valborg" the stanza in which Axel says to his beloved Valborg: "Soon we shall be united as truly and surely as our monograms./ Look, my sweet girl, what is this A?/ An inverted V. And what is this V?/ An inverted A!"

First Awakening of Spring in October

In his speech at the commencement of the congress, the chairman of the party, member of the Folketing, Ib Stetter, described the election victory as the first awakening of spring--despite the time of year. He said that the Conservative People's Party now is the biggest non-Socialist party in the metropolitan area, Roskilde and Frederiksberg counties with 160,000 voters between them against the 90,000 voters of the Progressive Party and the 70,000 of the Liberal Party. He warned his fellow party members, however, not to get intoxicated from the victory, and recognized that the prime minister can find a slender majority in the Folketing together with other parties "outside our group."

And the party chairman Poul Schlüter elaborated on the warning by the chairman of the party to the government party, by saying that the Social Democratic Party "may, of course, choose to build upon a cooperation with the Radical Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party. With the Socialist People's Party, the government, however, cannot pursue an incomes policy, nor a marketing policy. With the Radical Liberal Party, the government cannot pursue a defense policy. If Anker Jørgensen wants to lean on Gert Petersen, he will forfeit his chances."

As to the composition of the list of new ministers, Poul Schlüter said that it appeared rather more sensational and less convincing than before, with Kjeld Olesen's entry and Knud Heinesen's withdrawal. But, for the rest, he found that the Social Democratic Party in this election must have had a "fantastic free rein for its dispositions."

The Important Workday

The Nestor of the Folketing group and the most senior member of the Folketing ("the youngest who ever was the oldest"), former Minister of Finance Erik Ninn-Hansen, 57 years old, talked about the political working day

which he found so "terribly important," adding that, although the Conservative People's Party was back at the Promised Land, one had to recognize, first, that "we did not get the government we wanted," second, that "we were only a few hundred votes away from a red majority, which could have cemented a Social Democratic government." The reference implied by Ninn-Hansen was clear when he warned strongly against a non-Socialist cooperation developing into "a seamen's home where one goes if one has got no other place to go."

After the national election, there is no pronounced desire within the Conservative People's Party to break out of the cooperation among the four parties, which was so quickly re-established at the issue of writs for the general election.

One cannot expect a solid cooperation in all respects among the four parties: the Conservative People's Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Democratic Center, nor a dissolution at the instance of the Conservative People's Party.

On this question which, incidentally, did not take up much of the time devoted to speeches, Poul Schluter said that "it is true that the cooperation among the four parties is an advantage, but it is difficult to pursue a joint policy when four different parties are involved. "And can we expect," said the chairman of the Conservative People's Party polemically, "that the three other parties will pursue the same consistent and clear conservative policy?" But, in the same breath, he drew the attention of the prime minister to the fact that the 68 seats of the Social Democratic Party, together with the 56 seats of the four parties, between them have an overwhelming majority of 124 seats.

On one point, the position on a specific question was clear. If a bill concerning industrial democracy or an arrangement with compulsory profit sharing is introduced, the Conservative People's Party intends to take a referendum. During the next few weeks, this matter may become the politically most difficult question at Christiansborg [the Folketing], seeing that the introduction of an industrial democracy is the Danish Trade Union Confederation's condition for accepting a curbing of wages, perhaps in the form of a suspension of cost of living increments next year.

Rejuvenation

When, at the conclusion of the congress, the leaders of the Conservative People's Party took stock of the course of the meeting, it turned out that 119 of the delegates had been participating in the debate, and that there was a majority of young and fairly young delegates among the speakers. The party, moreover, is of the opinion that a great deal of the advance of the party may have been due to the accession of young voters to the party, which also came to play a role when, immediately prior to the congress, the parliamentary group distributed the parliamentary committee posts among its members.

CENTER-DEMOCRATS WEIGH ELECTION LOSSES AT CONGRESS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Nov 79 p 7

[Text] "Fellow party members! The Center Democrats have lost an election battle, but there is time to win a new one. We now need a push which will bring us 7 leagues ahead."

With these pathetic words, the chairman of the parliamentary group of the Democratic Center, Rene Brusvang, started his political report at the national congress of the Democratic Center at Faaborg yesterday. It was a report marked by political self-examination: Why did the Democratic Center lose five seats in the national election on 23 October? Rene Brusvang admitted that the party's economic policy might have its flaws, and that there might be a need for the Democratic Center to seek to gather together the fragments of a policy which it has in the economic area, into a firm pattern. It has been maintained that the Democratic Center put the issues in the wrong order of priority during the election campaign by talking so much about schools and the radio, seeing that the voters in the election situation they had been through, apparently were focusing on their wallets.

It, furthermore, might have contributed somewhat to the election defeat that the party leadership had expressed its positive position on the necessity of nuclear missiles. Here, Brusvang said that it is difficult, from a moral point of view, to defend the attitude that other countries, but not Denmark, will have to run a risk. We have the desire to adapt ourselves to the total defense arrangement within NATO in such a way that it will give us the best possibilities of avoiding that Denmark will become occupied. Erhard Jacobsen, who was the first one to make his statement on the question of nuclear missiles, is a ruthlessly honest politician, Brusvang said. He gives his opinion, even if he knows that it will cost votes.

On the cooperation among the four parties, the chairman of the parliamentary group said that it is today a forum where one meets to gather information to ensure that the government will not play off the parties against one another. But the four parties are not a forum where decisions are made.

As far as the Democratic Center is concerned, the decisions are made within the party's parliamentary group.

Brusvang outlined the party's position on the coming political problems. Perhaps a drastic devaluation would be the right thing. If a decision to that effect were made, the Democratic Center would support it. One had to oppose an industrial democracy with central funds.

The Democratic Center accepts a changing majority with regard to the temporary legislation which is being read during these days, but the party cannot approve of such a thing, i.e. a changing majority, when it comes to long-term measures.

The national chairman, Peter Duetoft, who is the party's organizational leader, said in his report that the organization of the Democratic Center should take charge of the political discussions in a number of areas. The organization should be the local spearheads in the cultural struggle in which one is involved. For example, it should open the eyes of ordinary non-political cultural societies to the fact that the children's theater might often have a heavily political influence. "Traditionally, people with conservative views are passive, but we must recognize that if we are not to be overrun by diminutive grass-roots movements, we must ourselves move out there where the debate is taking place. The Democratic Center, headed by its organization, must be the counterpart to the redeemed fashionable movements which want to change everything and everybody," Peter Duetoft said.

During the debate, several speakers dealt with the question what the party can do to get more influence. Per Berning, Frederiksborg county, thus said that if the Democratic Center were again to play a role in Danish politics, it would have to involve its members in the work in an entirely different way than hitherto. "The Democratic Center is like a football club in which the members are told that they will not get to play football themselves but will be allowed to see the first team play."

Lars Abel, Gladsaxe, expressed his fear that the Democratic Center would become a party without any ambitions. It was important for the Democratic Center to show that, from being Erhard Jacobsen's party, it had become a party whose chairman is called Erhard Jacobsen. Lars Abel found, however, that Erhard Jacobsen's initiative from 1973 when he founded the party, deserved that the level of ambitions be raised anew.

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CENTER-DEMOCRATS REELECT PARTY CHAIRMAN AT CONGRESS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] Erhard Jacobsen, who last Saturday attended the EC meeting in Spain, yesterday morning, at 9.30 a.m., rushed to the congress of the Democratic Center at Fåborg, was received with applause, made a long speech, and managed to make his reelection as chairman of the party a very special triumph.

When the election of party chairman, i.e. of the party's political leader, came up at the congress, Erhard Jacobsen said that he expected, of course, to be reelected, the more so as the parliamentary group of the party, which has the right of nomination, had appointed him the only candidate. But, with a view to the interpretation by the media of the events, he would not content himself with being reelected by acclamation, because such an election would not indicate the number of supporters and opponents. He, therefore, demanded a vote, and he got it. The ballot resulted in his reelection by 124 votes. Seven delegates voted against his reelection and twelve delegates returned blank ballot papers.

In his speech, Erhard Jacobsen explained, with a touch of irony, why he had neglected his party to serve the EC. He had 6-7 times had to send his regrets to meetings of the EC Committee in Spain on account of the national election here at home. But, this time, he had had to attend the meeting and define his position because the chairman and the other deputy chairmen had been prevented from attending.

"But I must frankly admit: My order of priorities is, first, my duty to the EC, for 100,000 voters have entrusted me with this task. Next comes my duty to the voters who have voted us into the Folketing. What I then have left is up to the party."

"When after the meeting in Spain, I got back to the airport at Kastrup, the customs officers shouted to me, 'It is a good thing that you came,

you will get a big blow at the congress.' But I was happy, for I had actually been afraid that nobody would have noticed my absence."

Erhard Jacobsen analysed the situation of the party and the reasons for its defeat in the national election. The Center Democrats had deserved an election victory, he said. But the disappointment at the defeat should not cause the Center-Democrats to sit down and blame somebody for it. He would take the blame, for if he would be given the credit for a victory, he would also have to take the blame for a defeat.

The question of nuclear armament of Denmark had been put to all parties. But all the others, perhaps with the exception of the Progressive Party, had evaded the issue. "The Democratic Center is of the opinion, however, that we must not try to coast within NATO. Are we perhaps in a more elevated position than the others? We lost a seat or two on the question of nuclear weapons, but we maintain our standpoint." He was of the opinion that the party had also lost seats because it had opposed the cut in unemployment benefits and because it had not been kindly and gentle enough in its discussion of cultural policy questions during the final debate among party leaders on TV. Finally, the party should perhaps have talked somewhat more about the economy.

Erhard Jacobsen said that, on a number of issues, the Democratic Center had not been in luck but he did not deplore the fact that the party had done what it did. He was fully confident that the Democratic Center would regain what had been lost, and there was no disunion within the parliamentary group.

The party leader pointed out that a large part of the political opinion-making process today takes place outside the Folketing and the municipal councils, viz. in environmental and anti-pollution groups and, for example, in political theaters. "There are theaters which try to frighten people from approving the use of nuclear power. But we shall let people know what these theaters stand for. We shall show them to the door and on their way--right into the Danish Broadcasting Corporation." Similarly, the party would have to continue its policy on schools and education and emphasize its position on the issue of taxation of single-family housing.

Subdued Criticism

The strong reelection of Erhard Jacobsen for the post of political leader of the Center-Democrats did not prevent the way in which the party is being operated from causing a subdued grumbling from a few quarters during the political debate which was carried on in cautious terms at the congress at Fåborg yesterday.

The criticism, which probably has been heard clearly earlier, was concerned, among other things, with the fact that the policy of the party is solely laid down by the parliamentary group, and the critics, moreover, find that the party does not have a coherent economic policy. Everybody recognizes that the party, at present, sticks with Erhard Jacobsen, but a few speakers at the congress apparently started looking around for what they called a "crown prince."

H. C. Hillerup Jensen, consultant, Ølstykke, who last Saturday was elected organizational deputy chairman of the party against a recommendation from a majority of the party's council (i.e. its central committee), thus deplored the fact that the Center-Democrats had not presented a well-structured program during the election campaign. However, no members of the party--except for the Folketing members--had any influence whatsoever on the official line of the party. The Folketing group had developed a completely exaggerated complex regarding the question of the sovereignty of those elected politically over the party apparatus. This state of affairs had to be changed radically.

Deputy Mayor Lars Abel, Gladsaxe, warned the Democratic Center against following other parties out of a political trench warfare. The Democratic Center ought to change its hitherto unsuccessful course and become a "party of the society."

Tom Heyem, secondary school principal, Høng, deplored the fact that the Democratic Center had become a bloc party, indeed perhaps even the most eager one within the group of four parties.

Arne Melchior, member of the Folketing, answered by referring to the fact that the Democratic Center, to a great degree, had participated in a parliamentary cooperation in various areas. The ideal of the party--to be a participant in talks and a partner in the cooperation--was intact.

Arne Melchior, moreover, found that the party had to try to employ a more distinguished usage of language and form of discussion. The party ought to do this because, as is well-known, it was the first party to blame others, including the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, when using simple and vulgar language.

Erhard Jacobsen pointed out that if the cooperation among the four parties had not existed in the recent election situation, the Democratic Center would probably have been pushed completely out of the picture in the general election. The Democratic Center had to participate in the cooperation among the four parties in order that Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen would not start saying that there was no alternative to the Social Democratic Party.

Bruno Fjelstrup, attorney, Frederiksberg, paid homage to Erhard Jacobsen: "The fateful hour of the party will come when the party will not elect a leader who is not afraid of stating his opinion, even on nuclear missiles, and who is not afraid of giving an important EC meeting priority over an irrelevant debate on rules and regulations at the congress."

CENTER-DEMOCRATS ELECT NEW DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 17 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] Consumer guidance regarding the political messages of theater and choral groups ranks high in the work program of the Center-Democrats, says the national chairman of the party organization, Peter Duetoft. He thus follows the line which party chairman Erhard Jacobsen talked about to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE last Monday.

The subject was yesterday taken up by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, and statements made by the newly elected deputy chairman of the party organization, A. E. Hillerup Jensen, a DANIDA consultant, revealed a distance to Erhard Jacobsen's view. A statement from the national chairman of the organization, Peter Duetoft, shows, however, that the organization stands completely behind the policy line.

Peter Duetoft points out that, with his report at the recent national congress, he was given unanimous support to give the cultural struggle at the local level a very high priority in the work program of the organization.

"Attempts to represent the Democratic Center's local cultural struggle as registration or censorship are completely abortive," he said. "The main task of the Democratic Center is to give information. No society must unsuspectingly engage a children's theater group, a musical group or the like, and then--too late--discover that it was heavy political propaganda they received. We want to inform the people of the political message of the groups on the basis of their own materials. This kind of information is general consumer information, and not political cataloguing, as it has been attempted in some quarters to call it.

7262
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JØRGENSEN LOSES TO NIELSEN IN SDP DEPUTY CHAIRMAN VOTE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Nov 79 p 5

[Text] At the meeting of its central committee at Christiansborg yesterday, the Social Democratic Party managed to avoid a fight for the post of deputy chairman of the party.

A unanimous executive committee had, prior to the meeting of the central committee, proposed that Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen be requested to continue as deputy chairman until the congress of the Social Democratic Party to be held in Copenhagen in September of next year. An equally unanimous central committee agreed to this, and Kjeld Olesen, who after becoming minister desired to resign from the post of deputy chairman, agreed to continue until the congress.

In this way, the Social Democratic Party postponed a confrontation with the trade union movement on the post of deputy chairman. The chairman of the party, Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen, would have welcomed the appointment of the chairman of the Danish Metal Workers Federation, Georg Poulsen, as the next deputy chairman. In this manner, Anker Jørgensen hoped to strengthen the relations between the party and the trade union movement, just as the election of Georg Poulsen would mean a weakening of the influence of the chairman of the Danish Trade Union Confederation, Thomas Nielsen.

Prior to the meeting of the central committee, Thomas Nielsen had opposed the appointment of Georg Poulsen as deputy chairman.

Georg Poulsen, who yesterday attended a meeting in Jutland and did not participate in the meeting of the central committee, had declared his willingness to take over the post as deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party. He had made it a condition, however, that his work would become more political than organizational.

Apparently in order to pave the way for Georg Poulsen's appointment to the post of deputy chairman, it was decided at the meeting of the central committee to set up an organizing committee, the first task of which will

be to prepare a description of the functions of the post of deputy chairman. According to information given to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, the post would have a more political, technical content than hitherto.

At the meeting of the central committee, Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen gave some general information on the political situation. The decision of the government and the Folketing group to ask NATO to postpone its adoption of the modernization of medium-distance missiles in Western Europe for 6 months, was the subject of a prolonged discussion. The central committee gave its support to the position taken by the government and the Folketing group on the question of the missiles.

The organizing secretary of the Social Democratic Party, Søren Hansen, was elected to the Folketing in the general election, and the central committee was yesterday to appoint his successor. There were two candidates: Frank Weiner, editor of the news service of the Social Democratic Party, and Willy Stig Andersen, travel secretary. The two candidates attained parity of votes, and the decision will now have to be made in a ballot within the central committee.

Another central committee meeting was scheduled for 26 January.

7262
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DEFENSE MINISTER ISSUES PROPOSALS TO CUT FORCES IN EIGHTIES PLAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE 24 Nov 79 p 16

[Article by Mogens Auning]

[Text] Considerable cuts in the number of conscripts in all three services, cutbacks in the number of officers in the Army, but increases in these two groups of personnel in the Navy and the Air Force are included in the draft plan for the coming defense program after 1981.

At the same time, considerable increases in defense materiel, such as antitank helicopters for the Army, more submarines for the Navy, twelve new F-16 aircraft for the Air Force--and expanded tasks for the Home Guard, are proposed.

With a view to the coming defense negotiations, Defense Minister Poul Seegaard yesterday sent the members of the defense committee of the Folketing an account of the plan together with a draft for the defense program. The account has been prepared by the Defense Command.

Three Economic Possibilities

The draft plan of the Defense Command discusses three economic possibilities for the defense program after 1981. At the so-called "Level 1," an unchanged continuation of the defense budget is expected, at "Level 2," an annual real increase of 1.5 per cent and, at "Level 3," a 3 per cent annual real increase in the budget are expected as of 1981.

The draft plan received by the defense committee is the third phase of the investigations into a future Danish defense system carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Command over the last few years, and it is based on an evaluation of the requirements which the Danish forces will have to fulfil, in order, together with the West German forces, in time and scope, to secure and support allied reinforcements on Danish territory.

The draft plan of the Defense Command includes an evaluation of the threat from the Warsaw Pact countries to which Denmark may become exposed in the eighties. The draft plan here says that, in view of the geographical conditions, an operation by land through Schleswig-Holstein towards Jutland and a combined amphibian/airborne operation towards one of the larger Danish islands for the purpose of conquering Danish territory, might be indicated.

Considerable Cutbacks in Personnel

In order to be able to solve the Danish defense tasks, both on a national and a NATO level, the Danish Defense Establishment is most interested in the "Level 3" solution.

It involves considerable expansion in the materiel sector for the Armed Forces as well as for the Navy and the Air Force. However, it comes as a surprise that, as far as the Armed Forces are concerned, the draft plan proposes cutbacks in personnel by approximately 140 officers, 760 men of the regular personnel and approximately 1,380 men years for conscripts. It is proposed to expand the materiel sector by, among other things, antitank helicopters.

At "Level 3" the Navy would, among other things, have more submarines and naval helicopters as well as a 25 per cent increase in the arsenal of missiles. As far as the Navy is concerned, the draft plan includes an increase in the officer corps by 110 men and in the regular personnel by 40 men, but a reduction in the force of conscripts by approximately 410 men years.

The "Level 3" solution proposes an expansion for the Air Force by twelve F-16 aircraft, increasing the organizational combat force to 100 aircraft, as well as new air defense systems. The draft plan also here proposes a reduction in the force of conscripts, as far as the Air Force is concerned, by approximately 190 men years. The plan proposes to increase the officer corps by approximately 50 men and the regular personnel by approximately 490 men.

7262
CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

PURGED CP-LEADER'S NEW ORGANIZATION--Trade union leader Preben Møller Hansen's purge from the Communist Party of Denmark has led to the formation of a small Communist organization at Køge. The organization has been given the name of the United Front, and the members are Communists who have resigned from the Communist Party of Denmark in protest against the exclusion of Preben Møller Hansen. In the election, Preben Møller Hansen was the Communist candidate for the Folketing of the Køge branch of the party. The chairman of the United Front is Torben Sørensen, a former CP member of the Køge town council, at present an independent. The secretary is Sussi Hanberg, who is the social worker of the Seamen's Federation. The United Front so far has approximately 20 members who will work locally in the Køge area. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Nov 79 p 7] 7262

CSO: 3106

STRAUSS DISCUSSES DOMESTIC, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUES IN ADDRESS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Nov 79 p 5

[Article by Wolfgang Tersteegen: "Strauss: Weather in World Politics Can Change Quickly"]

[Text] Hannover, 25 November--The candidate for the chancellorship keeps everybody waiting. Nevertheless, 1,400 "functionaries" of Lower Saxony's CDU, who had come to Hannover for his sake from all parts of the Land, are not impatient. "Northern lights" like them, do not lack topics for conversation. They are gathered in the main restaurant of the fairgrounds to give their approval to the 1980 Bundestag election campaign and listen to a special performance by Franz Josef Strauss. Did they not favor "their own" Minister-President Albrecht as Union candidate for the chancellorship as recent as last summer? Were there not at least 150 members in Lower Saxony who left the party when the Bavarian was nominated because they felt that liberal-conservative support would be lost on account of him, the alleged "extremist on the right?" Those who are gathered, Land committee members, local and district chairmen, Landtag and Bundestag delegates, are asking themselves which Strauss they will now experience--the tough "woodcutter," whom they would have to view with suspicion, or the politician who is aiming at conciliation and the representative of all basic Christian Democratic convictions who deserves their solidarity.

Strauss has not yet arrived: But Land Chairman Hasselmann announces that he has already concluded his speech on the Germany Day of the Young Union at Niedersachsen Hall, which is only a few kilometers away. The crowd makes use of the time by exchanging ideas. And there are some who finally have an opportunity to shake hands with the head of government or get a pat on the shoulder from Hasselmann before they move to the table on the platform. Up there, in addition to seats for them and for Strauss, three additional seats have been reserved, one for the deputy Land chairman, one for the treasurer and one for the Land business manager. Minister of Finance Kiep, the designated leading candidate of Lower Saxony's CDU, is seated "below," which surprised some party friends.

Three quarters of an hour have passed. In the meantime Albrecht, more or less in an attempt to bridge the situation, said something about his radio policies; then the applause for Strauss takes over. Many of those present stand up to applaud when the candidate for the chancellorship approaches the steps leading to the platform. When he passes Kiep, who happens to be standing there, he greets him warmly. Hasselmann, turning to Strauss, shouts into the microphone: "You are the Union candidate for the chancellorship in Germany and consequently you are also the candidate for the chancellorship of Lower Saxony's CDU. With you we want to break the majority of the SPD and FDP in the German Bundestag--a warm welcome to you in Hannover." The fact that the nomination of the candidate for the chancellorship had been disputed, was mentioned by Hasselmann, but he combined it with the statement that this is part of a broadly based people's party like the Union and "dear Mr Dr Strauss" knew very well, being one of those Bavarians who has always had a better understanding of federalism than others, that this very Union is no more a unity party than the FRG is a centralized state.

Strauss approaches the speaker's podium and greets Albrecht, his "senior office colleague." He already paid him a brief official visit in the afternoon in the state chancellory upon his arrival in a private plane which he piloted himself. He also greets Hasselmann, his "junior office colleague" in the party leadership.

Then he refers to what Albrecht said about radio and the discussion about the NDR. "In this matter," Strauss says, "the CSU is behind you unanimously."

The Union candidate for the chancellorship does not want to be categorized according to political assessments. He considers himself simultaneously a "modern conservative," a "genuine liberal" and "leaning toward European nationalism." He professes an ideology which is based on Christian moral laws, demonstrates a consciousness of history; however, he opposes the concept that the Germans alone are responsible for the "return to barbarism" in the 20th century.

On current questions concerning policies of detente or education Strauss says, they must first of all be clearly recognized and presented to the voters without sugarcoating before they can be solved for the future. With respect to promises the Union cannot compete with the Social Democrats. Facts, openness, coherent presentations of problems are necessary. In addition, it is necessary for the Union to be aware of the fact that with the 1980's Germany will probably enter its third critical decade, in addition to those decades following the two world wars, that Germany might have to face a period of historic justification, a period threatening its existence. In order to prevail, better policies are necessary, the SPD and FDP will have to be replaced. The weather could change quickly, even in world politics.

Again there is applause: Those who have been listening to him for more than 1 1/2 hours do not reveal any reservations. Are they surprised about the fact that they experienced Strauss as a person who can hardly be called a polemic? Albrecht gives the assurance that the candidate for the chancellorship can rely upon the support of Lower Saxony's CDU, there will be no "detours," no "traps," no "ulterior motives." The party will fight for Strauss.

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CS0: 3103

CSU-GENERAL SECRETARY PLEDGES CAMPAIGN COOPERATION WITH CDU

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Nov 79 p 4

[Article by Tgn: "Stoiber Praises Cooperation With CDU. Union's Election Campaign: Mobilization, Information, Confrontation"]

[Text] Hannover, 13 November. "We are reaching agreement on everything." With this simply enthusiastic statement, CSU General Secretary Stoiber expressed on Tuesday in Hannover his satisfaction about the cooperation of the CDU/CSU in the preparation for the 1980 election campaign. The cooperation, especially between the party headquarters in Bonn and Munich which are organizing the election campaign for the common chancellor-candidate, the CSU chairman and Bavarian minister president Strauss, is much more intensive than it was four years ago, said Stoiber during a visit of the Lower Saxony CDU. He rejected as "complete nonsense" allegations from the political opponents' camp that as a standard bearer, Strauss had had a bad start not the least because the CDU/CSU is lacking a real election campaign concept.

According to Stoiber who spoke in the evening at the CDU event in Nienburg and who Monday was guest at the Lower Saxony CSU's economic council, there are for the Union three phases of the Federal election campaign. What must be achieved above all during the first phase, which is to last perhaps to the end of the year, is the mobilization of functionaries, members and sympathizers. This includes conferences of Strauss with important CDU/CSU groupings, such as the Young Union at their 24 November All-German Congress in Hannover (Strauss is combining this date with an appearance in front of some thousand Lower Saxony CDU functionaries) or with the social committees, as well as his, Stoiber's, visits with several CDU Land associations.

The second phase, planned for January to May, is to serve the information of CDU/CSU supporters on all political program questions, on the basis of the campaign platform worked out by the beginning of the year. In this phase, Strauss, after consultation with the election campaign commission, is to recruit the election campaign team to which would belong the CDU/CSU's leading personalities and of course all of the CDU/CSU minister presidents.

From the "team", Strauss would then, presumably in late spring, select those who would be in a position and ready to assume with him the governmental responsibility in Bonn. His decision will also hinge upon whether the Lower Saxony CDU standard bearer, finance minister (and CDU Federal treasurer) Kiep can find his place on the government team. The third election campaign phase starting at the end of August, after an attempt at bridging the summer break of the election campaign, for instance by campaigning in vacation areas, is to be characterized, so says Stoiber, by clear confrontation with the primary political adversary, the SPD.

Stoiber, who had been welcomed by the Lower Saxony CDU Land president, Minister Hasselmann, expressed the CDU/CSU interest in the conclusion of an election campaign agreement. He said CDU general secretary Geissler and he are at this moment engaged in trying to reach an agreement with the remaining parties on the limitation of the election campaign. The CDR and the CSU are also concerned with a limitation of election campaign costs. The expenditures of the last Bundestag election (CSU: DM 9 million, CDU around DM 30 million) should if at all possible not be surpassed, which with greater participation by the members can be achieved, asserted Stoiber.

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CSO: 3103

SAARLAND FDP BACKS COALITION WITH CDU PREPARATORY TO APRIL VOTE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Dec 79 p 4

[Report by "mtz": "Decision in Favor of CDU-FDP Coalition--Party Congress in Saarbruecken--Klumpff Criticizes Saar SPD"]

[Text] Saarbruecken, 2 December--On Sunday evening [2 December], the Saarland FDP Decided to continue its coalition with the CDU also after the 27 April Landtag election. After a lively debate, which also included personal attacks, the Saarbruecken party congress approved a relevant proposal by the FDP Land executive with a two-thirds majority. The opponents of the coalition statement in part backed the proposal of Land Deputy Chairman Kaltenbach, who had advocated that the matter be "left open," and in part had favored a statement in favor of the SPD. Opponents of party Chairman Klumpff time and again had called on the Free Democrats to put an end to the more than 30-year rule of the CDU and CVP, and one could clearly feel the split which has divided the party since 1976, when a coalition with the CDU was decided by a narrow majority.

Pleading for continuing the coalition with the CDU beyond 1980, FDP Chairman and Minister of Economics Klumpff said that the cooperation begun in 1977 had stood the test. For the FDP to go into the campaign for the (27 April) 1980 Landtag election without a coalition statement presupposed the kind of strength which the party did not have at this time. "As long as we have not won over a sufficient number of dependable and constant voters--and by that I mean a two-digit percentage--I consider such an approach dangerous," Klumpff said.

Turning to the advocates of an SPD-FDP coalition on the Saar, Klumpff went on to say that precisely the successful economic policy since 1977 in the Land had been implemented over the embittered opposition of the Saarland Social Democrats. Klumpff cited their "disappropriation concepts" in the steel industry, the "chaotic energy policy," the dangerous demand for a 35-hour week and the rejection by the SPD of the proposition that the private sector assume public services. "I seriously put the question," he said, "as to whether we can be interested in installing the power apparatus of bureaucratic socialism in the whole Land." The demand of

the hour, Klumpp said, was not to remove the CDU from government but to prevent the Land from being delivered into the hands of the same SPD "which with its politics has removed itself farther and farther from us in the Saarland Landtag."

Some criticism by Klumpp was also directed toward the SPD in Bonn. He said limits are imposed on cooperating with the SPD in national policy "unless Helmut Schmidt can at last put across a clear energy policy in his party and if within the SPD those forces should prevail which want to weaken, or even abandon, the defense readiness of the West."

The cooperation with the CDU on the Saar was justified by Klumpp not only by citing the "confrontation-reducing" effect of the Saar coalition in the Bundesrat [FRG upper house], the successful reduction of unemployment on the Saar, the positive job procurement programs and the good cooperation with Minister-President Zeyer. Klumpp further said that on the Saar the FDP had gotten into a position "enabling us to demonstrate the independence of the FDP not only in the Land but with nationwide effects." Klumpp made it clear that he considered his Saar coalition to be a model when he said: "Cooperation with the CDU such as we have here should also again become possible one day in the Rhineland-Palatinate and in Baden-Wuerttemberg." A "spot of color" had become "a new south German liberal line which, on its traditional bourgeois-liberal electoral basis, could again become the creative force of German liberalism." The other possibility meant to adjust to the uniformity of a so-called bloc strategy.

The debate was marked by partly very fiery contributions by advocates and opponents of the Klumpp course. The chairman of the Saarland Young Democrats went so far as to accuse the party executive of "threats, defamations and attempts at corruption.

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CSO: 3103

SCHMIDT DISCUSSES ENERGY POLICY WITH LABOR, BUSINESS CHIEFS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Nov 79 p 3

[Article by K.B.: "Schmidt Discusses Energy Policy With Business and Labor Unions"]

[Text] Bonn, 13 November. This Wednesday, for the second time this fall, Federal Chancellor Schmidt is receiving leading business and labor union representatives for an exchange of views on policies in respect to energy and market conditions. This summit meeting will be controlled by increasing concern about future energy supplies. Bonn's and the economy's fears that the world economy could be greatly burdened by new disturbances in the international oil market have been confirmed sooner than expected by the most recent events in Iran. In connection with the German energy provisioning, the discussion at Federal Chancellor Schmidt's, as far as can be determined, will focus for the second time on the problem how an expansion of nuclear energy can be protected from judgments of administrative courts in the disposal of irradiated fuel elements (nuclear waste disposal).

The energy—political exchange of views at the Federal Chancellor's merits this time special attention because it is taking place prior to the energy-decisions of the SPD-Federal Party Congress in early December in Berlin. There are suspicions in Bonn that Schmidt has scheduled this discussion on purpose prior to the party congress.

At the Chancellor's office they say, moreover, that at the first meeting on 18 September, the participants had already welcomed the idea to continue the discussion in the first half of November. But Schmidt seems to be especially interested in having the approval of his energy policy reaffirmed by the labor union leaders at this particular moment when the opponents of nuclear energy in the SPD have formulated a proposal for the "step-by-step abandonment" of atomic energy.

Even more attention than to the energy discussion at the Chancellor's is currently paid in Bonn to the answer which in the midst of an intra-party controversy before the SPD-Party Congress the Federal government gives to an interpellation by the opponents of nuclear energy. With this interpellation, the CDU/CSU faction tried to embarrass the Federal government to

repeat the declarations regarding energy policy once more before the party congress. To the opposition's surprise, the Federal government did not shy away from committing itself unequivocally as far as energy policy is concerned. The answer was not postponed, as was the answer to a similar interpellation before the 1977 SPD Party Congress had been, but was given promptly. There is much to indicate strongly the Federal Chancellor's hand in the position on nuclear energy. Whether on the basis of this interpellation it will still come to a debate between the opposition and the coalition in the Bundestag shortly before the SPD Party Congress, will be determined by the council of the elders this coming Thursday.

The most important theses on nuclear energy policy in the Federal Government's answer read: According to the still valid second energy-policy declaration, the increase in demand is to be reduced over the long run and the supply to cover the demand is to be expanded. It is repeated that the Federal government considers it essential, and in light of the high safety standards achieved also as defensible, that further nuclear power plants be built, especially also under regional aspects. But the expansion of nuclear energy is circumscribed in as much as other possibilities, primarily rational and economical energy utilization and exploiting of German coal have priority. With this nuclear energy policy, the Federal government finds itself in basic agreement with virtually all Western partner-nations. As far as it is its responsibility, the Federal government will speedily translate into action the 28 September agreement on nuclear waste disposal between the federal government and the Laender. The implementation of the nuclear waste disposal policy depends to a great extent on the participation of the Laender. The agreement is seen as an expression of the Federal government's and the Laender's readiness to solve the nuclear waste disposal problem as a common responsibility.

Explanatory comments by the federal government on the federal government-Laender agreement are now also becoming known. The nuclear waste disposal principle on which hinges the construction and operation of nuclear power plants is to be adapted without delay to the varied nuclear waste disposal concept. The Federal government gives assurances that no alternative nuclear waste disposal technique, which from a safety-technical point of view might be superior to the reprocessing of fuel elements, will be left untested. As regards the government chiefs' decision to continue the work on the construction of a reprocessing plant, it is said that the possibility of constructing a reprocessing plant at a location other than Gorleben is also to be taken into consideration, if necessary with smaller capacity. The Federal government assumes that once the results of an investigation by the federal government-Laender Commission for nuclear energy about reprocessing capacities and location criteria are available, the Laender will accept and check proposals for the construction of a smaller reprocessing plant, so that in this manner an important contribution can be made to the final solution of nuclear waste disposal. Federal Chancellor Schmidt

attaches great importance to explaining in detail to the labor unionists and the economists, the nuclear waste disposal concept during the energy discussion.

For the part of the summit meeting concerned with policies in respect to market conditions, it is expected that Schmidt, in spite of the new risks in the oil market, does not share the pessimistic prognosis of the Kiel Institute for World Economics. It is known that Schmidt leans more towards a positive evaluation of the state of the economy, based on representative surveys of businessmen. Schmidt does not conceal his concern that market conditions could be talked into a downswing by pessimistic scientific prognoses.

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CSO: 3103

MAOISTS RUNNING SELF-SUFFICIENT MODEL FARM IN THE NORTH

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Dec 79 p 4

[Report by "al.": "Keeps of Refuge in Schleswig-Holstein?--The KBW's Efforts for Self-Sufficiency--Preparations for Election Campaign"]

[Text] Kiel, 2 December--The West German Communist League (KBW) is at present building a model farm in the small locality of Oster-Ohrstedt in Schleswig-Holstein. This has been observed by the Schleswig-Holstein Office for the Protection of the Constitution [VfS]. It reports that what is striking is the KBW's economic demeanor and its efforts at self-sufficiency. The running of the farm extends to the production of food, energy, paper and Biogas, with the KBW apparently now out to assume a pacemaker's role in the ecological movement. According to the director of the Land VfS, Kuhn, and his colleagues, "The importance attached by the KBW to using agricultural enterprises for purposes of revolution is also apparent from intensive efforts to acquire two more farms in Schleswig-Holstein." Possibly the plan is to turn a self-sufficient system of production, services, well-developed communications and standardized vehicle yards with automobile workshops into a network of keeps of refuge in town and country for the event of a "revolutionary situation." On the other hand, the VfS has information according to which the KBW comports itself like an employer of feudal times towards members who, for example, work on the farm, demanding that they work up to 12 hours a day.

Particularly also in light of the KBW headquarters in Frankfurt--"secured like a fortress"--the VfS people say that the KBW is acting like a "capitalist." To conduct its business activities, they say, the KBW founded the Kuehl-KG-Verlagsgesellschaft [Kuehl Limited Publishing Company] with its main office at KBW headquarters in Frankfurt. It not only produces printing matter but, for instance, also deals in building materials, dyes and the like. The same Kuehl company had also applied for a license to build "vacation homes" on that North Frisian model farm whose real purpose is the subject of VfS speculation. The VfS estimates that the KBW real estate and durable economic assets constitute a capital of about DM 10 million, a considerable amount considering that at present there are only 2,400 members in the Federal Republic--explained by the extent to which KBW members must make contributions if their income exceeds DM 1,000.

According to the VfS in Kiel, the communist groups are preparing for the Bundestag election campaign. In addition to the orthodox communists--the DKP--the KBW would go into the election with its own list. The Communist League (KB) at present was seeking an alliance with "radical democratic forces within an alternative list," going so far as to engage in self-denial in the process. The KPD-ML [Communist Party of Germany (Marxist-Leninist)], at the initiative of its chairman, Ernst Aust, was appearing in "a new getup," having founded a "popular front against reaction, fascism and war and for freedom and democracy, prosperity and peace." The popular front had already been registered as a party with the federal election director. "It is unique for a party itself to found a new party," Kuhn says. The slogan of the popular front in the Bundestag election campaign is to be "Stop Strauss!"

The VfS continues to regard the DKP as the most dangerous communist organization, the danger of it emanating from its policy of alliances with which it attempts to undermine democratic institutions. Current points of reference primarily were disarmament and detente, but also neonazism and "bans against employment" [in government for political reasons]. The DKP too had established a "Stop Strauss" action for the election. The party's main influence lay in works groups. Furthermore, it was also remarkable, for example, that the Schleswig-Holstein Land chairman of the Young Democrats, Schulz, had delivered greetings at the Land delegates conferences of the SDAJ [Socialist German Workers Youth], the DKP-oriented youth organization. Part of the stepped-up alliance policy ordered by the DKP district executive was also at present the establishment of a works newspaper for the North German Radio Network [NDR] for supporting the "Save the NDR" movement.

In the sector of rightist extremism, the VfS says, executive measures early this year succeeded in paralyzing this scene in Schleswig Holstein. Apart from some swastika graffiti, no neo-Nazi activities worth noting had occurred in Schleswig-Holstein in the past 6 months. The VfS also thinks it can see a lack of intellectual substance among the right extremists, though there are attempts to copy ways of the left extremist terrorist scene.

8790

CSO: 3103

BUNDESBANK EXPRESSES CONCERN ON RESERVE ROLE OF MARK

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Nov 79 p 34

[Article: "Big Ideas"]

[Excerpts] Increasingly the German mark is assuming the role of a reserve currency--causing a great deal of concern at the Bundesbank.

In past years, foreign central banks and private investors already began accumulating substantial reserves in German marks.

In just 4 years--from the middle of 1975 to the middle of 1979--foreigners doubled their investments in German money and capital markets to a total of DM 185 billion. Within 4 years the German mark increased its share from 7.6 to 11.3 percent of the entire foreign currency reserves held by foreign exchange authorities.

As a consequence, the German mark became the second-most important reserve currency--although it is still considerably behind the dollar, which accounts for 80 percent of the world currency reserves.

Officials at Frankfurt's issuing bank have been uncomfortable for a long time because of the international popularity of their currency. As is being demonstrated by the financial war between Iran and the United States, governments and currency authorities do not always dispose of reserve currencies for economic reasons.

There is concern at the Bundesbank in Frankfurt that some day even the German mark might be at the mercy of flipped-out revolutionaries.

Moreover, the constant back and forth of foreign currencies, their influx and outflow--as is customary and unavoidable in the case of reserve currencies--is also economically very dangerous, because it can lead to strong fluctuations in the exchange rate, the money supply and interest rates, and as a result it will be inevitable that the Bundesbank will not be able to accomplish its domestic economic goals.

During the summer of 1978, for instance, within a period of 5 months foreign currencies in the value of up to DM 20 billion entered the FRG, left and entered again.

At the moment international commercial banks are concerned less with the long-term consequences of the Iran crisis than its immediate dangers.

The Tehran government is no longer willing nor able to pay its debts of several billion dollars to non-American banks because \$8 billion in Iranian assets are frozen in the United States.

For instance, an interest payment for a Persian loan from 1977 which was due in the middle of November did not arrive at the international credit banks. As a consequence, the banks "canceled" the loan and it became due immediately.

According to international banking regulations this means that all other Iranian credits can also be canceled immediately—a disaster which is also impossible to imagine in the world of banking. Ekkehard Storck, chief of the Luxembourg branch of the Deutsche Bank, fears: "The entire network of international loans to Iran could collapse."

8991

CSO: 3103

BRIEFS

NO PARTY POLITICS FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS--Mainz, 2 December (DPA)--The Federal Association of Environmentalist Citizens' Initiatives (BBU) wants to remain independent from party politics. Executive members therefore may not run as party candidates. This was decided in Mainz during the weekend [of 1/2 December] by 150 delegates representing about 1,000 citizens' initiatives. As regards issues, the BBU does not want to forgo taking sides. Executive members emphasized that the association considered itself to be an "independent political entity in the extraparliamentary sector." The BBU called on radio and television to institute a "citizens' TV" with at least 2 hours' prime broadcasting time. The program must "definitely" be set up in cooperation with the BBU. The "most important voice of interested citizens." In addition the BBU advocated representation and a vote on the supervisory boards of radio and television, because it wants to be recognized as a socially relevant body. Josef Leinen (of Kirchzarten near Freiburg) and Hans Guenter Schumacher (of Germersheim) were reelected as members of the executive board. Martin Mombauer (Luechow-Dannenberg District) was elected to the body for the first time. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Dec 79 p 4] 8790

MORE VIETNAM REFUGEE AID--Bonn, 13 November (hls.)--In the name of Foreign Minister Genscher, the state minister in the Foreign Office, Mrs. Hamm-Bruecher, handed a check of DM 20 million to the representative of the United Nations' high commissioner for refugees, Yefine Zarjewski. This cash contribution from the Foreign Office's humanitarian aid funds is intended for immediate assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Indochina. The refugee commissioner will disburse the funds "with great urgency" as follows: DM 8 million for Cambodian refugees in Thailand and in the Thailand-Cambodian border area, DM 9 million for the establishment and maintenance of refugee camps in the Philippines and in Indonesia and DM 3 million for the alleviation of refugee misery in this region of Southeast Asia. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Nov 79 p 1] 9011

PARLIAMENT APPROVES NUCLEAR PACT WITH AUSTRALIA

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Oct 79 p 8

[Article: "Opposition Representatives Demanding Renunciation of Nuclear Power, Diet Approved Nuclear Pact"]

[Text] After a long nuclear power discussion the Diet approved an agreement for the transfer of nuclear materials between Finland and Australia. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure the future availability of uranium fuel for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plants operated by the Teollisuuden Voima [Industrial Power] Corporation.

During the third debate over the agreement there was a rather fundamental discussion of nuclear power, in which opponents demanded measures for the renunciation of nuclear power and bringing about a referendum on this issue.

The Diet finally approved the agreement by a vote of 122 to 15 with four Diet members abstaining. The agreement was supplemented by a point submitted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, according to which the treatment of waste must be handled in the most appropriate manner possible and international recommendations must be observed in the transfer of nuclear material.

The uranium agreement was opposed by factions of the Rural Party and the Liberal Party as well as Christian League Members Antero Juntumaa and Olavi Ronkainen and Conservative Party Members Toivo Makynen, Eva-Maija Pukkio and Ben Zyskowicz.

A point presented by 10 or so representatives was presented as an appendix to the agreement, but the Diet rejected it. Those whom the chairman did not even allow to take part in the discussion entered into an animated exchange of opinion on the procedures of the chairman and the rights of representatives.

The agreement itself is a framework agreement, on the basis of which it is possible to make uranium purchases.

The point adopted by the Rural Party urged the total renunciation of nuclear power, fixed attention on the question of nuclear wastes, and demanded that a

referendum be held with respect to the issue. This proposal presented by Pekka Vennamo [Finnish Rural Party] was supported by Conservative Party Jalmari Torikka, who referred to the vast importance of this issue.

"Plans for New Power Plants"

Conservative Party Member Ben Zyskowitz noted that the arguments of the government's proposal do not make it clear that the agreement is necessary for the operation of currently existing power plants. "Plans for increasing the number of nuclear power plants can be seen in the background of this agreement." Zyskowitz considers the agreement to be premature at the very least.

Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist, who has followed the discussion, urged those who are undecided about these plans to contact the representative of their parties in the parliamentary energy policy council.

Liberal Party Member Terhi Nieminen-Makynen considered the agreement to be part of the process by which Finland is to be made a nuclear country. "The Diet has still not been provided with a full explanation concerning nuclear power, of which this proposal is a part."

Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund (People's Democrat) hoped that the government would urge the Diet to take a stand on nuclear power. "This issue is connected with Finland's energy policy." Bjorklund noted that the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] had proposed at a committee meeting that the importer of nuclear material would also be required to take care of the question of waste.

Swedish Peoples Party Member Henrik Westerlund proposed a reform of nuclear legislation and a plan to phase out nuclear power plants as the final goal of legislation relating to operational permits. Westerlund stated that the agreement now concluded is not an indirect approval for the power plants at Olkiluoto since the political decisions concerning them were made previously.

Christian League Member Sauli Hautala hoped for the establishment of an institute dealing with nuclear material and parliamentary supervision of the decisionmaking process concerning nuclear supervision.

Ole Norrback stated that there is no cause to prevent the obtainment of fuel for plants already in operation. On the contrary, more attention should be given to the treatment and storage of nuclear waste, stated Norrback in presenting a point on this issue.

Finance Committee Supports Nuclear Power

The Diet Finance Committee has also taken a stand on nuclear power. In its stand the committee dealing with state finances stated that the continuing use of nuclear energy must be taken into consideration in the development predictions of energy management. The committee made reference to the declining supply of fossil fuels.

The Finance Committee also presupposes that problems concerning the treatment of nuclear fuel and its final storage will be resolved in a safe and permanent manner.

10576

CSO: 5500

AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY SEEKS SOVIET JOINT PROJECTS TO SURVIVE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Oct 79 p 26

[Article: "A Successor to the Hawk Is Sought, Aircraft Industry Conducting Several Export Negotiations"]

[Text] The first Hawk training destroyer aircraft to be built in Finland should be in the air in May 1981. In 5 years all the 50 aircraft from England will be assembled and the aircraft industry is now in a hurry to find new orders.

Five years is a short time to find work for a whole branch of industry. Valmet has, however, invested 20 million markkas at its Kuorevesi Aircraft Plant for the production of the "Hawks". The aircraft industry is aiming its sites beyond Hawk by these investments, which are large by Finnish standards.

"Exports of the Suhinu aircraft for towing gliders and of the Vinka to the East and partial production for the West are at least in this stage included in our plans for the period after the production of the Hawk aircraft is completed," states Heikki Mantyla, director of Valmet's defense equipment section.

Valmet has even considered the exporting of whole plants for the production of small aircraft. The corporation has excellent export experience with respect to tractor plants in Africa, for example.

The aircraft industry is particularly interested in the export of semicompleted products to the Soviet Union. Negotiations have already been conducted. Negotiations of partial deliveries have already been made in the next five-year trade agreement.

"I believe that we will be able to make semifinished products by the middle of the next decade at the latest," stated Mantyla. Semifinished products for civilian as well as military aircraft have already been discussed in the negotiations.

The concluding of an agreement would according to Mantyla guarantee longer successions for the domestic aircraft industry and a more stable employment. Also the Soviets have taken a very positive attitude toward joint ventures.

The difference in proportions was, of course, a difficulty in the initial phase of the negotiations. The Finnish aircraft industry is only a toy compared to the Soviet aircraft industry. Therefore, the size of the projected series of semifinished products was made smaller in accordance with Finnish wishes.

In spite of its small size the Finnish aircraft industry believes that, for example, it is able to offer work and parts in metal working, which will interest the Soviets.

Work on Hawk Has Begun

The airforce will receive the first four Hawks directly from the British manufacturer, British Aerospace. The subsequent 46 Hawks will be assembled at Kuorevesi. The first Hawk to be made in Finland should be in the air already in May 1981.

Valmet has built a new machine shop at Kuorevesi for the production of the Hawk. A large 50,000-cubic meter assembly hall, a testing facility, as well as a voltmeter and electronics repair shop are yet to be completed by the end of this year.

In fact, the partial assembly of Hawks has already begun at Valmet's Kuorevesi as well as Linnavuori plants. The aircraft engines are being assembled and the jets for the engines are being made at Linnavuori.

"The Hawk's elevators, air brakes, ailerons, and flaps, among other things, are being manufactured at Kuorevesi," states Manager Juhani Makinen. According to Makinen these parts are being manufactured all the way from the raw materials, which will provide the workers with the needed feeling for the technology of this area.

The domestic level of the Hawk will finally be 10 percent. Valmet wanted a larger percentage, but the English would not agree to this. "The investment would have increased significantly above and beyond the 20 million markkas if partial manufacturing had been expanded," states Section Chief Erkki Haapanen from Kuorevesi.

Otherwise the Finnish aircraft industry is satisfied with the Hawk transaction and the 100 percent compensation it will bring. If this transaction were being made now, there could be no talk about corresponding compensation, stated a spokesman.

The Kajaani Corporation, which will make electronic parts for the aircraft, received 6 million markkas' worth of the 100 million markka Hawk contract.

In addition to the Hawk Valmet must make the Vinka elementary training aircraft ready for the airforce. The company has had trouble with the Vinka. The aircraft has not been progressing according to schedule. The latest difficulty has been with the German radios. They did not satisfy the delivery conditions and new ones will not be coming until the spring.

"However, the Vinka will be put into the air before the current year is out and aircraft will be delivered without interruption," were the assurances from Kuorevesi.

Marketing Difficulties.

The export prospects of the Vinka are at this time rather difficult. British Airspace, which it was hoped would market the Vinka, now has its own competitive elementary training aircraft. "Therefore, the Vinka is now out of this picture, but this aircraft does have the properties to compete in international markets," stated Makinen.

It is not worth exporting the Vinka unless more than 200 aircraft can be produced. Export negotiations have been conducted with Arab countries and certain West European countries, but for the time being they have been without results.

Air Bus Reaches Even to Finland

The most natural subject for the production of semifinished products is, of course, the Hawk. "The necessary equipment and facilities are here and ready and experience can be found. Fortunately, the English have adopted a positive attitude toward our aspirations for making Hawk parts even in the future," states Haapanen.

The Air Bus A300, the largest West European aircraft project, is also on the minds of the Finns. "We will probably not be able to manufacture parts for the Air Bus, but this giant English-French venture may, perhaps, provide other work for us. Therefore, we are hopeful with respect to its also," states Mantyla.

The Hawk project will increase the number of workers in the Finnish aircraft industry from the present 500 to a full 600. In the future the Finnish aircraft industry will surprisingly be in the same situation as Sweden's. After the Viggen Sweden will not produce anymore new BL3A's and, therefore, Sweden will be forced to find more work from the civilian sector and especially from abroad. This is the same as Finland's position. The scale of Sweden's aircraft industry is, of course, of a different class than Finland's. Sweden's problems, however, will not be resolved by orders from its neighbor.

In Finland hopes are also being placed on exporting the new Suhinu aircraft for towing gliders. The Suhinu is still in the prototype stage, it is expected that export markets will be found for it in West and East Europe as well as the United States.

SOVIET NORDIC TRADE OFFICIAL DISCUSSES JOINT PROJECTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Oct 79 p 22

[Article by Matti Pensala: "Finland and Soviet Union Already Studying Dozens of Productive Joint Projects"]

[Text] The development of industrial cooperation will continue to occupy a central place in the economic relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. The success of this demanding task will make it possible for the Soviet Union to expand this cooperation to other Western countries also. This statement was made by Yuri Piskulov, an expert on trade with Finland and the Soviet Union's counterpart as secretary of the economic commission between our countries.

Production cooperation in economic relations is at a higher level than mere trade transactions. Piskulov emphasizes that its planning and preparation are demanding tasks, to which the difference in our economic systems should not present an obstacle.

The Soviet Union does not have extensive experience in production cooperation with capitalist countries. "The expansion of cooperation to other countries in the West will be easier if good experiences are gained from it in dealings with Finland."

The development plans aimed at cooperation are enumerated in the long-term economic program drawn up between our countries until the year 1990. As far as Piskulov recalls there are more than 60 active projects and a significant portion of them is being studied within the framework of border trade. There is no centrally obtainable information in Finland with respect to the number of projects.

Some of the projects may fall through, but good prospects for implementation can be seen for the majority of them. Such projects are according to Piskulov nuclear-powered icebreakers, paper manufacturing machinery, the auto industry, disposal of city garbage, and so on. According to Piskulov the development and construction of nuclear power plants is an area of the future in which the Soviet Union and Finland can work together especially in third party countries. For example, the construction of a thousand-megawatt

nuclear power plant in Finland will become a matter of importance in 1982.

Cooperation or Subcontracts

Piskulov states that productive cooperation has already been accomplished in the electric locomotives delivered to Finland. The speed regulating instruments for them were procured from Stromberg. Tampella Tamrock, on the other hand, is delivering stands for rock boring equipment, which the Soviet Union is equipping with bores. Subcontracts have been given to the Soviets for a number of years already for ships ordered by the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union there is a tendency to ceremoniously classify all subcontracts as productive cooperation. According to this Soviet term Finland and Sweden, for example, are involved in considerable cooperation in the area of production. We, however, prefer to just call them subcontracts.

In any event Piskulov considers the building of electric locomotives to be a good example of productive cooperation. The Soviet Union is currently promoting a similar venture in Denmark. "If it succeeds, markets will open up elsewhere in Europe".

More Power for the Commission

New productive joint ventures are being sought continually within the framework of the economic commission between our countries. According to Piskulov more decisionmaking power should be given to the commission with respect to projects to be implemented.

The economic commission from Finland participates in negotiations on large ventures, but agreements concerning production at a smaller scale are concluded at the enterprise level. Even in the Soviet Union an attempt is being made to give industrial and trade organizations more responsibility in the planning of cooperation. "In the Soviet Union there is a foreign trade monopoly. In Finland the organization of cooperation is more flexible since each plant also sells its products."

The Finnish-Soviet Economic Commission is bipartite. In both countries it has a chairman and members as well as permanent workers. In the Soviet Union the daily work of the commission is conducted by Secretary Piskulov, and his Finnish counterpart is General Secretary Aaro Ikonen.

Piskulov believes that productive cooperation can be accomplished more rapidly in small projects. The planning and preparation of large projects, on the other hand, consumes much energy and time. "We are aiming for a system in which the ministry of each industrial area will have his own projects with Finland and also its small and medium sized industries."

According to Piskulov the success of mutual production can also lead to joint ventures in third party countries.

The Soviet Union has for several years done work to be able to offer sub-contracts for Finnish construction projects in the Near East. "Cooperation should be equal, and neither party should concentrate on getting the best pieces for itself," noted Piskulov.

Piskulov enumerates power management projects, land and water management, as well as ferrous metallurgy as objects of cooperation in the Near East. "We are experts in the production of iron and steel." The Soviet Union and Rautaruukki are, indeed, developing a small steel plant together to be marketed in third party countries.

Initial Concentration to Be on Own Markets

Piskulov emphasizes that the transition to markets of third party countries will not become an important factor until later. "Initially productive cooperation should be made to function by finding a demand for its products from the markets of both our countries."

In productive cooperation it is not a question of establishing joint industrial plants, but of assembling the final product from parts manufactured in both countries whether they be paper manufacturing machinery, ships, or construction projects. The assembly can then take place in either country and the chief supplier can be either country depending on the type of product and the ability to manufacture it.

Upon the completion of productive cooperation questions of payment just as other transactions between our country will be managed on a clearing-basis. "Finland itself has requested this. A conversion to freely traded currencies could weaken the competitive ability of certain Finnish enterprises," states Piskulov.

The Weight of Projects in Construction Work

The recently signed 5-year agreement will mean a trade deficit for Finland. However, the Soviet Union has assured us that it will increase machinery and equipment procurements in Finland in an amount proportionate for achieving equality.

The uppermost projects are the second phase of the Kostamus Mining Association as well as the Paajarvi Forestry Center and the construction of the third phase of the Svetogorsk Cellulose and Paper Combine. Trade negotiations concerning contracts for the third phase of Svetogorsk are just now beginning.

"Also in Soviet Karelia, in particular, there are many paper plants which will be modernized during the years 1981-85, the term of the agreement. This will offer Finland good opportunities for machinery and equipment deliveries," states Piskulov.

Piskulov also considers it possible that projects similar to Kostamus and Svetogorsk will be implemented in Siberia and the Soviet Far East.

BRIEFS

MORE MEAT TO USSR--The Soviet Union is becoming an ever more important trading partner for the Finnish meat-packing industry. Next year 15 million kg will be exported, both as whole carcasses and in the form of processed products. The actual amount is thus 18 million kg, Director Toivo Haapakoski said at the hog raising session of the Stock Growers' Association, held at Lahtis Wednesday [14 November]. When the annual exports of pork go up to a total of 25 million kg, according to Director Haapakoski, there may be a question of somehow increasing production so that the contract can be carried out. The domestic consumption of meat (including beef, etc.) has increased during the last 10 years from 40 kg to a good 53 kg per Finn, and if the food industry's forecasts are to be believed, consumption in Finland will increase up to 1985 by about 2.2 percent a year. Pork consumption is very near 30 kg per year per capita. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 16 Nov 79 p 15] 8815

CSO: 3109

SEGUY STRESSES CGT'S COMMON POINTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 23 Oct 79 p 5

[Address by CGT Secretary General and PCF Politburo member Georges Seguy to PCF National Council]

[Text] L'HUMANITE continues its report of the proceedings of the PCF National Council, devoted to the party's activities in the companies. Today we publish the address by Georges Seguy, and on following days, those by Paul Laurent, Pierre Juquin and Rene Le Guen. Here is George Seguy's address.

One thing is obvious: there would be no socialist prospect for France if the working class did not have its own revolutionary party. And this prospect will take concrete form within historical periods that will be shorter in proportion to the strength of the working class. This may seem a truism; yet this truth, which underlies all the importance of the agenda of this first session of the party's National Committee, is perhaps not perceived as such by all Communists.

I would like to contribute to our discussion by considering an experience that I have faced many times regarding the question of how it is possible to strengthen both the party's activity and that of the working-class trade unions at the same time.

The concise, well-balanced and positive manner in which Jean Colpin has dealt with this question invites us to reflect on this and consider it more deeply.

With the arrival of new generations of militants, experience shows that if we wait too long without reasserting our positions of principle in this regard, incomprehension and questioning arise again quickly, around a central theme: "how to reconcile the party's activity in the companies with the role and action of the trade unions."

It is because the Politburo has felt the need to put this question on the agenda for discussion in the party that we have published a resolution that deals in a fundamental manner with the relations between the party and the trade unions.

It is regrettable that, generally speaking, this text has not commanded more attention from the party, that it has too often been considered a circumstantial resolution on a special subject, and that it has not given rise to more discussion within the party, with the participation of those Communists who have trade-union responsibilities.

A Clear Concept of the Party's Position in Relation to the Trade-Union Movement

A clear concept of the party's position in relation to the trade-union movement is one of the important conditions for the strengthening of the party's activity in the companies. This is true for various reasons, and particularly in order to ensure for the cells in the companies the participation of all Communists in the work of the party.

But it must be recognized that many Communists with trade-union responsibilities, at all levels, consider themselves exempt from having to contribute to the life of the party, to its struggle; and they do so with a completely easy conscience as Communists. This is what is really disturbing.

I am not referring only to those about whom Halbeher spoke, those who were called on the carpet by the 40th Congress of the CGT, those comrades considered irremovable and having trade-union responsibilities and mandates, who spend the best part of their time traveling, going to conferences and commission meetings, to the point of disappearing almost completely from the workplaces and losing all contact with the workers, the trade unions, and all the more certainly, with their party.

I am thinking also of those thousands of trade-union militants, party members, shop stewards, delegates to company committees or managing various social organisms, carrying out their trade-union tasks well, who have the workers' confidence, but who, because they do not understand the advantage of it, do not feel the need, the utility, of intense activity by the party in the enterprise, or who even go so far as to declare against it, or who, from lack of understanding of the role of the cell and of the trade union, think that they reduplicate one another and that the trade union can suffice for everything. This anarchosyndicalist theory, which is generally believed to have been filed away in the historical archives of the workers' movement, is still present, in forms that are perhaps less theoretical but are no less restrictive.

Thus it is that in complex political periods, periods of difficult struggles--as is the case at present--this incomprehension can produce two serious problems:

--either one attempts, out of necessity, to channel the party's positions through the trade union, at the risk of harming its mass character and its independence; but all the same, one takes certain precautions to attenuate the consequences of this method, which are usually distortion and even caricature of party positions reaching the workers, and which on the whole present us with the risk of losing on two scores;

--or one confuses trade-union independence with trade-union neutrality, taking in particular the position that in the case of differences between Communists and Socialists, the CGT does not, in principle, have to take sides. This propensity has been manifested frequently since March 1978; it is all the more disturbing in that it can result in an alteration of the class principles, the orientations, the program and the sense of struggle of the CGT.

There Are Many Points of Convergence between the CGT and the Communist Party

It is absurd to try to deny or hide the fact that there are many points of convergence between the CGT and the Communist Party. This does not result from subtle premeditation by those Communists who exercise important responsibilities in the CGT. It derives from a reality by which, on the trade-union level, the Communist Party finds only one authentic class trade-union organization: the CGT (and if matters stand so to the advantage of the workers among us, the French Communists have something to do with it). Reciprocally, when the CGT speaks of its relations and, as circumstances require, envision alliances with political formations, it finds only one authentically revolutionary party: the French Communist Party.

Having said this, I am sorry if the detractors of the party and of the CGT do not like it, but this reality entails no dubious links between these two great political and trade-union organizations of the working class, which respect one another mutually and forbid all interference in the internal life of each other.

If the Communists, contrary to trade-union militants of other parties that have little organization in the companies, are respectful of trade-union independence, of the trade union's autonomy of action, of its rules of democratic life, of its sovereignty as regards its orientation, it is precisely because they have no reason to seek elsewhere than in their party, and in their cell in the company, for the means to satisfy their need for political activity.

Differences of Function and of Role

In this sense, there is nothing contradictory about the normal functioning of the party within the company and the activity of the trade union. There is no formal partitioning of the prerogatives of the one and of the other, with one confining itself to the area of union demands and the other to the political battlefield.

There are differences of function, of role, that lead the party to state clearly, in all circumstances, that the conduct of struggles for demands is the job of the trade unions, inasmuch as at the time of the negotiations which such struggles can impose on the employers or on the employer state, no one but the trade union can represent the workers.

If, therefore, it is desirable for this National Committee to urge all Communists to take an active part in the party's activities in the companies,

it is no less important that they play their full part in the class trade-union life and action within the CGT, not out of sentimental sympathy with the CGT but because, as Marx said, "it would be serious for the working class to lose its foothold in a daily struggle against capital."

Now from this angle also, our class combat concerns all Communists, and it is normal that Communists can be indifferent to a decline of the CGT in the company in which they are active.

This is not an abstract question. One could cite too many examples of companies in which the number of trade-union members is falling at a disturbing rate even though the party is solidly implanted and is even getting stronger.

One could even cite cases--rare ones, it is true, but significant--in which the number of Communists exceeds the number of CGT members. These Communist comrades, the leaders of the party sections and federations to which they belong, cannot accommodate themselves to such situations and be at peace with their conscience as Communists.

Application of the Orientations of the 40th Congress of the CGT

As is known, the insufficiencies, the defects that sometimes affect the organizational activity of the CGT were analyzed and criticized without any complacency by the 40th Congress of the CGT.

Some, outside and even inside the CGT, have tried and are still trying to pull this congress to the right, as happened with the 22nd and 23rd congresses of the party.

But it was also a congress that ran up against reactions of narrowness, of paralyzing traditionalism, of routine practices, withering the imagination and spirit of initiative, a force of inertia and even tenacious resistance that impedes innovative application of the 40th Congress of the CGT.

This is why it is important for the Communists active in the companies to hear and understand the appeal made to them by Georges Marchais, at the last Central Committee meeting, to participate actively in the application of the orientations of the 40th Congress of the CGT for more combative trade-union action, both democratic and more unitary, closer to the workers, for a stronger CGT, more effective in the class combat. And, I would add, for the CGT to win the best possible success in the elections for the labor relations board.

Meeting 8 months after the elections of March 1978, it would have been surprising if the 40th Congress, in view of what the CGT is, had totally escaped the confrontation that followed the rupture of the union of the left.

There is no cause to regret it, but certain criticisms, indeed accusations, of Socialist inspiration and made in a partisan spirit, weighed on the debate that prepared for and prolonged the Congress, in such a way that the discus-

sion did not fully reflect the diversity of sensibilities that make the CGT what it is.

Trade-Union Work Offers a Place for Everyone

I am referring to the militants of Christian sensibility and to the many militants not politically committed who did not have the place in the debate conferred on them by the eminently positive role that they play in the life of the CGT, all the way up to the highest responsibilities.

For example, there was a lively controversy on the question of whether the CGT is suffering from an excessively strong presence of Communists in its leadership organisms.

Nothing is stupider than this kind of allegation. What the CGT is suffering from is not an excessive density of Communists, but rather too little participation, in all aspects of its activity, by those--and not just Socialists --who are not Communists.

Trade-union work, which is constantly expanding, is so vast, so diversified, that it offers a place for everyone, without regard to memberships, to political and philosophical opinions. This also is what the 40th Congress of the CGT expressed.

In concluding, I would like to evoke briefly a question on which some calculations have emerged here and there in recent times.

While the governmental and employer coalition rages against the party and the CGT, there are some, including some not far from us sometimes, who try, in a highly dogmatic manner, to pit CGT-CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] unit of action, often broadened to include the FEN [National Education Federation] and the FO [Workers Force], against the party's strategy, as if unity of trade-union action for demands could be intrinsically compared with a strategy of struggle for power and the transformation of society toward socialism.

And as always in such cases, those who indulge in this kind of speculation insidiously let it be understood that there are supposed to be differences, even divergences, within the very leadership of the party.

Let us leave these charlatans to their turpitudes and appreciate the CGT-CFDT agreement on unity of action for what it is.

I would first of all like to point out that no party other than ours has hailed the reaching of this agreement and that no newspaper has given a more complete and objective report of it than our L'HUMANITE.

The fact is that this is one of the positive results of our struggle against the reinforced austerity policy of the government and the employers, of the

vigorous denunciation that we made against the "consensual" strategy of Giscard d'Estaing and the CNPF [National Council of French Employers].

It is also a result of the light we have thrown on everything that veers toward the right in the direction of crisis and austerity management, including the "recentering" of the CFDT.

The nature of the difficulties that the CGT ran up against in reaching this agreement and that it is running up against in applying it are obvious enough to make us aware that its significance must not be overestimated or its scope underestimated.

It is the development of the struggles in August and early September, on our initiative, that made the agreement and its conclusion possible and that, despite all the difficulties, are an element of stimulation to action at all levels, beginning with the rank and file in the companies.

It seriously counters the wide-sweeping operation hatched by the government and the employers which was to result, this autumn, in a holy alliance above class considerations, in the name of the imperative of national solidarity in the face of the crisis, and of which it was hoped in high places that it would leave the Communist Party and the CGT in isolation.

Without eliminating the divergences between the two central trade-union organizations, without restricting the critical debate on these divergences, without altering their clarity, without limiting the initiatives that the CGT can take on its own toward objectives which unity of action does not preempt, the CGT-CFDT agreement is a means of raising the struggle, of thwarting the antisocial policy of the right as well as all class-collaboration undertakings.

It is also a means of winning successes on demands, of scoring points, of imposing concessions whose value must not be minimized especially in this context of bitterness of struggle, in which even the least success inspires confidence in effectiveness of action.

Those who, mistaking their desire for reality, might have imagined that there could have been the least doubt among us as to the best way to rally the workers in struggle are in for some bitter disappointments.

11267
CSO: 3100

HEALTH OF PRIME MINISTER BARRE CAUSE FOR CONCERN

Paris LE POINT in French 22 Oct 79 p 72

[Article by Michele Cotta]

[Text] Simply unavailable for several days? Or did an occupational accident, a sudden increase in blood pressure, cause the suspension of Raymond Barre's activities for a period of 2 weeks or more? On Friday afternoon, when VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing] went to his prime minister's bedside, the examination was not yet complete. The verdict will come from Val-de-Grace doctors after their examinations are completed.

One thing is certain: when he left Hotel Matignon at 9:45 on Thursday morning, after seeing his personal physician, Raymond Barre's blood pressure was critical, requiring immediate hospitalization at any rate. According to those who saw him, Raymond Barre had been exhausted for several days. Hobbling along, he attended the ceremonies, receptions, luncheons and dinners for Chinese chairman Hua Guofeng: a knee ailment, he said, due to "a little fatigue," but which, in connection with high blood pressure, could lead to relatively troublesome vascular problems, according to doctors consulted by LE POINT. In any case, enough that he was given an infusion all day Thursday in his room in the fifth floor of Val-de-Grace military hospital. He was still there when his executive secretary came to visit him late in the evening to talk to him about current affairs, i.e., the confrontation between the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the government concerning the budget in the National Assembly.

It is the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic that an acting prime minister has been hospitalized, if only for several days. Physically and emotionally, however, the office of prime minister is probably the most exacting in the government. It is actually where all current matters converge. There is no factory closing, no movement of foreign exchange, no international confrontation, no European "summit" or domestic political debate which does not reach the offices of the prime minister or his executive secretary. On the other hand, only matters which are really a problem reach the Elysee Palace, after "screening" by the prime minister's office. Finally, there is no doubt that daily questioning of his government action since August--i.e., at the

end of the period which he set for bringing about France's economic recovery--has deeply affected him. Especially since a personal challenge has recently been added, in regard to the purchase of a parcel of land on the French riviera, judged untimely by some members of the press--which is something that could really cause blood pressure to shoot up.

It remains to be seen whether the prime minister will be able to return to his normal level of activity in the coming days. A Val-de-Grace communique stated late Friday evening that too rapid a resumption of work would be unwise. At a time when the RPR is joining with the opposition in parliament to oppose the tax schedule submitted by the minister of the budget and when political observers are thinking and writing that the government is in suspension and that its program is short of breath, Raymond Barre's illness--and the suspension of his activities if it should continue--will obviously reopen the inquiries concerning his possible replacement.

11915

CSO: 3100

ARMY CREATES RAPID-STRIKE FOREIGN INTERVENTION FORCES

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Nov 79 p 15

[Article by Jacques Isnard]

[Text] The French army plans to round out its foreign intervention forces with some special units to be known as Operational Assistance Detachments (DAO) and manned by professional soldiers, which would be kept on a combat-ready footing and called on as immediate reinforcements for action overseas.

With these new units now in the 11th paratroop division in the Southwest and in the 9th marine division in Brittany, the government will continue into 1980 its sweeping reorganization of the foreign intervention forces initially undertaken in 1979, and whose existence the prime minister's office categorically denied last June [LE MONDE, 8 June], when it said -- in the teeth of the evidence -- that "no new units are currently in position or even contemplated for intervention in any part of the world whatsoever."

The grand reorganization began to be visible with the approval by the cabinet on June 6 of this year of an airborne command group attached to the 11th paratroop division. This operational general staff, now being set up at Albi, will have permanent control of three of the paratroop regiments made up of professional soldiers: the 3rd marine paratroop regiment at Carcassonne, the 8th marine paratroop regiment at Castres, and the second legionnaire paratroop regiment at Calvi, the last of which took part in May 1978 in Operation Bonite" at Kolwezi in Zaire.

Since then, the reorganization now admitted even by the defense ministry plans to move in 1980 on creation of crack rapid-strike units.

According to information gathered from the army general staff, the DAO concept is still in the experimental stages. The goal remains, however, to set up five DAOs with the 11th paratroop division and three more with the 9th marine division, as revealed -- very discreetly -- in the budget documents officially delivered on Tuesday 6 November to members of parliament.

'A Big Unit at the Ready'

Including career cadres from these two major units, the detachments will have a twofold mission: to provide local cadre for French assistance and training missions at the request of the foreign countries which have signed defense agreements with Paris, and to take part in local reinforcement operations overseas. The DAOs will have a complement -- picked from among the ranks of career soldiers and selected by the command -- which will vary in size according to the operation. At most, according to the general staff, they should be a mobile detachment of less than platoon size, or some 30 highly disciplined career veterans.

Reorganization of the intervention forces will not stop with the DAOs. During the summer of 1980, something called the 31st armored and motorized half-brigade will be formed in the departement of Var (LE MONDE, 15 Sep): "a big unit at the ready at all times," to quote the defense ministry's description in the documents handed out to the Deputies. This unit, consisting of around 3,500 men, will include, in addition to command and support elements, the 21st marine regiment AMX-10 armored squadrons backed up with a battery of 155-mm motorized artillery and a Foreign Legion motorized infantry regiment equipped with front-armored vehicles (VABs). Now at the Sissonne camp in the Aisne, the 21st marines will be gradually transferred to Frejus (Var), moving into the quarters now occupied by the 4th marine regiment, which will go to Perpignan.

The 21st RIMA is on its way to becoming a 100-percent career unit made up of cadre on active service and of enlisted volunteers. This is one of the earmarks of this reorganization of the intervention forces. For all these overseas military actions, the doctrine now calls for units of veteran troops under the direct command of the president, since it would take an act of parliament to allow the government to commit these troops to combat operations abroad.

New Threats

It has also been learned that the 11th paratroop division is -- if we exclude the navy and air force commandos -- the first operational ground forces unit to get, beginning this year, the

new FAMAS 5.56 automatic rifle, plus training for both officers and non-coms in handling and use of the new weapon.

For a better idea of the real scope of the reorganization now under way in the French intervention forces, which the Elysee stubbornly refuses to admit is going on, we might add that, probably early next year, the foreign action forces will have their own Transall aircraft with special equipment which will enable them to get along without the American satellite communications channels they had to rely on during earlier operations in Africa, and to communicate directly with the high command centers.

Essentially, the rationale for this reorganization lies in an altered perception of threats in possible foreign theaters of operation. The general staff seems to have learned some lessons from past operations and it is apparently aware of the fact that actions from the past cannot be carried out as carbon copies in the present, because the military situation, particularly in Africa and in the Mediterranean basin, will in all likelihood keep on changing rapidly.

Specifically, the French army aims at working out a flexible system of forces whose mission would be simultaneously to contain enemy actions limited in time and space, and to train the armies of allied francophone countries to defend their own national security. The plans now in course of implementation seem to be responding to this twofold concern: to set up, well in advance of need, basic interbranch cells or teams, which would be constantly available to provide local reinforcement for units already engaged, and to create a grand strategic mobility package to cope with the steady upgrading of armor and artillery among the world's armed forces which might someday be confronting French intervention units which, thus far, have been equipped only with light weapons.

6182

CSO: 3100

COMMENTARY SCORES EANES FOR RECEIVING PLO'S ARAFAT

Libson A TARDE in Portuguese 3 Nov 79 p 5

[Article by Peixe Dias]

[Text] With commendable composure revealing exceptional courage, General (by self-elevation) Ramalho Eanes yesterday, unarmed, greeted armed terrorist, Yasser Arafat. Eanes thus became--so wrote the trusted DIARIO DE LISBOA-- "the first European head of state (and of NATO) to meet officially with the highest authority in the Palestine struggle." The euphemism in the renowned evening paper, which includes among its notable editors an overwhelming majority of Communist Party members, should be understood to mean, once it is translated from the Russian, "the person responsible for thousands of crimes, numerous defenseless victims of terrorism, among them hundreds of women and children. He must be held responsible for those downed airplanes, attacked civilian automobiles in Jerusalem, cowardly murdered Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games, etc. etc., in a wave of unparalleled terror, which no cause, no matter how just, no man, no matter how cruel, can understand and still less sanction," Ramalho Eanes, who as an officer in the Portuguese army in "Fascist times," was fighting terrorists and, perchance, killing them, has now turned around 180 degrees, the most complete rotation on the Euclidean scale, for he now receives armed terrorists while he himself is unarmed.

But this is understandable. We understand very well what is at the bottom of all this. Arafat, renowned leader of international terrorism, came to Lisbon at the initiative of the World Council of Peace--and the top-ranking person of said movement is no other than Mr Costa Gomes. Costa Gomes who was a member of the Salazar government, who was highly honored by the PIDE [International and State Defense Police], and who was commander-in-chief of the struggle against terrorism in Africa. The Africa which many Portuguese know very well, in its abandonment, cowardice, surrender and, alas, in their own flesh and blood. Costa Gomes and Melo Antunes, sent for Arafat, and, therefore, Eanes could not bring himself to go counter to the will of such distinguished hosts: one, who appointed him on 25 November and made him what he is today, the other, who advises him in the capacity of the eminent counselor.

It has come to my attention (which my eminent Belem "comrades," God forbid, have neither confirmed nor refuted) that the learned Revolutionary Council, of which Mr Eanes is chairman and in collusion with, held a very long-drawn out meeting which lasted well into early morning. And, in early morning hours, some councilors are highly adept, as, for example, the eminent navyman, Crespo, who for so many nights pursued a zigzag course in Mozambique waters to solve the touchy problem: Arafat, a cloth on his head and armed with a pistol, is going to visit Eanes--because he is the terrorist leader, because he has friends in the oil industry who can grant favors, give rebates, and he is a tough one, he is always armed, because he is a promoter of war and not a herald of peace--and, as he is armed, how is an unarmed president to receive him? And what if the Arab takes a shot at him? Shall we be without a president? No, never! And from the highly respected councilors came the profound advice: "O.K., he is going to be armed, and we are sending and surrounding him with four thugs equally armed, and the best there are, with an unerring aim, and with the assurance that, in the event of a gun fight, Belem will outshine Carson City in the good old days of Billy the Kid."

Now nothing amazes us. Eanes receiving the terrorist Arafat in Belem is simply the logical consequence of that nameless shame which they call "exemplary decolonization."

Even if the Arabs send us two or three oil tankers, as an alms; even if we have only enough oil drums to fill the cars for the president, the Revolutionary Council and the government; even if, even if...we must respect our own sense of personal pride!

Eanes is in office, alas, until 1981--3 years before Orwell's terrifying prophecy.

8870

CSO: 3101

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS RECONSIDERING PARTY LEADERSHIP AFTER ELECTIONS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 2 Nov 79 p 2

[Commentary by Axel Waldemarson]

I cannot oblige with a formula that guarantees success, but I can give you the recipe that leads to failure; it runs: Try to satisfy everybody!

--Herbert Bayard Swope

[Text] What shall the Social Democrats do?

That is a very timely question in Scandinavia.

In Norway the Labor Party seems to believe that a desertion of the party program which makes it possible to collaborate with some party of the center is the only refuge from the "conservative wind."

The party's chief ideolog--by which is meant the chairman of the program committee--Einar Førde--declared in a statement that for the sake of that the party should be ready "to put old warhorses in the stable."

Prime Minister Odvar Nordli agrees--but is not willing to give up his ideology for that reason, but instead means to use it as a weapon.

The whole thing is an excellent illustration of the Labor Party's dilemma. Is it really possible to give up the "hobbyhorses" that are the political expression of the party's ideology and at the same time keep the foundation intact?

Across Bloc Lines

The postelection debate is under way. On this side of the Kjölen, too, there are Social Democrats who--faced with the prospect of not being able to get a majority of their own--are talking more and more about a collaboration across the bloc lines.

The orthodox, the puritans of the party, shout for more socialism. The pragmatics, filled with desire for the center of power, the Government

Offices Building, are beginning to relish the old word "result politics."

But the Social Democratic problems are not so simple. The party's ever more binding ties to the union, to the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions], reduces the space for maneuver. At the same time a shift in the direction of the middle class is taking place within the union.

Next Largest

In Norway the Conservatives, with 15 percent of the LO members as sympathizers, constitute the second biggest workers' party. A third of the members--just as in Sweden--vote with a party other than the Social Democratic Party. A shift up toward 40 percent would create a new situation.

Paradoxically enough, it is the growing public sector that the Social Democrats are working for that increase the number of non-socialists in the LO!

The Critical Voices

Within the Swedish Social Democratic Party there are critical voices. There is probably a good deal in what the "low-income analyst" Per Holmberg wrote in an article in LO-TIDNINGEN:

"The cause of the SAP's [Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party's] lack of vitality is to be sought in the party itself. The recent election results may also be interpreted as meaning that Sweden's best-organized party has more potential than actual strength."

The famous election crew and election organization can, to be sure, coax tens of thousands of listeners to the election meetings, but that may still not be decisive.

In the Social Democratic Party there has always been a strong conviction of the importance of "work with the masses." Demonstrations of strength used to have a paralyzing effect on non-socialist election workers. They wondered whether it was worthwhile to oppose such strong forces.

Wrong Main Question

Throughout the 1970's, however, the irresistible strength of the Social Democratic Party has been something of a myth; during this decade it has been the non-socialist parties that succeeded in mobilizing their voters best.

Many election analysts--doubtless against the background of the party's "apparatus"--ask the wrong main question. It is always a matter of what is wrong with the Social Democratic Party, why, in spite of a favorable starting position, it could not regain power, and why, for example, the "oncoming generation" of Sweden has forsaken it.

From the Social Democratic point of view there cannot very well be anything wrong with the politics that Olof Palme presents. Based on the resolutions

of the 1978 party congress, as Social Democratic goods it must meet high requirements.

Wind Gave the Message

The relevant question, of course, is why the Conservatives won so big. It is not enough to say that they got voters from other non-socialist parties. The Social Democrats thought they also had chances of doing that.

It is a matter of a West European "conservative wind" that would have helped the Conservatives even if they had sat with their hands folded. All they had to do was passively reap what the wind had sown.

Instead, of course, the wind is an active phenomenon--the political message triggered the election campaign that gave the election wind such unusual strength.

Palme's Four Elections

During Olof Palme's chairmanship it has never been the opponents' merits or his own errors that affected the outcome of the elections.

Palme's four lost elections--this year's limited success is being regarded more and more as a defeat--is largely explained by only two things.

The first of them applies to the defeats of 1970 and 1973, which were turned into Social Democratic victories.

After a whole day's discussion with the central committee of the Social Democratic Party on 30 September 1970, the central committee adopted Olof Palme's statement about the outcome of the election as its own:

"The bourgeois parties had high expectations. They failed in their attempt to get a combined majority in the Riksdag. There is thus no basis for a bourgeois government. That is an incontestable result of the election."

Down 22 Seats

Another incontestable result is that the Social Democrats lost 22 seats and 200,000 voters.

Neither that nor the fact that the party lost its absolute majority in the Riksdag was mentioned.

After the election defeat in 1973 the party statement again was that "the bourgeois parties failed in their attempt to get a majority in the Riksdag and a consequent change of government..."

At the congress of the Woodworkers' Union, Palme made the following comment on the election that wiped out the S-VPK [Social Democratic Party and Left Party - Communist] majority in the Riksdag:

"If the election is not felt to be a victory for the labor movement, at least it is felt as a defeat for the bourgeois parties and as a victory for us..."

Harder in 1976

When the ruling power was lost in 1976, it was harder for Palme to explain the defeat. There was no "victory" as a Social Democratic minister left.

Instead, it was Thorbjörn Fälldin's "defection" on nuclear energy that robbed the Social Democrats of power.

In 1979 it was the Conservatives that won. The three-party government was revived. Again Palme had an explanation: Bohman was "bluffing" in the election campaign.

Old Pattern

Palme follows an old pattern when it is the bourgeois party that comes out winner. Bertil Ohlin got to experience that as the successful Liberal Party leader in the 1950's. In his book of memoirs, entitled "Socialistisk skördetid som kom bort" [The Socialist Harvest That Was Lost], Ohlin, who died last summer, wrote:

"As I pointed out earlier in speaking of the three election campaigns, it was found necessary to paint a distorted picture of the Liberal Party as lacking interest in social policy, doing the dirty work for high finance, and being unreliable on the neutrality policy."

In 1979 the Social Democrats got 64,000 fewer votes than in 1968--Palme took over after Erlander in 1969--in spite of the fact that the number voting had increased in the meantime by 620,000.

From time to time the Social Democratic Party has begun to wonder whether the fault is not to be found in its own leadership.

The columnist Macke Nilsson, in a contribution to AFTONBLADET (Social Democratic) Tuesday, writes:

"Before the disappointment assumes desperate manifestations, we must soberly, purposefully, and honestly begin to formulate what we should demand of the leadership of this popular movement. The consequence will be and must be that Olof Palme and his advisers will be offered other tasks."

8815

CSO: 3109

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SEEKING NEW STRATEGIES, THEMES FOR 1980'S

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Social Democratic Party in 1980's"]

[Text] Will the Social Democratic Party after the ordeals of the 1980's be the same party as today? And if not, how will it develop? Try to get ahead showing a pretty much liberal "people's home" profile, or show its Marxist heritage more conspicuously? Become bigger and perhaps in exclusive control again, or direct itself toward living with a non-socialist majority and so being forced to choose between being in the opposition and collaborating with somebody else?

The post-election debate has concerned coalition combinations and--still more important--social problems and ideas for solving them, often with a sympathetic desire to go to the root of them. There need not necessarily be a connection between the attitude toward the party's strategic plan ("bloc boundary" or not) and that toward the many different fields of practical politics. But still it is possible to discern a certain tendency as compared to previous post-election debates; there are more real Social Democrats today who are pleading for a different watershed in Swedish politics (like the motto "With the Center against the Conservatives"); there are also more who can conceive of abandoning a number of specifically socialistic features. Carl Johan Åberg mentions both the tax field and the "view of enterprise and capital formation," which may be taken as alluding to graduated income taxes, profit level, and Meidner funds. Similar but still more center-oriented views have been expressed by Björn von Sydow and Ulrich Herz. The latest issues of the party organ TIDEN are full of self-searching, some of it with new overtones. The question is what traces this may leave on the party's real profile and course of action.

As long as the Social Democratic Party had a majority position (either by itself or with the VPK [Left Party - Communists] or had one almost within reach, the party conceived of itself as one alternative and all the others as the antipole. The bloc boundary was much more popular and more emphasized among Social Democrats than among the non-socialists; that stood out unmistakably throughout the 1950's, 1960's, and the beginning of the 1970's.

A long-term shift in strength between the blocs, both in Sweden and in a number of similar countries, has caused the Social Democratic Party's fondness for polarization to soften up; even the election campaign furnished definite instances. But the party today is as diversified as a big and not authoritarian party must be. Some want to shut the door to the center and "turn the seven-barred lock, too" (the otherwise open-hearted Stig Malm of the Metalworkers' Union). Others, including the SSU [Swedish Social Democratic Youth Association] chairman, play along quite readily with "progressive bourgeois."

Behind this, as in the various shades of collaborators in the Liberal Party, there is a sincere groping for the most sensible possible policy and a certain amount of vote-maximizing tactics. The Conservatives are described in TIDEN's editorials as probably incapable of driving the parties of the center to "significant concessions in practical politics," but the climate of the debate seems negative. C.J. Åberg, on the other hand, talks from time to time about the Conservatives' "quite dominating rôle in Swedish politics." How that can be measured after only a few weeks in power and still fewer specific bills is hard to understand. Descriptions of reality are colored, of course, by the opinion-forming aim; on the one hand it is desired to bring about a split in the current coalition, and on the other to appear center-oriented and moderate (in the original meaning of the word-measured).

The Liberals and the Center should not object if the Social Democratic Party approaches the "center" on certain specific questions and in its general appearance. Still, they naturally feel exposed to increased competition. And any form of understanding between the Social Democratic Party and the Liberals and/or the Center could easily be pictured as if the latter had moved toward socialism, even though it was rather a question of giving in by the other side. This applies as long as the Social Democratic Party (together with the VPK) is as strong as it is in Sweden and the public has not yet, as it has in, for example, Denmark, West Germany, and The Netherlands, conceived the political center of gravity as definitively anchored in some sort of social liberalism. The 1980's may involve a period of non-socialist government with a gradual drift toward a so-called "Dano-German" situation. A different coalition pattern may be possible, of course, since the socialist parties can no longer put anything through unless at least the liberals are in agreement. Perhaps the post-election debate reflects such a presentiment among either pessimistic or liberally oriented Social Democrats.

Just where the "big difference in views in Swedish politics" is to be drawn is rather arbitrary; the choices are located on a continuous line "from right to left" and in several other dimensions. Indicating that the gulf between Conservatives and Center is deeper than that between Social Democrats and Center (or vice versa) tells more about how one wants it to be than about how it really is. Possibly there is an "objective" tendency for hard and decisive conflicts to take place near the 50-50 mark, and that is about where it has been for rather a long time.

The most interesting thing in the latest TIDEN is that several writers (particularly Anne-Marie Lindgren and Sven Hultström) that the party may have forgotten that "a feeling of responsibility is not created simply by paying a fairly anonymous tax," but demands a chance of more personal choices. There is an increased understanding here for center sympathies in the big towns and big cities and liberal ideas of reasoning more in individual terms than in group terms.

Sociopolitical involvement, especially in regard to drug, alcohol, and other deviational phenomena, is also tangible and can certainly constitute a bridge over the bloc lines. "Maybe it is time to start making demands of people?" Sven Hultström wonders. Surely no Swedish party will change radically in the 1980's, but the problems will be so different and difficult that every party should thankfully note points of contact with others wherever they are to be found. It would be splendid if the many good people in the Social Democratic Party could manage to do some good without being strong enough to make the decisions alone.

8815

CSO: 3109

GOVERNMENT LEADERS PREPARING NEW MOVES TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Nov 79 p 6

[Article by Lars Ramklint and Bjorn Anders Olson]

[Text] The government is sending out warning signals thick and fast. These indicate new thinking on how to handle the difficult economic situation.

Government experts have figured that the rapid rise in public spending threatens to use up the entire gross national income.

The new tones heard from Bohman, Ullsten and Falldin on Monday will be felt by the Swedish people as soon as next year in the form of more expensive food and higher rents.

Food and Rents Up, Taxes Down

"A reduction of total tax burdens would lead to a better society." So said Budget Minister Ingemar Mundebo in an interview on TV 2's "Monday Report."

Earlier Mundebo had not promised a reduction of the total tax burden, just a reduction of the tax rate on increased income. The deficit in the state budget is expected to be 50 billion kronor and must be sharply reduced, which can only be done by keeping the rate of increase of public spending down. Tax increases would lower industrial competitiveness and increase inflation.

"I believe that people will demand that politicians lower the tax burden over the next few years," said Mundebo. "I believe the people will find that a balanced economy, a lower inflation and a moderate tax burden benefit everybody."

Mundebo had earlier spoken in favor of a 50 percent tax rate for most incomes.

On Sunday the Social Democratic economic expert, Carl Johan Aberg, said that he also favored changing tax policy to a 50 percent marginal tax rate for most workers, with a rate of 75 percent for those receiving higher incomes.

Mundebo said: "During the 3 years I spent as budget minister my goal was to get down to a marginal tax rate of 50 percent for most wage earners. I now hope it will be easier to get parliament to go along with reducing marginal taxes since the Social Democrats have decided to lend their support."

Devastating

"I also hope we will get support for an inflation hedge in tax rate schedules. It is the combination of a high inflation rate and high marginal taxes that is so devastating."

But it will take a number of years to reduce the tax rate to 50 percent, Mundebo said. He stressed that the tax rate must also decline for higher incomes. Marginal tax rates of 90 percent are unreasonable.

Ola Ullsten: All Assistance to be Reviewed

"We must review the assistance system in all sectors." So said Liberal Party leader Ola Ullsten in a radio broadcast on Monday. A review of food and housing subsidies is particularly urgent.

"We can debate the justification of paying as much in food subsidies to fairly well-nourished Swedes as we pay in aid to developing nations. With regard to housing subsidies we should make sure that the subsidies we do have benefit those who are really in need. Unfortunately a lot of cheating is going on here," Ullsten said.

Weakened

The Social Democratic economic spokesman in parliament, Kjell-Olof Feldt, wants to bring about an economic debate in parliament this fall, since the market outlook is deteriorating.

In an interpellation to Bohman, Feldt wanted to know why the government was not presenting any bills dealing with economic policy this fall. Feldt also wanted to know what the government said to labor market factions on the economic situation and what plans the government had for dealing with economic policy.

According to Feldt the international market outlook has weakened considerably. The rate of inflation has climbed and it appears that the foreign trade deficit in 1979 will be 10 billion kronor larger than parliament counted on in the spring. Obvious crisis symptoms have hit the home construction sector.

Gosta Bohman: Lower Branch Subsidies

"To restore its balance with the rest of the world Sweden would need 90,000 new industrial jobs, strictly speaking. That kind of production increase is what is needed to pay the rising oil bills," said Economy Minister Gosta Bohman at the Tetra Days celebration in Lund.

"The excess cost for Sweden is around 8 billion kronor a year. It will take a much tighter policy than we were counting on earlier to handle the growing balance of payments deficit," said Bohman. "To achieve balance with other countries investments must increase along with industrial employment opportunities and in order to get increased investments, business profitability must be improved."

New Figures

Bohman presented an 11-point program calling for increased mobility for both labor and capital. He wanted to hurry up structural changes and reduce state support subsidies to branches and individual firms.

Bohman greeted with satisfaction the statements by his government colleagues, Falldin and Ullsten, that the expansion of public spending must be checked. Bohman explained that new figures had been presented by the government secretariat showing that if no steps were taken the public sector in 1990 would swallow up the entire Swedish gross national income.

Bohman assumed that the three-party government would not raise food subsidies for the time being in connection with preparing the new price contract with farmers. He pointed out that the former three-party government had a more cautious attitude toward such general subsidies and felt the same should be true now as well.

Thorbjorn Falldin: No Higher Living Standard

The government has adjusted the tax scales presented this fall in the election campaign by the Center and Liberal parties. Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin revealed this at the congress of the State Civil Servants Union, meeting in Stockholm on Monday.

The government took note of the views presented by the labor market groups, the prime minister said.

"The proposal to lower the marginal tax rate for 1980 is based on the income situation in which the large groups of full-time workers find themselves," he said.

Thorbjorn Falldin rejected any suggestion that the government would allow some space for wage increases next year.

On the contrary, he urged self-restraint on the part of the state, communities, businesses and wage earners.

"In terms of wages workers must show a restraint that is consistent with improved international competitiveness and they must exhibit solidarity with the weaker groups in our society."

According to the prime minister businesses have not accepted their responsibility to increase exports. Instead they have raised prices too quickly, in his view.

Thorbjorn Falldin was very concerned with the need to improve our international competitiveness.

"Better conditions must be created for improving sales of our export products, there must be more investments in an expanded production apparatus and more people must have jobs.

"To make this possible restraint must be shown with regard to private consumption as well as social spending on new measures."

To a large extent the prime minister blames the problems faced by Swedish business today and tomorrow, problems that affect everyone in Sweden, on rising oil prices.

"Our exports must rise or our imports decline by 2000 to 3000 kronor per working Swede per year if we are to avoid borrowing to pay for our current consumption of imported products, aid to developing countries and vacation travel."

The prime minister also said that after the oil crisis of 1973-74 we had gained some experience with respect to meeting a new crisis. According to Thorbjorn Falldin we can neither starve ourselves or consume ourselves out of a crisis.

He did not present any real remedy as an alternative but pointed out that tendencies in other countries indicate a revaluation--an increase in the value of currencies.

6578

CSO: 3109

FÄLLDIN SEEKING TO HOLD LINE ON TAXES, SPENDING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Nov 79 p 5

[Article by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] "The present system in which the citizens are constantly swapping money with the public must be changed. It is better for people to be allowed to keep a bigger part of their income than first to pay taxes and then get part of it back in the form of contributions from the state."

So said Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin in a speech to the Stockholm Center Party Saturday [10 November]. About 200 party activists had gathered for a postelection discussion in the Högloft on the city wall. Besides Fälldin, the Center Party members listening and injecting remarks included Olof Johansson, minister of wages, and Karin Andersson, minister for immigrant affairs and equality.

With the Center's trefoil emblem and two green flags as decoration--in addition to the heavy Old Norse items that the city wall premises offer in the form of reindeer and elk horns--a serious Center Party leader pointed out that the next few years will not be "any bed of roses in the field of economic policy."

Not Conservative Policy

After having first made it clear that the government is not a "conservative government" and that the government's policy is not a "conservative policy," as the Social Democrats are claiming, Fälldin elucidated the development of public spending. That set of problems was one of the Conservatives' favorite subjects in the election campaign. For 15 years public expenditures have increased an average of 6.8 percent a year, and now amount to 65 percent of the gross national product, or GNP.

But at a press conference later, Fälldin pointed out that he had not talked in the Conservatives' terms--about the "economic roundabout" that consists of our paying taxes and then getting part of the tax money back in the form of various contributions.

"Even if we only count on an increase of 6 percent in the future, it will not take long for the public spending to be as big as all the income taken in. Then we will not get to keep any of our earnings."

Doling Out Scraps

"Then, figuratively speaking, we will begin to dole out scraps. Obviously that must not happen. The system of taxes and spending with contributions and compensation is important from the distribution point of view," said Fälldin.

The Center Party leader declared repeatedly, however, and at the press conference, too, that the low-income people will not be hit. Old-age pensioners, the sick and handicapped, and families with children must get their part.

In his speech Fälldin did not go into what benefits are in the danger zone. At the press conference he did say that the "general housing subsidies" will be restricted. But not the socially conditioned--income-tested--housing benefits. When pressed in several fields Fälldin also indicated that various supplementary pensions may not be so much a matter of course in the future.

Fälldin also made it clear to the Center Party activists that the difficult economic situation--we are on the way down into a slump again--does not permit any reduction in taxes. He pointed out that the deficit in the state budget is 50 billion kronor. There is no way to get rid of that right away, he said, either by raising taxes or by reducing expenditures.

Fight Against Nuclear Power

The Center Party leader also, at the beginning of his speech, tried to rouse his party comrades to concentrate every effort on winning the Swedish people for the no alternative in the coming plebiscite.

"More and more people are realizing that nuclear power must not enter into the future energy policy."

Fälldin pointed out that nuclear power and nuclear weapons are "Siamese twins," and that an increasing international public opinion is beginning to realize that. Nuclear energy is by no means as cheap as has been believed hitherto. The American power companies have begun to realize that nuclear power is not at all the "good business" they had believed it to be at first.

And the Harrisburg report shows clearly that nuclear power makes great demands on both people and technology that are hard to meet.

"It presupposes unerring people," Fälldin stated.

In the question period following the speech, Andreas Carlgren, district chairman of the youth federation, CUF, expressed the hope that the plebiscite

will be the thing that turns the Center Party's downward trend into an upward trend. As the ATP [general supplementary pension] plebiscite was for the Social Democrats, who in 1956 had an election defeat behind them. Then came success.

8815

CSO: 3109

SODER TO RESIGN PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE BOARD CHAIRMANSHIP

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Nov 79 p 8

[Text] The leadership of the Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) should be restructured in order to meet reasonable requirements of rotation and renewal. To counteract rigidity, for example, the head of the institute and its board members should not remain in office longer than 10 years.

This criticism comes from former Defense Minister Sven Andersson (Social Democrat) who studied the SIPRI organization at the request of the government.

Among other things it has been proposed that the present chief of SIPRI, Frank Barnaby, resign in 1981 when his appointment expires.

A number of proposals in the report emphasize the need for democratization of the institute. A research group was proposed to balance the power of the board to some extent. For the same reason the report suggests strengthening the position of the assistant director.

Sven Andersson did not find that the independence of the institute was threatened by Swedish labor market security laws.

His report was the direct reason why Social Minister Karin Soder (Center), chairman of the board, left Tuesday's board meeting after member Gunnar Myrdal criticized her.

The board met to issue a statement on Sven Andersson's report. Myrdal was opposed to the participation of Karin Soder, as a member of the government, in this work.

"Since I share Myrdal's views in principle, I left the meeting," said Karin Soder. And she is thinking of resigning from the board.

"When I became a cabinet minister a month ago I informed Ola Ullsten that the SIPRI job was incompatible with my post in the government.

"I promised to stay long enough to allow them to find a new chairman--and the search is underway," said Karin Soder.

6578

CSO: 3109

NAVY CHIEF SAYS BUDGET UNDERMINING DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] Some parts of Sweden cannot be defended in an acceptable fashion by the Navy. The reason is the "austerity policy" pursued in recent years, the chief of the Swedish Navy, Admiral Per Rudberg, wrote in his annual report which he presented to the government on Wednesday.

Over the last 20 years Navy requests have been cut and now Per Rudberg writes:

"The military organization has been eroded even though new and efficient equipment is being added."

During the last budget year the Navy rationalized and made savings in order to keep within the given economic limits and for the first time in several years it succeeded in this effort.

But because of this it was not possible to acquire new materiel the Navy wanted to maintain efficiency.

"If this continues certain areas of the country cannot be defended well and the development involves an imbalance in total defense."

But during this year the Navy has acquired new coastal artillery batteries and three submarines in the "Nacken" series and now they will also renovate and re-equip older ships, batteries, supplies and other things.

The Navy also participated in the oil clean-up in the Stockholm archipelago this spring which cost 6.6 million kronor and meant the loss of 2 weeks of training.

"But this was offset by the fact that the units worked under field conditions and the noncommissioned officers received good training in exercising leadership."

Despite all the negative aspects the chief of the Navy concluded his report by saying that things were better this year than they were the year before.

VOLVO CONTRACTS TO IMPROVE BUS TRANSIT SYSTEM IN LAHORE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Nov 79 p 27

[Text] Volvo will build up mass transit in a city of 3 million, Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city. Volvo International Development, Inc. has signed a 5-year contract with the firm responsible for bus transportation in Lahore. In the first stage the contract is worth 50 million kronor.

Pakistan is financing the investment in mass transit with the help of so-called uncommitted assistance from SIDA [Swedish Industrial Development Agency].

In addition to a large number of buses the contract includes the entire planning and organization of mass transit in the city which has very complicated traffic conditions.

They will also build up a service apparatus for the vehicles and--in cooperation with a coach manufacturer--local production of bus coaches.

"The contract is an example of Volvo's total transportation solutions, of special importance in developing countries," said Bertil Bengtsson, executive director of Volvo International Development.

"While other manufacturers offer only hardware--coaches and spare parts--we provide a total solution. We start by studying needs and then plan out routes, service frequency, design of bus stops, printing of route schedules, and so forth."

"The education and training of personnel for administration, driving and service are also important," said Bo Magnusson of Volvo who headed the Pakistan delegation.

In the first stage, lasting about a year, 300 bus chassis components will be delivered from the Borås factory. After that the buses will be assembled in Pakistan.

"Today Lahore has around 600 buses but half of them are always in for repairs," Sven Wassberg of Volvo International told DAGENS NYHETER. "A city the size of Lahore needs around 1500 buses. So the need will not be filled by the first year's deliveries. We estimate there will be about 100 buses per year after 1980."

"One of the new moves to be used in Lahore is to use mass transit as a tool in guiding urban development," said Bertil Bengtsson.

"The conventional procedure has been to study everything for years first and then make decisions on what should be done. Our model calls for making studies in stages.

"The project that has just been started should produce changes for the better that Lahore residents will be able to note as early as 1980," Bertil Bengtsson said.

6578

CSO: 3109

SOCIALISTS CONSIDER SUCCESSOR TO DONZE

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 13 Nov 79 p 15

[Article by Francoise Buffat: "In the Socialist Party, Willy Donze's Succession Is Open"]

[Text] Within the socialist party the way is open for the successor of Willy Donze. Not that Donze has announced his resignation, but he has so frequently mentioned the possibility, because of the weariness his two mandates cause him, that certain people are convinced he will resign from the Council of State before the end of the Fall 1981 legislative session. "Not before the national elections," he at first insisted, not wishing to lose the substance for the shadow, "when my bills on charitable institutions and medical aid will have weathered their way through the Great Council," he declared recently. The work sessions of the parliamentary commission which is considering these bills are nearly finished, and they could be presented before the plenary session by next spring. Thus the possibility of an interim election may not be excluded.

He has several "papabili," including Christian Grobet and Claude Ketterer

Therefore the socialist party has two important decisions to make: it must choose a candidate, and it must decide whether it would be advisable to change the departments it controls. Jacques Vernet has at one time or other let it be understood that he could be tempted by the department of Health and Social Preparedness. Officially there is no candidate, but certain people are already maneuvering. Thus the favorite of the Great Council, Christian Grobet, has changed his tone: watching his language and tempering his trenchancy, he has already assumed what might almost be called a governmental bearing! As a discerning politician and a hard worker, moreover, he obviously has the range of ideas of a future state councillor; and even if within his own party he has the reputation of being a loner, difficult to deal with (he rarely goes out for a drink!), his

good points are recognized. Then, too, he will play the role of spoilsport within the present Council of State, a role that cannot but please the socialist party, for it deplors the fact that sometimes camaraderie appears to be of more value than political choices.

Another serious contender is the administrative councillor, Claude Ketterer. For the 11 years that he has served as director of the real estate board of the city of Geneva, he has given proof of his administrative talents. Claude Ketterer has other assets, too: he is a moderate socialist, of the same stamp as Willy Donze, in addition to which--and this weighs heavily with Genevans--he has long been active in church affairs. And like Willy Donze, he has often been at odds with the favorite sons of his party, but nothing has ever shaken his self-possession.

Other names are being bandied about. First, that of Emilio Luisoni, one of the master thinkers of the Genevan socialists. He was a good deputy, but resigned from the Great Council because the demands of his architectural career summoned him abroad too frequently. Yet those who know him well cannot see him fitting comfortably into an executive position, for he is said to be overly emotional. There is also talk of Pierre Schmid, the secretary-general of the FTMH [expansion unknown]; and of Armand Bruhlart, a deputy and head of the city's architectural commission; and even of Albert Knechtli, who was an outstanding president of the municipal council of Geneva, a body of which he has remained one of the leading lights. But on many occasions he has declared that even though communal affairs fascinate him, he has no liking for canton politics. Thus he has officially announced his candidacy for the administrative council of the city, if Claude Ketterer should decide to leave that post.

What will the future socialist ticket be like?

It has also been claimed that Willy Donze would resign from the Council of State only if his designated successor were satisfactory to him. Which of the above has his favor? The old lion simply replies: "It is my party that will make that decision." And this is quite likely, since his party must also take into account the eventual replacement of Andre Chavanne. The future socialist team will have to cover the whole range of party tendencies. That is why a Grobet/Ketterer ticket seems more likely than a Grobet/Luisoni ticket, since both the latter are products of the same turbulent socialist youth groups.

One of the concerns of the socialist party was to avoid having to replace both its state councillors at the same time. Now

what should happen? Andre Chavanne, who people thought was serving his last term in the legislature, lets it be known that he will once again be a candidate. Since his resignation from the National Council, his governmental mandate has filled his whole life--to the point where people see him working in his office on Saturdays and even Sundays. And then, Andre Chavanne might have another reason for staying in the legislature: namely to hold on to his post while Marie-Laure Francois, his new secretary-general, becomes experienced enough to be able to aspire to the State Council.

Finally, as far as the choice of departments is concerned, certain socialists believe that it is a mistake to keep for too long a time those who call for the greatest expenditures. They are also convinced that they have staked such a solid claim in Public Instruction and Health that it will henceforth be impossible to withdraw their claim markers; but for socialism to make any progress in Geneva, it would be best for it to be able to prove itself in other departments. In any general reordering of positions, he who has two posts to offer has more chances of obtaining what he desires than he who has only one. For all these reasons, although the succession to the post now held by Willy Donze seems to be open, it is not at all certain that he will resign from it before 1981.

8117

CSO: 3100

ARMY KEEPS STEEL PLANT RUNNING

Madras THE HINDU in English 26 Nov 79 p 8

[Text]

According to economics textbooks there are three factors of production: labour, capital and land. At the Soviet-built iron and steel plant, Isdemir, 15 km east of Iskenderun there is a fourth: the Turkish army.

A battalion of crack commandos is encamped on the complex, which stretches inland from the Mediterranean to a bare mountain range. Their duty is to deter extreme Rightwing workers, who are in a majority, from disrupting work, sabotaging equipment or persecuting Left-wing workers.

This peculiar arrangement offers a remarkable insight into the hazards of operating a public sector enterprise in a country which is in a state of political and economic ferment.

"The soldiers contribute to production as much as I or anybody else," says Mr. Aykut Deren the Isdemir director, a 43-year-old economist. "Everybody here is either Left- or Right-wing. You hire a new engineer—before he learns his way around the plant he is running round organising demonstrations. Get the army put out of here and you will have more blood flowing than iron."

The same is more or less true of the whole country. In the 20 months that the Prime Minister, Mr. Bulent Ecevit held power, over 1,500 people lost their lives in assassinations,

riots and massacres involving extreme Left- and Right-wing factions. Half of the population of 45 million lives under martial law.

Mr. Ecevit's predecessor, Mr. Suleyman Demirel, has again now become the Prime Minister. Under Mr. Demirel politics entered the plant before any product came out. He opened it before it was ready, as an investment for the 1977 general election: in a country where unemployment is well over 20 per cent, jobs mean votes.

Mr. Demirel and his coalition partners subsequently used Isdemir and the other state economic enterprises (SEEs)—State owned factories and utilities—to employ their more militant supporters. Already grossly over-staffed, the SEEs were forced to take on thousands more workers, to the point where Turkish bankers derisively call them State employment agencies.

The SEEs are taking out more than they are putting in to the economy, and represent one of the country's worst industrial problems. Conceived during the birth of the Turkish Republic 55 years ago when private capital was weak, these companies now account for half of total industrial output, manufacturing a vast range of products from shoes to cement.

But because of mismanagement, overstaffing and virtually



every single inefficiency known to industrial man, almost all of them incur vast losses. They stay afloat thanks to huge treasury support, which through deficit financing fans the flames of runaway inflation.

At Isdemir more than 6,000 workers were taken on when it "opened." Most were said to be supporters of Mr. Alparslan Turkes, the leader of the ultra-Right-wing Nationalist Action Party (NAP), from Iskenderun, a seaside town of 200,000 founded by Alexander the Great.

The Soviet Union, which is one of Turkey's biggest suppliers of project credit, had hoped that Isdemir would be a showcase for the Third World, particularly the West Asia. Its starting capacity of 1m tons a year was eventually to be increased to 8m tons a year, making it one of Moscow's biggest overseas projects.

The Russians were in for a surprise. In four years Isdemir changed 12 managers. The blueprints foresaw a workforce of 8,000 at 1m tons a year output. But with production at under a quarter of this, the plant employed 18,000. One Isdemir director who was asked by a Demirel minister to take on more workers is said to have replied: "Sure, but to put more workers in I'll have to start taking the machinery out."

Russian technology at Isdemir has been criticised as being crude and outdated. But Mr. Deren says that it is ideal for the country at its current level of development.

Three hundred Russian engineers at Isdemir are trying to make a success of the plant, which was supposed to have met a third of the country's iron and steel requirements. The large shortfall is a severe loss for Turkey, where there is a chronic shortage and a black

market in iron and steel products. Imports in 1978 amounted to over \$400m. Over the past five years demand has grown by 15 per cent and supply by 8 per cent. Governments could realise less than half of planned investments. Consequently, in 1978 only one-third of the 4.7m tons of iron and steel used was locally produced.

Mr. Deren assumed the management of the Isdemir complex a year ago with a salary of 11,000 Turkish lira (about Rs. 1,750) — another aberration of the State economic enterprises which pay workers more than managers.

He seems to have done an excellent job, despite having to pack a pistol because of all the threats he has received. The work force is now 18,000, and capacity utilisation this year is double last year's. Given an uninterrupted flow of raw materials, the complex will run at 80 per cent capacity.

But there are still great problems. The plant uses domestic iron ore but imports 60 per cent of its coke. There are transport problems for the ore and foreign currency problems for coke. Power cuts, a national menace, are also affecting Isdemir's production. Under even the most ideal conditions overstaffing will help cause a loss of at least 1.5 billion Turkish lira (Rs. 238 crores) this year, despite prices being 30 per cent above world levels—By arrangement with Financial Times.

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